Case Law Updates

Federal Court (Full Court): In Chung, FCA held that visa refusal notification under s 66 was no decision for the purpose of s 476. That led FCA to hold in BYN18 that a s 501CA(3)(a) notice was no decision for that purpose. Was BYN18 wrongly decided? If so, could Chung be revisited? In SZQDZ, FCAFC held that decision of an IMR was not a “migration decision” for the purpose of ss 476 / 477. HCA then held in SZSSJ that an ITOA was a “migration decision” for that purpose. Did SZSSJ impliedly overrule SZQDZ, as FCA held in EKU17? Is obligation under s 501CA(3) discharged if non-citizen does not have capacity to understand notification & invitation purportedly issued under it? Are there implications to or from DFQ17?

Federal Court (Full Court). Direction No 53 set out the factors decision-makers should take into account in determining whether a student visa satisfied the Genuine Temporary Entrant (GTE) requirement. Are decision-makers required to consider all of those factors and make findings about them in circumstances where the applicant does not place reliance on any of those factors? Does the same answer apply to the current direction, namely Direction No 69?

Federal Court. A person fails the character test under s 501(6)(h) if "an Interpol notice in relation to the person, from which it is reasonable to infer that the person would present a risk to the Australian community or a segment of that community, is in force". Interpol issued a notice (IRN) in relation to the Applicant. Was it open to the Minister to draw the inference in s 501(6)(h) from the IRN? In determining whether it was open to the Minister to draw the inference in s 501(6)(h) from the IRN, could regard "be had to the regulatory regime under which Interpol notices are issued"? For the purposes of s 501(6)(h), was the Minister confined to an examination of the IRN?

Federal Court held: leaving aside s 196, it is necessary for officers to hold a reasonable suspicion throughout the period of a detainee’s detention under s 189; the reasonable suspicion must be held by the detaining officer; the tasks of the immigration detention centre case managers in this case fell short of what is required for it to be said that they are detaining a person under s 189; the construction of s 196(4) involve reading it as if the words “if the person is detained as a result of the cancellation of his or her visa” read “if the person is on an ongoing continuous basis detained lawfully under s 189 as a result of the cancellation of his or her visa”; and despite the fact that, had the Applicant not been unlawfully detained, he should have been lawfully detained anyway, the Applicant was awarded exemplary damages.

Federal Court. Cl 8(3) of Direction 79 provides: "Both primary and other considerations may weigh in favour of, or against, refusal, cancellation of the visa, or whether or not to revoke a mandatory cancellation of a visa". Must decision-makers make express findings on each of those considerations? When considering under cl 14.5 the extent of impediments if Applicant were removed, AAT found it "appropriate to afford the expectations of the Australian community moderate weight in favour of non-revocation", which expectations had already been considered. Was AAT allowed to double-count those expectations?

Federal Court. Court ordered that Minister cease to detain the applicant at the Melbourne Immigration Transit Accommodation centre (MITA) due to the risk of covid-19 entering the MITA and then infecting the applicant. In practical terms, this means Minister will need to place applicant at a different detention centre.

Federal Court (Full Court). If a decision-maker disbelieves a person on one matter, can it be said that that disbelief might be carried over to affect the decision-maker's disbelief in other matters? If so and if it is established that belief of a person's credibility on one matter was erroneously based, can it be said, in the context of assessing the materiality of an error, that that might convince the decision-maker of the need to revisit its conclusions on other matters?

Federal Court. Subsection 196(4) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) read: "if the person is detained as a result of the cancellation of his or her visa under section 501, 501A, 501B, 501BA or 501F, the detention is to continue unless a court finally determines that the detention is unlawful, or that the person detained is not an unlawful non‑citizen". DHA cancelled Applicant's BVA under s 501(3A) and then refused to grant him a protection visa. Was he detained "as a result of the cancellation" of his visa or rather as a result of the visa refusal? Did FCA have power under s 23 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) to order his release on an interlocutory basis on the basis that s 196(1) of the Migration Act is not inconsistent with s 23?

Federal Court. Does the term 'before the Minister' in s 473DC(1)(a) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) refer to documents or information to which the delegate has had regard? Is it "necessary for a document or information to be physically before the Minister’s delegate or for the delegate to have had regard to it on the very day the decision is made for it to be said that the document or information was before the Minister when the Minister’s delegate made the decision under s 65"?

Federal Court (Full Court). Does s 473CB(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) require the Secretary to give the IAA the media or record in which information is stored or located, as opposed to the information itself? Should an obligation to "create a permanent record of information given to the delegate by a visa applicant" be implied into Division 3 of Part 2 and into the "review on the papers" mechanism created by Part 7AA of Act?