Appeal: is notification under s 501CA(3) a decision?

Federal Court (Full Court). FCA held that a notification under s 501CA(3) of a decision is not a decision. That judgement was appealed to FCAFC. Does a privative clause decision include the making of a determination of an administrative character? If so, does s 501CA(3) require the Minister to make an administrative determination as to the way in which he or she considers the written notice required by the provision is to be given to the person concerned, thus making a notification under that provision a privative clause decision and enlivening FCCA's jurisdiction? If so, does FCCA have jurisdiction to determine whether a determination was made by a person duly authorised by the Minister? Does a notification purportedly sent under s 501CA(3) by a person to whom the power to notify had not been delegated under s 496(1), have legal effect?

Courts permitted to engage in merits review?

It is often asserted that courts are not allowed to engage in merits review of administrative decisions. However, according to this Federal Court decision, there are circumstances where courts are allowed to do so. Further, can a 'court ... review an administrative decision for unreasonableness based on a finding of fact, short of there being “no evidence” for the finding'?

Sub 820/801: what happens if DHA resends refusal letter

Federal Court: when a person makes an application for visa subclasses 820 & 801 at the same time & place, does it require a  single decision or one decision for each subclass? If the decision record does not expressly refer to subclass 801, can it in some circumstances nevertheless, in substance, include that subclass? Can the Department resend a refusal notification letter for subclass 801? If so, does that enliven the Tribunal's power to review subclasses 820 and/or 801 once again?

Unreasonable not to give IAA other material under s 473CB(1)(C)?

Federal Court: Secretary must give IAA "any other material that ... is considered by the Secretary ... to be relevant to the review": s 473CB(1)(C). On judicial review, should the Secretary's subjective view on whether other material should be given to the IAA be determinative? If so, is that a question of fact? If so, who bears the onus of proving it? Secretary required to give reasons for "decision" on relevance? If not, does that make it difficult to prove that Secretary's "decision" was legally reasonable?

MARA: “creation of companies … for immigration outcomes”

OMARA's decision summary: "the Agent was complicit in fraudulent conduct in the creation of companies that the Agent knew, or should have reasonably known, were not lawfully operating in Australia but were registered for the purposes of obtaining immigration outcomes for his clients for which they were not genuinely entitled".

Appeal by consent dependent on court’s satisfaction?

Federal Court (Full Court). Is the power to allow an appeal by consent under s 25(2B)(b) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) dependent upon the identification, to the satisfaction of the Court, of arguable appellable error in the decision below?

Appeal: member of the Australian community?

Federal Court (Full Court). The Minister found that child pornography offences for which the Appellant was convicted were "offences against vulnerable member of the community". Was the Minister referring to members of the Australian community, despite the fact the location of the children involved was unknown? Was Dunn v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 489 wrongly decided?

Time of lifting the bar or TOA?

Federal Court. Applicant was an unauthorised maritime arrival (UMA) and thus s 46A barred. In July 2017, Minister made determination that bar be lifted for TPV or SHEV if: a) a similar determination had been made relating to UMA's parent; and b) any application by the parent was made by 1 Oct 2017; and c) that application has not been refused and finally determined. When July 2017 Determination was made, Applicant's mother satisfied criteria (a) to (c). In Sep 2019, Applicant applied for SHEV, but application was considered invalid by DHA, as criterion (c) was no longer satisfied. Was that criterion to be satisfied by reference to July 2017 or the time of the SHEV application? Alternatively, should procedural fairness have applied to an assessment carried out for the purposes of a possible exercise of the Minister's discretion to lift the bar?

Double counting?

Federal Court. AAT was required to consider under s 501CA(4) whether to revoke the mandatory cancellation of the judicial review time extension Applicant's visa and to take into account the protection of the Australian community, as mandated by Direction 79. Para 14.1 of that direction required decision makers to consider the "impact of a decision not to revoke on members of the Australian community, including victims of the non-citizen's criminal behaviour". Did the AAT engage in impermissible double counting when it considered the effect of the Applicant's offending both in the context of the protection of the Australian community and in the context of the impact on the victims of the Applicant's offending?

Habeas corpus available where lawful non-citizen reasonably suspected of being unlawful?

Federal Court. Will habeas corpus lie where, although a person is not an unlawful non-citizen, an officer detains him/her on the basis of a reasonable suspicion that he/she is an unlawful non-citizen? Must the suspicion that a person is an unlawful non-citizen "be objectively justifiable on the basis of relevant material, including that material which is discoverable by efforts of search and enquiry that are reasonable in the circumstances"?

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