Case Law Updates

Federal Court. AAT was bound by Direction 56 (now replaced by 84) to consider PAM3 guidelines in assessing Appellant's protection claims. Can it be said that, because AAT "had not mentioned the Guidelines in the section of its reasons on “Relevant Law” or in the substantive section containing its findings on the complementary protection criterion, the Court should infer that it had not taken them into account"? Did the fact that the AAT had only referred to conditions at a specific prison in the Appellant's home country and did not report on conditions in other prisons suggest AAT did not consider PAM3? Does the “intentional” infliction of harm for the purposes of the complementary protection require “actual, subjective intention by the actor to bring about the victims’ pain and suffering by the actor’s conduct”?

Federal Court (Full Court). Is 'danger' as used in s 36(1C)(b) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth): such that "the harm that will eventuate if the danger becomes a reality is non-trivial" and "of a physical or psychological kind"; one "that combines an assessment of how probable harm is with an assessment of the severity or seriousness if the probability eventuates"? Is the 'Australian community' as used in s 36(1C)(b) conceived of as the community as a whole and/or any person or persons who are part of it?

High Court. Can it be said that s 494AB of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) does not take away the jurisdiction of any court to hear and determine proceedings of the kinds described in s 494AB(1), but rather provides the Commonwealth with a defence to those claims if they are made in a court other than the High Court? If so, could proceedings instituted in the High Court in relation to the matters identified in s 494AB(1) be remitted to another court for hearing and determination without s 494AB providing an answer or defence to the claim?

Federal Court (Full Court). If the decision-maker assesses cl 500.212(a) of Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) as not satisfied, is it required to consider whether cll 500.212(b) or (c) are satisfied?

Federal Court. In order for illogicality to sound in jurisdictional error in the form of legal unreasonableness, must it be "extreme"?

Federal Court (Full Court): former RMA had charged clients "for nothing more than ‘being available’", said AAT when reviewing OMARA's sanction. According to Full Court, OMARA/AAT have jurisdiction even on the basis of conduct that falls outside client/agent relationships; in any event, in determining whether the complainants were clients, it was irrelevant whether immigration assistance had actually been provided

Federal Court: Section 430 requires AAT to provide written statement of reasons for Part 7-reviewable decisions. In Yusuf, it was held as follows about s 430: "The Tribunal is required, in setting out its reasons for decision, to set out "the findings on any material questions of fact". If it does not set out a finding on some question of fact, that will indicate that it made no finding on that matter; and that, in turn, may indicate that the Tribunal did not consider the matter to be material". Does the same principle apply to s 473EA, which requires the IAA to sets out its reasons for a decision?

Federal Court (Full Court). Was the Appellant denied procedural fairness in that "the Minister or the Minister’s delegate decided to exercise the cancellation power in s 501(3A) rather than 501(2) [of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth)] when the latter requires the person affected to be given an opportunity to be heard before the power is exercised whereas the former does not"?

Federal Court (Full Court). "Where it may be inferred that a Tribunal consciously determined not to have regard to extraneous and prejudicial information in making its decision, [does it necessarily follow] that the fair-minded lay observer would exclude the possibility that the Tribunal might have been subconsciously affected by that information"? In determining a claim of apprehended bias where the Secretary provided the Tribunal with irrelevant, but highly prejudicial, material in the context of Part 7 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), what is the knowledge attributable to the hypothetical fair-minded lay observer?

Federal Court. In order for the Minister to personally made a decision under s 501CA(4), must he be "briefed with an accurate and sufficient summary of the matters raised by the representations or ... undertake the consideration of the representations personally"? Can it be inferred from the form of the reasons (i.e. circling 1 of 3 options) that they were the means by which the Minister was briefed, with the result that "the matters that are known to the Minister are only those matters expressed in the reasons"?