Subsection 48A(1AA) interpreted

Federal Court (Full Court): The effect of s 48A(1AA) used to be that a person who relied on the Refugees Convention criterion under s 36(2)(a) for a protection visa (PV) application was barred from making a further PV application while in Australia if the original application had been refused. However, that person was not barred from making a further PV application based on the complementary protection under s 36(2)(aa). Subsection s 48A(1AA) was then amended, with the aim of changing that rule, but has the amendment achieved that aim?

Are road users obviously vulnerable members of community?

Federal Court. Was the adverse conclusion that the Applicant had committed serious crimes against other road users who were to be viewed as vulnerable members of the community for the purposes of para 8.1.1(1)(b)(ii) of Direction 90 one not obviously open on the known material, with the result that the Tribunal not putting the Applicant on notice of it amounted to a denial of procedural fairness?

Is legal unreasonableness on the way to final conclusion material by definition?

Federal Court (Full Court). Instead of saying that errors in the form of legal unreasonableness in the making of a finding “on the way” to the final conclusion are material by definition, can it be said that they are material if they are critical findings, in the sense that there is a built-in requirement of materiality?

Low tolerance of criminal conduct: a factual finding?

Federal Court. In deciding under s 501CA(4) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) not to revoke the mandatory cancellation of the Applicant's visa, the Minister found that "Australia has a low tolerance of criminal conduct for people…who have been participating in, and contributing to, the community only for a short period". Should that finding "be understood as a concrete factual finding reflective of some impossible synthesis or amalgamation of the views held collectively by the Australian community"?

Significant harm financially offset by parents?

Federal Court: Delegate refused to grant a primary applicant child and his/her secondary applicant parents a protection visa. AAT then found there was no real risk that the child would suffer significant harm, on the following basis: "I find that the effects of not having his birth registered and not being able to access citizenship documentation will thus be significantly offset by having two parents to care for him and the financial support of his father". Did AAT make a jurisdictional error by finding that the risk of harm to the child could be offset by the parents' financial support?

Apprehension of subconscious bias?

High Court: Unbeknown to the Appellant, Secretary gave IAA additional material in purported compliance with s 473CB(1)(c). However, the additional material was objectively both irrelevant to IAA's review and prejudicial to Appellant. IAA then wrote to Appellant: DHA "has provided us with all documents they consider relevant to your case". It eventually affirmed delegate's protection visa refusal, without requesting new information or interviewing Appellant. IAA's reasons: stated that IAA "had regard to the material referred by the Secretary"; did not refer to additional material. Did the giving of additional material result in: a material "failure of a precondition to the exercise of the jurisdiction of the [IAA] to conduct a review"; a reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of IAA?

cl 500.212(a)(iv): future intentions an irrelevant consideration?

Federal Court. Was it an irrelevant consideration for the Tribunal to take into account the Appellant's future intentions when determining whether he intended genuinely to stay in Australia temporarily pursuant to cl 500.212(a)(iv) of Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth)?

s 500(6H) interpreted again

Federal Court. Can it be said that, although the Tribunal would not have been entirely acting of its own initiative if it accepted K's invitation conveyed by the Applicant to speak to the Tribunal, the information that would have been given by K would not have been presented "in support of the [Applicant's] case", as it would rather have been presented as a result of the Tribunal eliciting information from K? In other words, was the giving of information by K precluded by s 500(6H) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth)?

Refusal to remove under s 198(1): a “migration decision”?

Federal Court (FCA). Following unsuccessful requests to be removed from Australia under s 198(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), the Applicant applied to the FCA for mandamus directing the Commonwealth to do so. Subsection 476A(1) provided that, despite any other law, the FCA's "original jurisdiction in relation to a migration decision" was limited to the matters under s 476A(1)(a) to (d). Is the refusal to discharge the obligation under s 198 a "migration decision", with the result that the FCA lacked jurisdiction?

Visa grant despite breach of condition = condoning breach?

Federal Court: Although Appellant had not complied with conditions imposed on previous student visas, Department granted him further student visas. AAT affirmed a decision to refuse the Appellant's last student visa application, due to the non-compliance described above. Appellant argued on judicial review that: "any breach of [visa conditions] had been 'condoned' by operation of law when subsequent visa applications were granted without any complaint being raised as to earlier non-compliance'; as a result, AAT was not allowed to take into account earlier non-compliance.