Case Law Updates

Federal Court: Applicant: unsuccessfully applied to FCA for judicial review and appealed to FCAFC; did not rely in those proceedings on the grounds relied on in Ibrahim; applied to the HCA for special leave to appeal the FCAFC's decision; made a fresh application to FCA for review of the same administrative decision while the special leave application was pending, but Registrar refused that application as an abuse of process; applied to FCA for order that Registrar accept his fresh application. Should the Anshun estoppel apply against the fresh application?

Federal Court: Applicant: applied for protection visa; was interviewed; raised a number of claims, except sexual assault; before delegate made decision, claimed he suffered sexual assault. Delegate found the sexual assault claim was embellishment. Matter was referred to IAA under Pt 7AA of Migration Act 1958. IAA took a stronger view than delegate on embellishment and did not exercise power to obtain new information. Was the IAA's decision legally unreasonable? What is the meaning of "credible personal information" in s 473DD(b)(ii)?

Tribunal: One of the components of the Australian study requirement (ASR) is that the applicant must have completed one or more courses that "were completed as a result of a total of at least 2 academic years study". It is commonly said that the duration of the course/s must be of 92 weeks. Is that correct? In this decision, the Tribunal accepted that 2 concurrent courses of 78 weeks each were sufficient to satisfy the ASR. We explain why.

Federal Court: In SZMTA, HCA held that: error was jurisdictional only if it was material, that is if a different decision could have been made had the error not been made; materiality is a question of fact of which judicial review applicants bear the onus of proof. In Ibrahim, FCAFC held that it was incumbent on the judicial review applicant to demonstrate what would or could have occurred had the error not been made. In Nguyen, FCAFC, differently constituted, disagreed with Ibrahim. Can that division be resolved? Further, can errors which individually do not satisfy the materiality test do so if combined?

Federal Court: In Ibrahim, FCAFC held that Minister was not prohibited from affording natural justice under s 501BA(2). In Burgess, FCAFC held that Ibrahim applied to s 501(3). Were Ibrahim or Burgess wrongly decided? If the Minister's decision record disclosed no error in the interpretation of the above provision, but the Minister admits that error in court, does that mean that the decision record should be ignored in determining whether the Minister made a jurisdictional error? Did the transfer of the Applicant between immigration detention centres amount to false imprisonment?

High Court: Plaintiff sentenced to imprisonment for life, with a non-parole period. Just before plaintiff became eligible to apply for parole, legislation changed in a way that his eligibility was severely constrained. Did the legislative change represent resentencing or repunishment, thus offending the separation of powers? Does the fact that the legislative change expressly singled out the plaintiff have any bearing on how that question should be answered? If the legislation was valid, could migration legislation also validly single out an individual?

Federal Court: The AAT received 2 non-disclosure certificates under s 375A, but only disclosed the existence of the first. The second certificate referred to the MRT, although the MRT had already amalgamated into the AAT. The appellant argue, among other things, that had he known about the existence of the second certificate, he could have argued: that it was invalid as it referred to the abolished MRT; that even if it were valid, he could have argued for a favourable discretion to disclose the content covered by it. Does a discretion really exist?

According to the OMARA, the suspended RMA turned 'a blind eye to the activities of [a non-RMA], choosing to be ignorant of his conduct'. It seems that assistance by the non-RMA with skills assessment applications was considered by the OMARA to be 'immigration assistance', which only RMAs can provide.

Federal Court (Full Court): Is the obiter dicta in MZZJO authority for the proposition that a decision-maker will necessarily make a jurisdictional error if, in assessing a protection visa application, he or she relies "solely or primarily on the absence of claims from an entry interview" whose purpose is not to assess the applicant's claim for protection?

Federal Court: AAT found: Kenyan authorities did not discriminate against people with mental illness, as they did not recognise those types of illness; rather, the authorities would, through a law of general application, take action against the Appellant on the basis of his (potentially criminal) erratic behaviour; thus, AAT found that he would not be discriminated against. Is a foreign law of general application capable of being implemented in a discriminatory manner? If so, can that amount to persecution? Does persecution require a subjective element of enmity or malignity?