Case Law Updates

According to the OMARA, the suspended RMA turned 'a blind eye to the activities of [a non-RMA], choosing to be ignorant of his conduct'. It seems that assistance by the non-RMA with skills assessment applications was considered by the OMARA to be 'immigration assistance', which only RMAs can provide.

Federal Circuit Court: the 'error made by the Tribunal was that it stopped short of assessing whether it was “unlikely” that the grant of the visa would result in undue cost or prejudice. Its analysis was entirely focused on the possibility'

Federal Court. Is the power under r 36.75(2) of the Federal Court Rules 2001 (Cth) to set aside or vary an order dismissing an appeal discretionary? What are the relevant considerations in the exercise of the power under r 36.75(2)? Can it be said that "the Tribunal, by indicating that 'it would think about' whether to seek a translation represented that it would inform the applicant one way of its consideration and allow the applicant to respond"?

Federal Court. May there "be overlap between a failure to afford an opportunity to be heard, and a reasonable apprehension of bias on the ground of pre-judgment, because the former may give rise to the latter"?

Federal Court.The OMARA cancelled the Respondent's registration as a migration agent under s 303(1)(a) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The Respondent then sought review by the Tribunal, pursuant to s 306. Did the Tribunal have power under s 311A to bar the Respondent from being a registered migration agent, in circumstances where the decision under review had been made under s 303(1)(a)?

Federal Court (Full Court). Do the words “a danger” in s 36(1C) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) refer to more than trivial harm? Can the expression “the Australian community” used in s 36(1C)(b) refer to a danger to an individual within that community? Is the word 'danger' in s 36(1C)(b) a function of probability and consequence?

Federal Court: In SZSSJ, HCA had found that "officers conducting the ITOAs were specifically instructed to assess the effect of the Data Breach on Australia's non-refoulement obligations [assuming] that an applicant's personal information may have been accessed by authorities in the country in which the applicant feared [being returned to]". Here, DHA informed Second Appellant that it would "assess any implications for [him] personally as part of its normal processes". Unlike in SZSSJ, "there was no evidence in the present case as to what the assessment in accordance with the department’s 'normal processes' came to entail". Can HCA's description of the ITOA process in SZSSJ be used as evidence in other cases?

Federal Court. Para 8.2(1) of Direction 90 read: "The Government has serious concerns about conferring on non-citizens who engage in family violence the privilege of entering or remaining in Australia..." Para 8.2(2)(b) read: "This consideration is relevant in circumstances where... there is information or evidence from independent and authoritative sources indicating that the non-citizen is, or has been, involved in the perpetration of family violence". Is a police report capable of being seen as an independent and authoritative source?

Federal Court (Full Court). Is the power in s 501BA(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) subject to an implied limitation that it be exercised within a reasonable period of time after the original decision?

Federal Court. Where the decision made was the only decision legally available to be made, does that constitute an exception to the rule that "the question of the materiality of the breach is an ordinary question of fact in respect of which the applicant bears the onus of proof"? For the purpose of para 14.2(1)(b) of Direction 79, was the Applicant's fianceé a member of his immediate family? Does para 8(4) of Direction 79 provide that primary considerations should invariably be given greater weight? In the context of s 501CA(4), does the materiality test call for a balancing or a binary exercise?