Case Law Updates

Federal Court. If primary and secondary visa applicants have their combined visa applications refused and they make a Tribunal application for the review of the refusals, does that constitute the making of multiple applications, one for each applicant? Is there anything in 426A "or the statutory context in which it appears which requires the Tribunal to have regard to the merits of the substantive application"? If not, does that mean that "in all circumstances no consideration of the merits is warranted"?

Federal Court (Full Court). Is the content of any statutory obligation to give reasons for a decision "relevant to the question of what, if any, inferences may be drawn from a decision-maker’s statement of reasons vis a vis the apparent absence of any reference to, or findings on, particular claims or evidence"?

Federal Court (Full Court). Does it follow from the High Court's decision in Plaintiff M1 that there is "an important distinction between considering (in the sense of adverting to and understanding) the representations made by an applicant seeking the revocation of a visa cancellation under s 501CA(4) (on the one hand) and considering the same representations, in the sense of evaluating their significance in the course of making the decision (on the other hand)"?

Federal Court (Full Court): In SZMTA, HCA held that: error was jurisdictional only if it was material, that is if a different decision could have been made had the error not been made; materiality is a question of fact of which judicial review applicants bear the onus of proof. In Ibrahim, FCAFC held that it was incumbent on the judicial review applicant to demonstrate what would or could have occurred had the error not been made. In Nguyen, FCAFC, differently constituted, disagreed with that aspect of Ibrahim. Can that division be resolved? Were those cases distinguished here?

Federal Court (Full Court): The mandatory cancellation provision, s 501(3A), was inserted into the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) in 2014 and obliges the Minister to cancel a visa if he/she is satisfied that a non-citizen has a substantial criminal record and is serving a full-time sentence of imprisonment. "What happens, then, where the non-citizen is serving a term of imprisonment at the time of the Minister’s decision (after the commencement of the mandatory visa cancellation scheme), but the non-citizen has a “substantial criminal record” only because of a different sentence of imprisonment that was served exclusively before the commencement of that scheme? Is the non-citizen’s visa liable to mandatory cancellation in these circumstances?"

Federal Circuit and Family Court. Did the Tribunal’s unattributed copying from the delegate’s reasons, combined with other factors, lead to the conclusion that it failed to bring its own independent mind to the merits of the review? If so, is that a type of error that is material by definition?

High Court (single Justice). Do the words 'benefits the Australian economy' in cl 132.227(2)(b) of Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) imply a significant benefit?

High Court. Does the information to be provided in compliance with s 29(1)(c) of the AAT Act need to be information of the slightest assistance to the Tribunal or any other party to the proceeding? Is non-compliance with s 29(1)(c) intended to result in the invalidity of a Tribunal application?

Federal Court (Full Court). Were the the answers to the interrogatory sought before the primary judge "capable of forming the basis for an inference that persons in the appellant’s situation are not removed from Australia to Iraq, even though s 197C of the Act (as it then stood) removed non-refoulement obligations as a reason to not comply with s 198" and an inference that the Minister "had personal knowledge of the number of persons in respect of whom Australia owed non-refoulement obligations who had been involuntarily returned to Iraq"?

Federal Court (Full Court). Is the word “should” in para 8.4(4) indicative of a requirement that must be followed (i.e. that is mandatory)? Is it doubtful that the Tribunal can permissibly have independent regard to community expectations as assessed by it, given the Direction’s express provisions with regard to that subject which can be expected to cover the field?