Materiality of erroneous finding that detention is indefinite
Federal Court. In assessing s 501CA(4), if the Tribunal erroneously finds that detention is indefinite, is the error nevertheless immaterial to the outcome, in that "being released from immigration detention is less of an imposition on a person than being held in immigration detention, even in circumstances of statelessness and the considerable insecurity that that necessarily brings"?
Protection of the community despite NZYQ?
Federal Court. Was it irrational or illogical for the Minister to give significant weight to the protection of the Australian community towards his satisfaction of the national interest under s 501A(3) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) in circumstances where, as the Applicant would not be taken into detention and would continue to reside in the community by reason of NZYQ?
BVE: obligation to explain why certain conditions would be imposed for the purpose of...
Federal Court. Was the Tribunal obliged to explain why certain conditions (if any) should be imposed for the purpose of cl 050.223 of Schedule 2 of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), instead of merely listing such conditions in its reasons for decision? If so, was that obligation obviated if the visa applicant conceded to the Tribunal that those conditions should be imposed?
BAL19 attacked again
Federal Court. In BAL19, FCA decided that s 501 did not apply to protection visa refusals. Does BAL19 also apply to s 501A refusals? Was the decision in BAL19 plainly wrong? Can the Minister "continue to administer the law on their own understanding of what the law is (or what it “should be”), and not as settled in BAL19, or to ... administer the law in a manner which they hope will be settled by the Full Court on appeal"? Subsection 476A(1) gave FCA jurisdiction in relation to migration decisions personally made by the Minister under s 501 and its analogues, but not under s 65. Minister argued that if he failed to make a decision within a reasonable time, that would be a decision under s 65, with the result that FCA did not have jurisdiction to order mandamus in relation to the failure to make a decision within a reasonable time. Did FCA have jurisdiction by reason of the terms "in relation to" in s 476A(1)?
Required to assess protection claim in the absence of protection application?
Federal Court. Was the Applicant "entitled to have his claims for protection in respect of Nauru determined and, if found to be well founded, not to be refouled to Nauru", in light of the omission in s 197C of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) to a reference to s 198AD, despite the Minister's power to take him to Nauru pursuant to s 198AD and despite the fact that the Migration Act does not provide a statutory mechanism to determine such a claim?
Mistranslations and practitioner’s fraud on the court?
Federal Court: FCCA dismissed application under s 477(2) for extension of time within which to make judicial review application under s 476. As dismissals under s 477(2) are not appealable, Applicant applied to FCA for judicial review of FCCA's decision, arguing that FCCA denied him procedural fairness and thus made a jurisdictional error. In what circumstances can mistranslations or non-translations vitiate a decision? Further, Applicant claimed that his representative "had undertaken to bring proceedings [to the FCCA within the statutory timeframe] challenging the IAA’s decision and yet had failed to do so". If that claim were accepted, did the representative's action constitute fraud on the FCCA?
s 23 of FCA Act: power or jurisdiction?
Federal Court (FCA). Is s 23 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) a conferral of power, not jurisdiction? Does the FCA have the power to grant an injunction in an appropriate case in aid of a statutory right?
Vexatious to commence 2nd proceeding dealing with same controversy?
High Court. In assessing whether a statute which is silent on a topic was nevertheless intended by its drafter to be governed in a certain way on that topic, is it telling that the drafter had before it a different statute from another jurisdiction on the same topic and decided not to adopt it? Is there a "common law principle that, if complete relief is available in a proceeding on foot, it is prima facie vexatious and oppressive to commence a second proceeding dealing with the same controversy"? Must any Act be read as a harmonious whole?
Did s 500(6H) preclude answers given to questions put by the AAT?
Federal Court. Did s 500(6H) "preclude the Tribunal from considering information which is not presented by, or on behalf of an applicant, including information that arises from cross-examination or answers given in response to questions put by the Tribunal"? Does s 500(6H) have the effect that oral evidence, which may be given in support of a review applicant’s case cannot "depar[t] in a substantive way from the content of the written statements"?
Cl 13.1.1(1) of Direction 79 interpreted
Federal Court. While the AAT was required to treat offending of the type described under cl 13.1.1(1)(a)-(b) of Direction 79 as “very serious”, did it remain for it to allocate weight in respect of such offending relative to all other relevant considerations under s 501CA(4)(b)(ii) of the Migration Act? Are cl 13.1.1(1)(b) and (d) ultra vires s 499 of the Act to the extent that they "required the Tribunal to proceed upon the basis that crimes of a violent nature against women or children are to viewed very seriously, regardless of the sentence imposed"?




















