Case Law Updates

Federal Court. In an application for an extension of time within which to appeal, should the merits of the appeal be approached at a "reasonably impressionistic" level? Or should the merits of the appeal rather be assessed in a "rough and ready way"? In determining whether to grant leave to rely upon a ground not raised before the primary judge, is it relevant that the grant would "[deprive] the respondent of a right to appeal in respect of the consideration of the issue because any further appeal is only available with leave"?

Federal Court. Gleeson CJ and Gummow J held in Jia Legeng that an allegation of actual bias must be "distinctly made and clearly proved". Does the same principle apply to an allegation of apprehended bias? Is the IAA required to "give notice of its receipt of a reference of a fast track reviewable decision or state that it would review the decision within a certain period of time"? Is the IAA authorised to make a decision at any time after a decision has been referred to it?

Federal Court (Full Court). One of the judges of the Full Court had appeared as the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions in a conviction appeal on a point of law involving the non-citizen in question. The non-citizen's representative applied for that judge to recuse himself from hearing the appeal from an FCA decision dismissing a judicial review application.

Federal Court. Can it be said that the proposed additional ground of review amounted to "an allegation of fraud on the part of the Minister and was to the effect that the reasons of the Minister were a sham and were not in fact the reasons of the Minister at all"? Should the proposed interrogatory be administered?

Federal Court. Can it be said that "the generally serious consequences of refoulement – but not the particular consequences in an individual case – are taken into account in giving meaning and content to the requirement that there be “serious reasons for considering”" pursuant to s 5H(2)(a) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth)? How to interpret Articles 22(1) and 25(3)(c)-(d) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, entered into force 1 July 2002?

Federal Court. While the AAT was required to treat offending of the type described under cl 13.1.1(1)(a)-(b) of Direction 79 as “very serious”, did it remain for it to allocate weight in respect of such offending relative to all other relevant considerations under s 501CA(4)(b)(ii) of the Migration Act? Are cl 13.1.1(1)(b) and (d) ultra vires s 499 of the Act to the extent that they "required the Tribunal to proceed upon the basis that crimes of a violent nature against women or children are to viewed very seriously, regardless of the sentence imposed"?

Federal Court (Full Court). Does it follow from the failure to reference certiorari in s 39B of the Judiciary Act, that [the Federal Court] lacks jurisdiction to grant relief of that character, the effect of which is to quash an impugned decision"? Can it be said that the Federal Court "has jurisdiction (not by way of an appeal regularly brought) to review decisions made by its judges"?

Federal Court. Did the failure of the applicant to point out the defeasibility, pursuant to s 36(3) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), of his right to enter the Republic of South Africa (RSA) "obviate the obligation on the decision-maker to make a finding of fact on the materials before it that such a right was currently in existence and not immediately defeasible on return to the RSA"?

Federal Court. Section 36(1C)(b) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) referred to a protection visa applicant being "a danger to the Australian community"? Must the nature of the danger "be one to the safety and wellbeing of the Australian community at large, in general or as a whole, rather than to “one or more members”"? If the delegate's protection visa refusal was made before s 36A was added, did this provision apply to the AAT?

Federal Court. Was the question under the definition of “serious Australian offence” whether the particular offence is “punishable by” a certain term of imprisonment, instead of whether the offender was capable of being so punished? Was the definition of “particularly serious crime” in s 5M of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) limited to a “serious Australian offence” or a “serious foreign offence”?