Federal Court (Full Court). For the purposes of assessing complementary protection criteria, s 36(2B)(a) required AAT to consider whether "it would be reasonable for the non-citizen to relocate to an area of the country where there would not be a real risk that the non-citizen will suffer significant harm". Is s 36(2B)(a) informed by, and does it give effect to, a principle akin to the principle of internal relocation? Did AAT misinterpret s 36(2B)(a) by using as a starting point its assessment that Appellant had two "home areas", rather than directing attention to the place where Appellant was likely to return to?
Federal Court. Was AAT required to make a finding about the actual likelihood of sponsor and partner visa applicant being half-siblings? Is the combined effect of s 88C and s 88D of the Marriage Act 1961 (Cth) that a marriage that is valid under foreign law shall be recognised in Australia as valid, unless one of the exceptions in ss 88D(2) to (5) is engaged? While a marriage is prima facie valid pursuant to s 88G(1), do s 88D and s 23B(2) prevail? Does s 12 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) have the effect that s 88G(1) of the Marriage Act applies to an administrative decision concerning a partner visa application, despite s 353 of the Migration Act?
Federal Court. In Australia, it a matter of "ordinary human experience" that a copy of an arrest warrant may be left with a third party connected to the suspected offender? Are the laws of a foreign country relating to the issuance of arrest warrants a matter of "ordinary human experience"?
High Court: "This Court accepted in [SZMTA] that the giving of a notification under s 438(2)(a) ... triggers an obligation of procedural fairness on the part of the [Tribunal] to disclose the fact of notification to an applicant for review under Pt 7. [Does] the giving of a notification under s 473GB(2)(a) triggers an equivalent obligation of procedural fairness on the part of the Immigration Assessment Authority ... to disclose the fact of notification to a referred applicant in a review under Pt 7AA"?
Federal Court: The FCA assumed, without determining, that 'the exercise of power under s 501A is subject to an implied obligation that it be exercised within a reasonable time'. Given that assumption, was that obligation breached by the Minister's 5-month delay in making a decision?
If an applicant nominates an occupation in a subclass 485 visa application form and then seeks to change the occupation before the decision, the change can only be made if it stems from a mistake, as opposed to a change of mind; The use of a "change of circumstance" (as opposed to an "incorrect information") form might suggest that the change stems from a change of mind
Federal Court (Full Court): a non-citizen was born, and was usually resident, in India. Although eligible for Sri Lankan citizenship, he was stateless. The IAA assessed his protection visa application on the basis that he was a Sri Lankan "national". The Minister argued to the Court that a person is a "national" of a country if they are a citizen or eligible for citizenship of that country.
Federal Court. DFQ17 held that a visa refusal notification letter must clearly convey the deadline for an application for merits review in order to comply with s 66(2)(d)(ii). Here, the following sentence was found under the heading "Registries of the [AAT]": "As this letter was given to you by hand, you are taken to have received it when it was handed to you". Did the place of that sentence render the notification unclear? The letter also read: "As you are in immigration detention, the prescribed timeframe commences on the day on which you were notified of this decision, and ends at the end of seven working days (beginning with the first working day that occurs on or after that day)". Did the latter sentence precisely track reg 4.31(1)?
'That there were errors in the [Minister's] decision record does not affect its character as a Pt 5 reviewable decision'
Federal Court. Can it be said that "the threshold for establishing illogicality is very high and requires extreme illogicality such that the decision was one that no rational or logical decision-maker could arrive at on the same evidence"? In Makasa, HCA held that power to cancel visa under s 501(2) was spent by AAT's decision to set aside delegate's original decision. Does Makasa apply to s 501CA(4)? Can the same sentence of imprisonment lead to satisfaction of both ss 501(3A)(a) and (b)?