Case Law Updates

Federal Court. In order for the Minister to personally made a decision under s 501CA(4), must he be "briefed with an accurate and sufficient summary of the matters raised by the representations or ... undertake the consideration of the representations personally"? Can it be inferred from the form of the reasons (i.e. circling 1 of 3 options) that they were the means by which the Minister was briefed, with the result that "the matters that are known to the Minister are only those matters expressed in the reasons"?

Federal Court. In deciding under s 501CA(4) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) not to revoke the mandatory cancellation of the Applicant's visa, the Minister found that "Australia has a low tolerance of criminal conduct for people…who have been participating in, and contributing to, the community only for a short period". Should that finding "be understood as a concrete factual finding reflective of some impossible synthesis or amalgamation of the views held collectively by the Australian community"?

Federal Court. Were the financial capacity criterion and enrolment criterion not entirely independent, with the result that the Tribunal's finding on the latter did not render its error on the former immaterial?

Federal Court (Full Court): As mentioned in previous articles, at least 4 single-judge Federal Court decisions are authorities for the proposition that the materiality test expounded by the High Court in Hossain should not be treated as binary in nature. Now, the Full Court has said something which "might" be interpreted as treating the materiality test as binary. If that is the case, we respectfully disagree and explain why.

Federal Court. For the purposes of s 501CA(4) and Direction 79, can the "circumstance that a father does not disclose the existence of his natural children ... be taken into account in determining where the best interests of the children may lie"? If the non-citizen has minor children in Australia, but does not make their best interests part of his/her claim, does the AAT nevertheless have an obligation to consider those interests if it is aware of the existence of the children? Does that obligation arise if the non-citizen is not the parent of the children? If not, does that obligation nevertheless arise if "there are a number of additional circumstances known to the [AAT that indicate that the children in question] may be affected by the decision"? Further, did the AAT misinterpret cl 14.2(1)(b) of Direction 79?

Federal Court. AAT set refusal aside, finding Applicant met s 36(2)(aa). On remittal, in considering exercise of discretion under s 501(1), Minister "accepted" AAT had found s 36(2)(aa) was satisfied and "noted" Applicant's submission to Minister relating non-refoulement obligations. Can it be said that Minister's acceptance that the AAT had found that s 36(2)(aa) was met should not be viewed as acceptance by him of substratum of AAT's finding? Can it be said that the use by the Minister of term "note" should not be read as the Minister stating that he agreed with the substratum of the Applicant's submissions, with the consequence that the Minister failed to meaningfully assess the Applicant's submissions and thus failed to discharge his discretion? For the purposes of discretion under s 501(1), is Minister entitled to disagree with or adopt AAT's findings?

Federal Court. The Appellant answered in the affirmative the following question contained in a form given to him by the Tribunal: "Do you and any other applicants consent to the Tribunal deciding the review without a hearing?" Was there ambiguity as to whether consent was given for the Tribunal to proceed without a hearing? Is it "contrary to the ‘spirit’ of the Migration Act [for the Tribunal] to ask an applicant if he or she consents to a review without an oral hearing"?

Federal Court: under the Medevac provisions, 2 doctors must assess ("either remotely or in person") a transitory person before they can be brought to Australia for medical treatment. The non-citizen argued that the review of medical records of itself constituted "remote assessment". The Minister argued that "remote assessment" must involve a consultation.

Federal Court: In SZTAL, the plurality of the HCA held that "the intent requirement in relation to significant harm will only be satisfied if the perpetrator has an “actual, subjective, intention” to cause pain or suffering and that “knowledge or foresight of a result is not to be equated with intent”". However, can it be said that "evidence of foresight of the risk of pain or suffering or humiliation may support an inference of intention and in some cases the degree of foresight may render the inference compelling"?

Federal Court. Is the ongoing validity of a cancellation effected under s 501(3) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) conditional upon timely compliance with the requirements of s 501CA? Does the use of the word 'may' in s 501CA(4) mean that the decision-maker retains the discretion not to revoke a visa cancellation even if satisfied that the non-citizen passes the character or that there is 'another reason' to revoke?