Case Law Updates

The Full Court of the Federal Court has unanimously held that 'Brown No 2 was wrongly decided and should not be followed'

Federal Court. In Nathanson, Kiefel CJ, Keane and Gleeson JJ held in the context of a denial of procedural fairness that the standard of reasonable conjecture, used to determine whether an error was material and thus jurisdictional, was "undemanding". Is reasonable conjecture applicable in the context of an assessment of the materiality of errors in the form of misinterpretation of s 473DD of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth)? If so, is the standard of reasonable conjecture also undemanding in such a context?

High Court. In some cases, may a statutory provision by which: a right of appeal is conferred impliedly grant jurisdiction to hear the appeal; jurisdiction is granted to hear an appeal impliedly confer a right to appeal? Is a provision that grants jurisdiction to a court to be construed "with all the amplitude that the ordinary meaning of its words admits"?

Federal Court (Full Court). If a person is born overseas to non-Australian biological parents and is later adopted by individuals who were Australian citizens at the time of that person's birth, is that person deemed to have been born to Australian parents for the purposes of s 16(2) of the Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth)? Does that Act provide a pathway for all children adopted under Australian law or does it only provide a pathway for children adopted before 22 November 1984?

Federal Court (Full Court): We recently summarised a FCAFC decision which held that: the Minister had made a personal procedural decision to consider the exercise of his powers under s 46A; the exercise of the revocation power in s 46A(2C) was subject to procedural fairness. Now, the FCAFC delivered a further judgement, with remedies that gave effect to that decision. Both decisions could positively affect other unauthorised maritime arrivals who missed the deadline of 1 October 2017 for making a protection visa application.

Federal Court. In Ibrahim, FCAFC had held that Assistant Minister conflated Australia’s non-refoulement obligations under international treaties with the protection obligations under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), thus vitiating decision under s 501BA(2) with jurisdictional error. Does the same principle apply to decisions under s 501(2)? Here, did Assistant Minister incorrectly assume that Applicant’s claims would be considered in the same way if he applied for a protection visa, as the circumstances in which consideration of non-refoulement occurs are very different as between the determination of a visa application under s 65 and the exercise of the discretionary power in s 501(2)? Does Direction 75 require that the protection criteria in s 36(2)(a) and (aa) be considered before all other criteria for a protection visa?

Federal Court. Should there be an implication in s 198(6) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) that "the duty imposed on an officer to remove him as soon as reasonably practicable had to be postponed while there was a realistic possibility that the Minister would consider exercising his discretion to lift the bar under s 48B(1), until after the Minister made a procedural decision, through the Department following his instructions in the Guidelines, that the request was in a class of case that he either would or would not consider"?

Federal Court. Minister revoked Applicant's citizenship, who applied under s 29(7) of AAT Act for time extension to apply for merits review. AAT wrote: "There is prejudice to the public and the general administration of justice if decisions are not regarded as final and can be re-opened after a period of 12 years unless there are truly exceptional circumstances". As a matter of law, do time extension applicants need to establish “truly exceptional circumstances”? Did AAT treat the need for exceptional circumstances as a matter of law?

Federal Court. In determining whether an unarticulated claim nevertheless clearly arose from the materials before an administrative decision-maker, is it relevant that the non-citizen was professionally represented before that decision-maker throughout the process?

Federal Court (FCA). Can it be said that, "in the ordinary course all issues of fact and law should be determined at the one time and that the [FCA] should generally exercise the power in r 30.01 of the Rules cautiously and sparingly"?