Criterion 5001 necessarily neutral for s 501CA(4)?
Federal Court. In the context of s 501CA(4) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), did the Tribunal err in assessing the legal consequences of its decision in that it wrongly found that indefinite exclusion from Australia under special return criterion 5001 of Schedule 5 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) was an intended consequence of the cancellation of his visa by operation of law and thus necessarily of neutral weight?
BVR monitoring and curfew conditions unconstitutional?
High Court. Were the conditions in cll 070.612A(1)(a) and (d) of Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) prima facie punitive? If so, can it be said that there is no legitimate non-punitive purpose justifying the powers, with the result that such powers should be characterised as punitive and therefore as infringing on the exclusively judicial power of the Commonwealth in Ch III of the Constitution?
Reasonability of removal an objective jurisdictional fact?
Federal Court. Is it reasonably arguable that the question of whether it is ‘reasonably practicable’ to remove a person from Australia is an objective ‘jurisdictional fact’, that is a fact which a court can and should determine for itself?
Uncertainty in the interaction between SAAP and Hossain?
Federal Court. Is there uncertainty in the interaction between SAAP and Hossain? In determining, pursuant to s 120(1)(a) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), whether a fact adverted to by the delegate in the Decision Record constituted “part of the reason” for the delegate’s decision to cancel the appellant’s visa, was it is necessary to have regard to the form (including its pre-populated questions) and content of the Decision Record?
s 501CA(3) and r 2.52 interpreted
Federal Court. Does the Tribunal have jurisdiction to review a delegate's decision made under s 501CA(4) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), even if the delegate’s decision was invalid or beyond power?
Keeping in detention = “migration decision” under s 476A?
Federal Court. Once an act is made to detain a person under s 189 of the Migration Act 1958, is the continuation of that detention also an act under s 189? If so, is the continued detention of a person under s 189 a "migration decision", with the result that the FCA does not have original jurisdiction in an application for a writ in the nature of habeas corpus? If so, does the FCA have a residual original jurisdiction to determine whether a habeas corpus applicant is a person to whom s 189(1) can validly apply? Can 189(1) be applied by reference to a hypothetical officer? Was the Applicant "born in Australia" for the purposes of the Australian Citizenship Act 1948, despite being born in the Cook Islands? Was the Applicant an Aboriginal Australian? Were enrolment on the Commonwealth electoral roll and the issue of an Australian passport determinative of whether Applicant was a citizen?
Is notification of a decision a decision?
Federal Court: a previous FCA judgement had held that a notice under s 66 of the Migration Act 1958 of a decision to refuse to grant a visa did not itself constitute a "decision" that enlivened the jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit Court (FCCA). Does the same principle apply to visa cancellation revocation notices issued pursuant to s 501CA(3)?
Does Makasa apply to s 501CA(4)?
Federal Court. Can it be said that "the threshold for establishing illogicality is very high and requires extreme illogicality such that the decision was one that no rational or logical decision-maker could arrive at on the same evidence"? In Makasa, HCA held that power to cancel visa under s 501(2) was spent by AAT's decision to set aside delegate's original decision. Does Makasa apply to s 501CA(4)? Can the same sentence of imprisonment lead to satisfaction of both ss 501(3A)(a) and (b)?
Can ambushing by a decision-maker lead to jurisdictional error?
Federal Court (Full Court). Can it be said that, "if it is common ground between parties that a particular fact is so, then it is a denial of procedural fairness for an administrator, for example, the Tribunal, to depart from that position without giving each party an opportunity to make submissions on that subject; in other words, ambushing by a decision-maker can amount to jurisdictional error"?
Division shown by Ibrahim / Nguyen tension continues
Federal Court. For the purposes of the materiality test, FCAFC (White, Perry and Charlesworth JJ) held in Ibrahim that the judicial review applicant had to prove what would have happened had the decision-maker not made the error in question. FCAFC (Rares, Griffiths and Burley JJ) in Karan came to the same conclusion. FCAFC (Jagot, Robertson and Farrell JJ) in Nguyen disagreed with Ibrahim. FCAFC (Katzmann, Mortimer and Bromwich JJ) recently adopted one of Ibrahim and Nguyen. However, as the FCA decision extracted in this article indicates, the division shown by the Ibrahim / Nguyen tension is still present among justices of the FCA.



















