Direction 79: treating balancing exercise as a discretion an immaterial error?
Federal Court. Did the Tribunal err by assuming that its task was a ‘re-exercise’ of a general discretion having regard to the considerations in Direction 79? If so, but the Tribunal nevertheless engages in a balancing exercise of the factors set out in Direction 79, might the error be immaterial, as such a balancing exercise is, in substance, the same as the exercise involved in the exercise of a discretion?
Regulations 5.19(3)(d)(i)-(ii) interpreted
Federal Court. Could r 5.19(3)(d)(i) of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) only be satisfied if the nominator would not operate at a loss as a result of employing the nominee for 2 years? Was the salary of another nominee a prohibited consideration under r 5.19(3)(d)(i)? If an employment contract makes no mention on whether the terms and conditions of the person’s employment exclude the possibility of extending the period of employment, does that amount to a failure to satisfy r 5.19(3)(d)(ii)?
s 501CA(4): briefs given to Minister
Federal Court. In order for the Minister to personally made a decision under s 501CA(4), must he be "briefed with an accurate and sufficient summary of the matters raised by the representations or ... undertake the consideration of the representations personally"? Can it be inferred from the form of the reasons (i.e. circling 1 of 3 options) that they were the means by which the Minister was briefed, with the result that "the matters that are known to the Minister are only those matters expressed in the reasons"?
AAT’s too narrow approach on reinstatement decision
A reinstatement decision by the AAT focusing only on whether the appellant had been properly notified of the hearing was 'too narrow', given that the appellant's arguments on the reinstatement application had not been so confined.
How long should matters be considered for before decision?
Federal Court (Full Court): Q1 to the FCAFC: did Minister personally spend about an hour or only 11 minutes considering whether to cancel a visa? Q2: should the Court could draw a Jones v Dunkel inference that the Minister spent only 11 minutes? Q3: if the Court finds that Minister spent only 11 minutes, was that sufficient for the Minister to give proper, genuine and realistic consideration to the materials provided by the Department?
Reasonable suspicion that Minister has reasonable suspicion?
Federal Court: the Minister may seize a document if he/she "reasonably suspects" that it is forfeited under s 45A(2) of Citizenship Act, which provides that a "bogus document" given to the Minister is forfeited. A bogus document is defined as a document that the Minister "reasonably suspects" satisfies some criteria. Does that mean that "all that is required for seizure is a reasonable suspicion that the Minister has a reasonable suspicion that the document is a bogus document"?
Legally unreasonable to consider lack of response to NOICC?
High Court. Can it be said that it is "not reasonably open to a decision maker, when exercising their discretion to cancel a visa under s 116 of the [Migration Act 1958 (Cth)], to take into account a failure to respond to an NOICC [Notice of Intention to Consider Cancellation] in a manner adverse to a visa holder, as there is no legal requirement for a person to respond to such a notice"?
Applicant not indifferent although aware of agent’s fraud
Federal Court (Full Court): it is settled law that, in order for a fraudulent visa application lodged by an RMA to be invalid, the applicant must be neither complicit in, nor 'indifferent' to, the fraud (Gill and Singh). The Full Court elaborated on those previous decisions, holding that 'indifference' in public law means 'reckless indifference' at common law
Meaning of ‘conviction’
Federal Court. Even though the applicant had not been convicted in court, the Tribunal found that he had been 'convicted'. Did the Tribunal finding involve a misinterpretation of the law? Could the Tribunal have reasonably considered the view of the applicant's minor child to love the applicant to be irrelevant to the best interests of the child?
Inference that drug abstinence in detention is not as fully tested as in community?
Federal Court. Was it "uncontroversial that people in immigration detention are subject to a much greater level of surveillance and monitoring than people in the community generally"? Would the complaint that the Tribunal took into account an irrelevant consideration have force "if the fact that the applicant’s ability to avoid drug use had not been “tested” was the Tribunal’s only basis for finding that he posed an elevated risk of reoffending"?


















