Case Law Updates

High Court. In a proceeding for a declaration that an officer exceeded the executive power of the Commonwealth in declining to refer to the Minister a request for intervention under s 195A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), can the Federal Court "make an interlocutory order restraining officers from removing the unlawful non‑citizen, notwithstanding the duty imposed on officers by s 198(6) to remove the unlawful non-citizen as soon as reasonably practicable, where the proceeding does not challenge the valid application of s 198(6) to the unlawful non-citizen"?

Federal Court. Must the power in s 501BA of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) be exercised within a reasonable period of time? May satisfaction of the preconditions to the exercise of the power in s 501BA arise by consideration of matters that have arisen after the s 501CA decision?

Federal Court (Full Court): 'the decision in Hossain did not state a general principle of statutory construction to the effect that there is an implied obligation that all powers conferred on administrative decision-makers are to be exercised on a correct understanding and application of the applicable law such that a material breach of that obligation would be jurisdictional'.

Federal Court (Full Court). Cl 820.211(2)(c) required Appellant to be sponsored at TOA. Cl 820.221(4) required sponsorship to have been approved at TOD. Under reg 1.20(1), sponsor is a "person …who undertakes the obligations stated in sub-regulation (2)". Reg 1.20(2)(c) provided that the "sponsor undertakes to assist the applicant, to the extent necessary, financially and in relation to accommodation...". AAT adopted PAM3, which read that r 1.20 "requires officers to be satisfied that the sponsor can meet the financial needs of the applicant". AAT found Appellant's partner was not capable of fulfilling the undertaking under r 1.20 and thus was not a sponsor. Is the capacity to fulfil that undertaking relevant for the purposes of cl 820.221(4)?

Federal Court. If the parties to litigation agree on a principle, is that principle's precedential force diminished? Further, in Vaitaiki, Teoh was interpreted by: Burchett J as requiring decision-makers to take the best interests of children into account as a primary consideration if no notice to the contrary was given; Branson J as requiring decision-makers to treat those interests as a primary consideration. Is the error discussed in Teoh better characterised as one going to procedural fairness or as a failure to take into account a relevant consideration? If the former: is the procedural fairness obligation discussed in Teoh either subsumed within s 425 or not a matter dealt with by Div 4 of Pt 7 of the Act; should the FCA adopt Burchett J's or Branson J's interpretation of Teoh?

Federal Court. Does the Briginshaw principle favour a conclusion that a person's onus of proving that they were not recklessly indifferent to fraud is low? Is there anything untoward about a client attending the office of a practitioner for the purpose of procuring their services and making an upfront payment? Can it be said that, "whether a person is or is not indifferent to another’s fraud is to be assessed subjectively, although the objective facts may permit an inference to be drawn about a person’s state of mind"?

Federal Court (Full Court): ordinarily, a subclass 820 visa application will be decided first and the 801 second. However, decision makers can reverse that order in some circumstances; perhaps that means that a TSS visa can be refused before nomination is processed in some circumstances, thus denying review rights to visa applicants

Federal Court: In considering non-refoulement obligations in the context of a decision under s 501CA(4) and Direction 65, did Minister "[misunderstand] that the applicant’s claims would 'necessarily' be considered in the event that the applicant was to make an application for a protection visa"? Minister said it was "unnecessary to determine whether non-refoulement obligations are owed in respect of [the applicant] for the purposes of the present decision as he is able to make a valid application for a Protection visa". Is it implicit that Minister understood that such obligations would be considered in the same way in the context of an application for a protection visa? Did Minister fail to give genuine consideration to matters raised by the Applicant outside of the concept of non-refoulement obligations?

High Court. Is para 8.2 of Direction 90 invalid, based on the proposition that "family violence can be relevant only to the protection of the Australian community (under para 8.1) or to the expectations of the Australian community (under para 8.4)"? Does the attribution of weight to family violence under paras 8.1, 8.2 and 8.4 involve double counting?

Federal Court (Full Court). The primary judge held that term “detain” when employed in ss 189 and 196 meant "lawfully detain", instead of “detain in fact”. In AJL20, the majority judgement of the High Court rejected "the view that the detention of an unlawful non‑citizen ceases to be authorised by the Act immediately, where there has been a delay in the Executive’s performance of the duty imposed by s 198". Did AJL20 foreclose the path of reasoning applied by the primary judge?