Can legislation expressly single out an individual?

High Court: Plaintiff sentenced to imprisonment for life, with a non-parole period. Just before plaintiff became eligible to apply for parole, legislation changed in a way that his eligibility was severely constrained. Did the legislative change represent resentencing or repunishment, thus offending the separation of powers? Does the fact that the legislative change expressly singled out the plaintiff have any bearing on how that question should be answered? If the legislation was valid, could migration legislation also validly single out an individual?

Matters in para 8.4(4) of Direction 99 mandatory considerations?

Federal Court (Full Court). Does the decision to be made as to whether to revoke a visa cancellation under s 501CA(4) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) require "each of the factors that are listed in s 8.4(4) [of Direction 99] to be taken into account as part of the final weighing exercise to be undertaken in order to comply with the direction"?

“You can’t say… these police reports are not to be accepted”

Federal Court. In the context of s 501CA(4), AAT said to self-represented Applicant at 1st hearing: "But what you can’t say, and what is not standing up to any sort of scrutiny, is that these police reports are not to be accepted, because Ms [L] be a little bit - or a lot - mentally unwell. If that were the case, the police wouldn’t have made the reports". At the end of 2nd hearing, Applicant was asked whether he wished to disagree with the police reports, but he answered in the negative. Did 1st hearing have the effect of directing Applicant that he could not present his case, thus constituting a denial of procedural fairness (PF)? Or did the opportunity to challenge the reports at the 2nd hearing cure any denial of PF that might have occurred at the 1st hearing?

May s 473DD(a) and (b)(ii) overlap?

Federal Court: May ss 473DD(a) and (b)(ii) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) overlap? Further, IAA refused to consider new info, saying: "The mere fact that some of the applicant’s siblings have been granted protection on the basis the applicant claims is the same as his own claims, has no probative value when assessing the applicant’s claims for protection". Did IAA, in effect, say that "in no circumstances could evidence" relating to the siblings "have probative value when assessing the applicant’s claims for protection", thus amounting to jurisdictional error?

Is offending relevant to consideration of ties to Australia?

Federal Court. Were the applicant’s offending and risk of re-offending matters properly able to be considered as part of the evaluation of the strength, nature and duration of his ties to Australia? Did the Tribunal double count its assessment of the nature and seriousness of the applicant’s offending and the risk of re-offending?Federal Court. Were the applicant’s offending and risk of re-offending matters properly able to be considered as part of the evaluation of the strength, nature and duration of his ties to Australia? Did the Tribunal double count its assessment of the nature and seriousness of the applicant’s offending and the risk of re-offending?

Criminal conduct an independently relevant consideration?

Federal Court (Full Court): Is para 12.3(1) of Direction No 65 concerned with the effects of a crime on a victim and their family? Or is it concerned with the additional impact of a decision to grant a visa on the victim and their family? If the latter applies: could AAT nonetheless deal with Appellant's criminal conduct as "an aspect of evaluating the seriousness of the offending conduct and also a consideration that could be viewed as independently relevant and therefore a matter that must be taken into account under para 12(1)"; if AAT treated para 12.3(1) as concerned with the effects of the crime (as opposed to the effect of visa grant) on the victim and their family, does it necessarily follow that AAT made a jurisdictional error?

Material failure to comply with Direction 63

Federal Court. Paragraph 116(1)(g) provided that the Minister may cancel a visa if "a prescribed ground for cancelling a visa applies to the holder". Reg 2.43(1)(p)(ii) prescribed the following ground: "in the case of the holder of a Subclass 050 ... or ... 051 ... visa - that the Minister is satisfied that the holder ... has been charged with an offence against a law of the Commonwealth, a State, a Territory or another country". Does a material failure to comply with Direction 63, issued under s 499, lead to jurisdictional error?

Minister circling option = making decision? Part 2

Federal Court. In an FCA decision we recently summarised, the Minister's application for leave to appeal from a decision where he was ordered to answer an interrogatory aimed at determining whether he had turned his mind to a decision was dismissed. In a different case extracted in this article, one of the questions to the FCA was whether it should use its discretion to refuse to grant leave to the Applicant for an interlocutory application seeking a very similar interrogatory, because of the “impracticalities” presented by the possibility of portfolio Ministers being overwhelmed with interrogatories.

AAT limited to power exercised by MARA?

Federal Court.The OMARA cancelled the Respondent's registration as a migration agent under s 303(1)(a) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The Respondent then sought review by the Tribunal, pursuant to s 306. Did the Tribunal have power under s 311A to bar the Respondent from being a registered migration agent, in circumstances where the decision under review had been made under s 303(1)(a)?

Bogus documents: protection visas

The provision of false information was irrelevant for the purposes of determining whether a passport was a bogus document under s 5(1) and thus whether a protection visa should be refused under s 91WA of the Migration Act 1958