Case Law Updates

Federal Court (Full Court). "Where it may be inferred that a Tribunal consciously determined not to have regard to extraneous and prejudicial information in making its decision, [does it necessarily follow] that the fair-minded lay observer would exclude the possibility that the Tribunal might have been subconsciously affected by that information"? In determining a claim of apprehended bias where the Secretary provided the Tribunal with irrelevant, but highly prejudicial, material in the context of Part 7 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), what is the knowledge attributable to the hypothetical fair-minded lay observer?

Federal Court: In assessing complementary protection claims, the existence of an element of intentionality in the definitions of "cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment" and "degrading treatment or punishment" requires subjective intention, which is not the case where prison conditions are the result of a lack of resources in a receiving country: SZTAL. Applying SZTAL, FCA had held in AJI16 that "denial or unavailability of healthcare in a receiving country will only engage s 36(2A) where it is in some way personal to the person being returned". Does that mean that "the fact that a visa applicant has a serious health condition cannot be relevant to a claim for complementary protection"?

High Court: it was not in dispute that 'MARA may not take spent convictions into account in making [decisions under s 290(2) of the Migration Act 1958]', but the question was whether the AAT could; Discussion: are visa applicants really required to disclose convictions for which there was no sentence of imprisonment? Can the Minister take into account a visa applicant's spent conviction? Does the non-disclosure of a spent conviction really trigger PIC 4020?

Federal Court. For the purposes of s 423A, is a “claim” to be equated with a singular factual allegation? Were the “clear particulars” the Tribunal was obliged to provide to the appellants under s 424A “clear particulars” of the "information that the Tribunal considered rightly or wrongly would be a reason or part of a reason for affirming the decision under review"?

High Court. Practitioner used written submissions deriving from a previous client as a template for submissions sent to the IAA concerning 2 other clients. As a ground of judicial review, must fraud affect a particular duty, function, or power of the IAA? If so, were they affected for either of those 2 other clients? Was the IAA's failure to exercise the power in s 473DC to get new information, namely new submissions, legally unreasonable?

Federal Circuit and Family Court. Does s 131 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) imply an obligation that a revocation decision is to be made within a "reasonable time"? If so, can it be said that "the decision-making scheme of Subdivision F gives rise to a powerful implication that the Minister’s obligation to consider and determine a revocation application under s 131 should be discharged within a time which is capable of effecting a restoration of the cancelled rights in both a legal and practical sense"?

Federal Court. Section 36(1C)(b) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) referred to a protection visa applicant being "a danger to the Australian community"? Must the nature of the danger "be one to the safety and wellbeing of the Australian community at large, in general or as a whole, rather than to “one or more members”"? If the delegate's protection visa refusal was made before s 36A was added, did this provision apply to the AAT?

Federal Court. Does the concept of proportionality play a role in determining whether an exercise of discretionary power was legally unreasonable? Does the concept of legal unreasonableness apply to individual aspects of the fact-finding of a decision-maker, such as credibility findings? Does the concept of proportionality form part of the assessment of whether a credibility finding has been made in accordance with established principles as to illogicality or irrationality?

Federal Court (Full Court). Does para 14.1(2) of Direction 79 require decision-makers to take account of non-refoulement obligations? If not, might those obligations be required to be considered nevertheless for other reasons, such as because an applicant has raised those obligations? Since the introduction of s 197C, is indefinitely holding a person in detention for no lawful purpose and not refouling the person a possible legal outcome? If so, is the last sentence of para 14.1(6) incorrect to the extent it suggests otherwise? Was AAT obliged by paragraph 14.1(2) to proceed on the basis that refoulement was not a possible outcome?

Federal Court: IAA affirmed decision to refuse Appellant a protection visa on the basis that he could relocate to Kabul: "I am ... not satisfied that there is a real risk of him facing significant harm ... in Kabul". Under s 36(2B)(a), "there is taken not to be a real risk that a non-citizen will suffer significant harm in a country if ... it would be reasonable for the non-citizen to relocate to an area of the country where there would not be a real risk that the non-citizen will suffer significant harm". As per MZACX and MZZJY, in order for relocation to be reasonable, risk of harm in other place is relevant, but risk need not be as high as "real" and harm need not be as serious as "significant". Did IAA treat reasonableness of relocation as necessarily involving the same risk and level of harm as set out in s 36(2)(aa), namely "real" and "significant"?