Case Law Updates

Federal Court. Does a Class BF Transitional (Permanent) Visa satisfy the definition of a “protection visa” in s 48A(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth)? Was BAL19, which held that s 501(1) did not apply to protection visas, wrongly decided?

Federal Court. For the purposes of the materiality test, FCAFC (White, Perry and Charlesworth JJ) held in Ibrahim that the judicial review applicant had to prove what would have happened had the decision-maker not made the error in question. FCAFC (Rares, Griffiths and Burley JJ) in Karan came to the same conclusion. FCAFC (Jagot, Robertson and Farrell JJ) in Nguyen disagreed with Ibrahim. FCAFC (Katzmann, Mortimer and Bromwich JJ) recently adopted one of Ibrahim and Nguyen. However, as the FCA decision extracted in this article indicates, the division shown by the Ibrahim / Nguyen tension is still present among justices of the FCA.

High Court. Does responsibility for ensuring an absence of bias, whether actual or apprehended, ultimately lie with a court as an institution and not merely with a member of that court whose impartiality might be called into question? Was there a reasonable apprehension of bias in circumstances where one of the members of the Full Court of the Federal Court hearing a migration-related appeal had appeared for the Crown against the appellant in criminal proceedings?

Federal Court. In considering whether an applicant for visa subclass 309 (partner) was a de facto partner of the visa sponsor, was the Tribunal allowed to consider the best interests of the affected children or related issues or "any hardship that might be occasioned by refusal of the visa, be that to the visa applicant, the sponsor, or their children"?

Federal Court (Full Court). Can it be said that, although a court cannot scrutinise an administrative decision with "an eye keenly attuned to the perception of error", it is equally well-established that the eyes of a reader “should not be so blinkered as to avoid discerning an absence of reasons or reasons devoid of any consideration of a submission central to a party’s case"?

Federal Court (FCA). Can it be said that, "in the ordinary course all issues of fact and law should be determined at the one time and that the [FCA] should generally exercise the power in r 30.01 of the Rules cautiously and sparingly"? 

Federal Court. AAT was bound by Direction 56 (now replaced by 84) to consider PAM3 guidelines in assessing Appellant's protection claims. Can it be said that, because AAT "had not mentioned the Guidelines in the section of its reasons on “Relevant Law” or in the substantive section containing its findings on the complementary protection criterion, the Court should infer that it had not taken them into account"? Did the fact that the AAT had only referred to conditions at a specific prison in the Appellant's home country and did not report on conditions in other prisons suggest AAT did not consider PAM3? Does the “intentional” infliction of harm for the purposes of the complementary protection require “actual, subjective intention by the actor to bring about the victims’ pain and suffering by the actor’s conduct”?

OMARA's decision summary: "the Agent was complicit in fraudulent conduct in the creation of companies that the Agent knew, or should have reasonably known, were not lawfully operating in Australia but were registered for the purposes of obtaining immigration outcomes for his clients for which they were not genuinely entitled".

Federal Court. Although the weight to be ascribed to evidence is a matter for administrative decision-makers, can a court in some circumstances "set aside an administrative decision which has failed to give adequate weight to a relevant factor of great importance, or has given excessive weight to a relevant factor of no great importance"? In determining whether an administrative decision is legally unreasonable, is it to the point that it might be characterised as cruel or inhumane?

Federal Court (Full Court). Can it be said that, "absent prior notice here that the weight that the Tribunal might attach to its consideration of the best interests of affected children would be less than the weight that it might attach to its consideration of a different matter or circumstance, procedural fairness would be denied"?