Reg 2.55 a prescribed method for s 119(2)?

High Court (single Justice). Can it be said that, although "a separate visa was granted to each of the First, Second and Third Plaintiffs, nevertheless the Second and Third Plaintiffs were each a "holder" of the Protection visa granted to the First Plaintiff"? Was r 2.55 of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) a prescribed method for the giving of a NOICC under s 119(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth)?

ADJR Act: discretion under s 10(2)(b)(ii)

Federal Court (Full Court). Can it be said that, "for the purposes of the discretion under s 10(2)(b)(ii) [of the ADJR Act], the availability of a full merits review on a de novo basis can constitute “adequate provision” for review and entitle the Court to refuse relief in its discretion"? If so, is the position "perhaps even stronger here where the appellant potentially had available to him two tiers of review in the AAT"?

NBMZ limited to particular types of legal consequences?

Federal Court. Can it be said that indefinite detention may need to be considered as a legal consequence of a non-revocation decision under s 501CA(4) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) even where Australia’s non-refoulement obligations are not enlivened? Is the finding in NBMZ that decision-makers should consider the legal consequences of a decision limited to the consequence of indefinite detention arising from non-refoulement obligations?

Department’s data breach

Federal Court: In SZSSJ: personal details of SZSSJ were unintentionally disclosed on the DHA's website; DHA refused to disclose the full content of a KPMG report on the data breach, but referred SZSSJ to an ITOA with instructions to assume that information from him had been accessed by all persons from whom he feared persecution; HCA held that even if there was a denial of procedural fairness in not disclosing the full report, that was cured by the assumption. Was the AAT in this case obliged to make that assumption?

Does materiality apply to the ADJR Act?

Federal Court (Full Court). In order to make out the statutory grounds of review specified in s 5 of the ADJR Act, was it necessary for the judicial review applicant to show that any errors were jurisdictional? In relation to the exercise of the discretion under s 16 of the ADJR Act as to whether to grant relief, is there a like standard of “reasonable conjecture” to that which informs whether an error is jurisdictional?

Part 3: Katoa extended to determination of leave to raise new judicial review ground?

Federal Court. Is the assessment of whether a ground of judicial review has sufficient merit to justify the grant of leave for it to be agitated for the first time on appeal to be conducted on a "reasonably impressionistic" basis?

Appeal: cancellation under s 501(3A) on the day of release?

Federal Court (Full Court). The respondent gave evidence that, at the time he received notice of a decision to cancel his visa under s 501(3A) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), he had been processed and released from prison, and waiting in a cell. Does the onus of proof shift to the Minister to establish the fact that the respondent was serving a sentence of full time imprisonment when the cancellation decision was made? If the cancellation occurred on the day of the respondent's release, was s 501(3A)(b) necessarily not met?

Omar (first instance) wrongly decided?

Federal Court (Full Court). Can it be said that, in the content of determining whether there is another reason to revoke under s 501CA(4) the mandatory cancellation of a visa under s 501(3A), "the greater the degree of clarity in which a claim has been made and advanced for consideration, the greater may be the need for the Tribunal to consider the claim in clear terms"? Further, was Omar (first instance) wrongly decided?

Was there a “matter” before the FCAFC?

High Court. Is it necessary for there to be a "matter" before the Full Court of the Federal Court for it to have jurisdiction in an appeal? If so, can it be said that there was no "matter" before the Full Court "because the orders that the Commonwealth parties sought to appeal had no operative legal effect by the time the Full Court determined the appeals"?

Para 8.3(4)(a) of Direction 90 interpreted

Federal Court (Full Court). Did para 8.3(4)(a) of Direction 90 suggest that decision-makers cannot consider periods of absence or of limited meaningful contact arising from periods during which a non-citizen is incarcerated? Was para 8.3(4)(a) ultra vires the Migration Act 1958 (Cth)?