Sections 501G(3) and 494A(1) and r 5.02 interpreted

Federal Court. Did s 501G(3) satisfy the phrase in s 494A(1)(b)(ii) of a provision that "does not state that the document must be given ... by a method prescribed for the purposes of giving documents to a person in immigration detention”? If s 494A(1) applied, did ss 494B(5)(b) and (d), 494C(1) and (5) and s 494D(1) apply? Did the word “giving” in r 5.02 imply a requirement to hand a written notice of the delegate’s non-revocation decision personally to either the applicant or his solicitor? If not and the written notice occurs by email, must it be actually received to satisfy r 5.02?

Tribunal to consider Direction in force before its decision?

High Court. Was the Tribunal required to apply a Direction in force at the time when the decision under review was made or when the application for merits review was made, instead of the Direction in force at the time when the Tribunal made its decision? In other words, did the Appellant have an accrued right to have Tribunal determine his review in accordance with a Direction in force before the date of the Tribunal's decision?

When admin decision maker chooses to give reasons

Federal Court: There is no common law duty on administrative decision-makers to provide reasons for their decisions. Thus, in the absence of a statutory duty, those decision-makers are not required to provide reasons at all. However, if an administrative decision-maker chooses to provide reasons in circumstances where they are not obliged to do so, can a court on judicial review draw an inference from the fact that the decision record is silent about a particular consideration that such a consideration was not taken into account?

Appeal: Ministerial intervention for AAT’s ‘no jurisdiction’ decision?

Federal Court (Full Court). In determining that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to review the decision because of the invalidity of the application, was there a "decision of the Tribunal under section 415" of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), with the result that the Minister had the power under s 417 to substitute for the decision of the Tribunal?

Section 46A: procedural fairness & remedies

Federal Court (Full Court): We recently summarised a FCAFC decision which held that: the Minister had made a personal procedural decision to consider the exercise of his powers under s 46A; the exercise of the revocation power in s 46A(2C) was subject to procedural fairness. Now, the FCAFC delivered a further judgement, with remedies that gave effect to that decision. Both decisions could positively affect other unauthorised maritime arrivals who missed the deadline of 1 October 2017 for making a protection visa application.

Cl 11.2(4)(e) of Direction No 65 directed only to existing state of affairs?

Federal Court. Does it matter for the purpose of s 501(7)(c) the country where a non-citizen is sentenced? Was subparagraph 11.2(4)(e) of Direction No 65 directed only to an existing state of affairs, as opposed to possible future events? If so, does it follow that AAT could not have considered possible future events if there had been sufficient evidence before it?

Para 8.3(4)(a) of Direction 90 interpreted

Federal Court (Full Court). Did para 8.3(4)(a) of Direction 90 suggest that decision-makers cannot consider periods of absence or of limited meaningful contact arising from periods during which a non-citizen is incarcerated? Was para 8.3(4)(a) ultra vires the Migration Act 1958 (Cth)?

OMARA found RMA lodged applications where no RMA was declared

According to the OMARA, the suspended RMA turned 'a blind eye to the activities of [a non-RMA], choosing to be ignorant of his conduct'. It seems that assistance by the non-RMA with skills assessment applications was considered by the OMARA to be 'immigration assistance', which only RMAs can provide.

Jones distinguished?

Federal Court (Full Court). As good character was not required when the Appellant was granted citizenship as a minor, should the Court "distinguish Jones on the basis that the power to revoke his citizenship based on the commission of a serious offence before he became an Australian citizen is not reasonably capable of being seen as necessary to protect the integrity of the naturalisation process, and is therefore properly characterised as punitive in nature"?

Appellant entitled to costs if he only won due to Minister’s identification of error?

Federal Court (FCA). The Appellant's judicial review application to the Federal Circuit Court was dismissed. He then appealed that decision to the FCA. During FCA proceedings, the Minister identified an error by the IAA which had not been identified by the Appellant and conceded the appeal on that basis. Should the Appellant obtain an order for costs at first instance?