Case Law Updates

Federal Court: In an application for merits review to which the 84-day deadline under s 500(6L) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) applies, should the reasons provided by the AAT be scrutinised less rigorously than would otherwise be the case? Was the Tribunal required to expressly put the Applicant on notice that it would consider the impact on victims that could flow from a decision to revoke the visa cancellation, pursuant to cl 14.4(1) of Direction 65? Did the AAT misinterpret cl 14.4(1)? Note: cl 14.4(1) of Direction 79 is identical to cl 14.4(1) of Direction 65.

Federal Court (Full Court). Could a conclusion that a non-citizen posed a risk of reoffending similar to other ordinary Australian residents rationally support a conclusion that the risk was unacceptable? Can it be said that "a finding that the appellant’s conduct has not been tested in the community does not establish that the appellant is a risk of reoffending"?

Federal Court. In light of the High Court decision in MZAPC, is it necessary for a court to consider materiality as a separate issue after finding that an administrative decision was legally unreasonable?

Federal Court. Can it be said that "the existence of unreasonable or even very harsh conditions in a third country is not a basis to disengage s 36(3), unless the circumstances in subss (4), (5) or (5A) exist"? If so, is "an interpretation of the phrase “right to enter and reside” which incorporates some limited form of qualitative assessment" precluded? If so, would a person "entering a refugee camp, or a camp for displaced persons, where their freedom would be confined and they would be dependent (for example) on international aid" have the right to reside in the country?

Federal Court. Can it be said that "a notice [such as form 956] which does not state that the authority conferred is for the Minister to give documents to the authorised recipient, instead of the person concerned, is not a notice for the purposes of [s 494D of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth)]"?

Federal Court: cl 485.223 requires application to be accompanied by evidence that skills assessment has been applied for. In Khan, Full Court had decided that the clause "established an objective temporal test" which does not "import notions of fairness". Here, as a result of a practitioner's mistake, the assessment was only applied for after the visa application had been lodged. Should this case be decided differently on the basis that, here: the practitioner made that mistake; and ImmiAccount "should have rejected the application" given the answer "no" to the question on the visa application form on whether the applicant had applied for an assessment?

Federal Court (Full Court). Is the power to allow an appeal by consent under s 25(2B)(b) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) dependent upon the identification, to the satisfaction of the Court, of arguable appellable error in the decision below?

Federal Court. Is an alien who has no legal right to remain in Australia "permitted to engineer their own release into the community by frustrating the efforts of officers to carry out their duty under s 198 of the Act"? If so, should a non-citizen who seeks to prevent his/her return to the country where they fear harm, but does not seek to prevent his/her removal from Australia to some other place, be seen as engineering their own release into the community?

Federal Court. Should Direction 65 be read down to be consistent with the Family Law Act 1975? Was AAT required to "give weight to a right, value or interest recognised by statute, international instrument or the common law"? Is Direction 65 inconsistent with that Act? Does the Convention on the Rights of the Child inform the interpretation of paras 13(2)(b), 13.2(1) and 13.2(4) of Direction 65? Is Direction 65 delegated legislation? If not, is it anyway sensible to assume it intended to give effect to Australia's obligations under international law? Is Direction 65 inconsistent with the common law principle of parental responsibility?

Federal Court: 86-year-old UK national Appellant had visa mandatorily cancelled and applied for a protection visa, claiming he had several health conditions, including a major depressive disorder. He provided a medical letter stating that, if returned to the UK, he was at high risk of suicide. He claimed he was owed complementary protection under s 36(2)(aa) in that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of being removed, he would suffer significant harm by being arbitrarily deprived of his life pursuant to s 36(2A)(a). Is s 36(2A)(a) restricted to the risk of being deprived of life by a third party? If so and if the UK did not prevent his suicide, would that constitute arbitrary deprivation of life? If so, did the Tribunal made a jurisdictional error in not assessing what would be the UK’s response to the risk of suicide?