Case Law Updates

AAT gave some weight to the fact that the applicant's country of origin is impacted by covid-19 in assessing under cl 820.211(2)(d)(ii) whether there were compelling reasons for not applying Sch 3. Although past AAT decisions are not binding on future AAT decisions, we discuss how a decision of the Federal Court can be useful in that it states that like cases should be treated alike, meaning that this AAT decision can be used to argue that the AAT should also give some weight to covid-19 in future cases.

Federal Court. If a conviction and sentence was sufficient to engage the Tribunal's jurisdiction for the purposes of s 501CA(4)(a)(i) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and other convictions and sentences were not needed to engage that jurisdiction, could the Tribunal go behind those other convictions and sentences insofar as they had a bearing on s 501CA(4)(a)(ii)?

Federal Court: this decision answers whether: time of decision (TOD) criteria require decision-makers to consider up-to-the-minute information or whether there can be a gap between the point in time the information relates to and the TOD; in protection claims, the assessment of fear of harm can be temporally relative such as "the risks have reduced over time" or whether it must be an absolute assessment of the fear as at the TOD; decision-makers can "rely on the subjective experience of a limited class of people, of uncertain characteristics, to determine an objective level of safety" for an applicant.

Federal Court: It is often said that jurisdictional errors made by an original decision-maker are always irrelevant to a merits review application, given that the Tribunal will make a decision de novo. However, that is not always the case, as this decision illustrates.

Federal Court: "In light of the appellant’s self-represented status on his appeal, it remains to consider whether the Court should exercise its discretion to order the Minister to produce the country information so as to enable the merits of the appellant’s argument to be determined by reference to it ... Despite the urgings of the Court [the Appellant] has expressed an unwillingness to participate in the hearing of the appeal in a meaningful way". Should the FCA exercise its discretion in favour of the Appellant?

Federal Court. Is it "antithetical to the appellate process [or] at odds with s 476A" for FCA to allow "a new ground not considered by the primary judge"? Further, Appellant presented his taskera (Afghan ID card) in support of protection visa application. Delegate suspected taskera was bogus and his representative provided delegate with a document from Appellant's father as evidence that Appellant's taskera was not bogus. The document the representative provided was the father's birth certificate. But representative inadvertently mischaracterised that document as the father's taskera. Given discrepancies between Appellant's taskera and his father's "taskera", delegate found the former was a bogus document. Did delegate make a jurisdictional error despite being entirely blameless? Was forensic examination of taskera irrelevant?

Federal Court (FCA). Can a court grant mandamus by way of interlocutory relief? Does the FCA have jurisdiction or power to grant mandamus compelling...

Federal Court (Full Court). Are all duties of care discharged by the exercise of reasonable care, without imposing more stringent or onerous burdens? If so, does it necessarily follow that "a duty to achieve a particular result (eg confining the appellant’s detention to a specified duration) is not one that the law of tort would impose"?

Federal Court (Full Court): 'Modern Australian society’s cultural awareness... should be at the very foundation of a decision which affects Aboriginal family and community'

Federal Court (Full Court). Is the Minister's ‘decision’ not to afford natural justice in exercising power in s 501BA(2) a migration decision listed in any of s 476A(1)(a)-(d), with the result that the Federal Court lacked jurisdiction to review that 'decision'? Was the power in s 501BA conditioned by an obligation to consider whether to afford procedural fairness? If not, can it nevertheless be said that "the Minister’s choice as to whether to afford a visa applicant natural justice before deciding whether to cancel the visa might be reviewable for legality"?