cl 9.1.2(2)(a) of Direction 79: would or could?

Federal Court. Can it be said that, although drink driving and possession of child pornography do not require an element of harm to another person to attract criminal sanction, they can cause the type of harm contemplated by cl 9.1.2(2)(a) of Direction 79? Does cl 9.1.2(2)(a) call for consideration of what would most likely (as opposed to what could) occur in the future if the non-citizen engaged in conduct which led to the cancellation of their visa?

Logical to reason that appellant was a risk to community, even though he would...

Federal Court (Full Court). Was it legally unreasonable, irrational or illogical for the Minister to conclude that the risk that the appellant posed to the community and community expectations weighed in favour of cancellation of his visa when the appellant would remain in the community anyway on a BVR because of the effect of NZYQ?

Is ADVO sufficient to prove spousal relationship?

Federal Court. Applicant gave AAT copy of an Apprehended Domestic Violence Order (ADVO) granted against the sponsor of his partner visa application. AAT affirmed partner visa refusal. Applicant claimed his lawyer advised him to withdraw judicial review application before FCCA in the last minute. FCA found Applicant disagreed with lawyer's advice but "went along with [it]". FCCA gave consent orders, dismissing judicial review application. Applicant applied to FCA for leave to appeal FCCA's decision. Was Applicant estopped by the doctrines of res judicata or Anshun estoppel from pursuing the appeal? Did the circumstances in which the consent orders were made vitiate that consent? Was the grant of the ADVO in itself proof that Applicant was in a spousal relationship with sponsor and therefore met cl 820.211?

Making a decision the same as providing reasons?

Federal Court (Full Court): AAT had to make a decision within 84 days of the delegate's decision. Hearing was scheduled for 1 week before that deadline, but the Appellant was not ready to present arguments by then. AAT adjourned hearing for just 1 day, on the assumption it had to give reasons within the above deadline. Was that assumption wrong? Further, was the visa refusal notification invalid, by analogy with DFQ17 ? With respect and the benefit of hindsight, could Appellant have made an additional argument?

Can AAT cancel 2nd hearing?

Federal Court. The AAT carried out a hearing and then invited the Appellant in writing to a second hearing, seeking to "provide [her] with an extended opportunity to address any concerns or issues arising from the evidence before it". The Appellant's RMA would be on maternity leave on the date proposed for the second hearing, so she requested another date. The AAT then cancelled the second hearing and sent a s 359A letter instead, setting out what would be the reason for affirming the delegate's decision and inviting comments. Was the AAT obliged to proceed with the second hearing?

PIC 4020: several concepts discussed

Federal Court. Are decision-makers required to identify the precise respects in which information is false or misleading? Can the question of whether a person provided "false or misleading information in a material particular" within the meaning of PIC 4020 be answered by a court? In order for the "false or misleading in a material particular" limb of PIC 4020 to be enlivened against a visa applicant, must the applicant have knowledge that the information is false or misleading? If so, are decision-makers required to identify knowledge as a requirement and make an express finding about the matter? Does the materiality threshold involve a question of whether the chances of a different outcome in the absence of error would have been "slim"?

Direction 90: cl 9.2 interpreted

Federal Court. Can it be said that, "in order to raise a relevant issue under cl 9.2 there needs to be some evidence of the relevant support in the home country"? For the purpose of cl 9.2, is it "necessary that there be some evidence or material to demonstrate there is some qualitative difference between the circumstances in Australia and those in the applicant’s home country"?

Ibrahim / Nguyen division resolved?

Federal Court: In SZMTA, HCA held that: error was jurisdictional only if it was material, that is if a different decision could have been made had the error not been made; materiality is a question of fact of which judicial review applicants bear the onus of proof. In Ibrahim, FCAFC held that it was incumbent on the judicial review applicant to demonstrate what would or could have occurred had the error not been made. In Nguyen, FCAFC, differently constituted, disagreed with Ibrahim. Can that division be resolved? Further, can errors which individually do not satisfy the materiality test do so if combined?

Expert’s report: implied waiver of legal privilege?

Federal Court. Can it be said that, "ordinarily disclosure of the expert's report for the purpose of reliance on it in the litigation will result in an implied waiver of the privilege in respect of the brief or instructions or documents … at least if the appropriate inference to be drawn is that they were used in a way that could be said to influence the content of the report, because, in these circumstances, it would be unfair for the client to rely on the report without disclosure of the brief, instructions or documents"?

Change from visitor to student visa enough to fail cl 500.212(a)?

Federal Court. In the context of cl 500.212(a) of Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), can it be said that, since the grant of a student visa would allow the appellants to stay in Australia for only a specified period, a mere change of plans from a visitor visa to make an application for a student visa could not provide evidence of an intention to stay permanently or indefinitely in Australia?