Case Law Updates

Federal Court. Applicant's visa was cancelled under s 501(3A). Delegate refused to revoke cancellation under s 501CA(4). AAT: found it had jurisdiction to review delegate's decision; erroneously found revocation request had not been made by deadline; thus, found that neither AAT nor delegate had power to revoke; nonetheless found that, had it been made by deadline, it would have affirmed delegate's decision, based on its opinion that there was not "another reason" to revoke cancellation; set aside non-revocation decision; and remitted matter to Minister with a direction that the cancellation decision not be set aside. Was AAT's error not jurisdictional, given its opinion that there was not "another reason"?

Federal Court. Is the risk posed by the non-citizen in question to the Australian community a mandatory relevant consideration for the Minister when exercising the discretion under s 501A(3)(b) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth)?

Federal Court (Full Court). Did subpara (b)(v) of the definition of “immigration detention” in s 5(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) impliedly confer power on the Minister to approve in writing “another place” of immigration detention? If so, did that power exclude the power to create a de-facto detention centre, which is already provided for in subpara (b)(i) of that definition and s 273 of the Act? Is immigration detention lawful even if the expenditure involved in detaining the appellant was not lawfully authorised?

Federal Court: Was the AAT obliged to call a psychologists for cross-examination? Was the AAT's reason illogical on the basis that, on the one hand, it expressed 'concerns about the reliability of the final conclusions in relation to recidivism presented in the reports of both [psychologists]' and, on the other hand, 'proceeded to accept both those assessments and use them effectively as bookends to a range which is expressed by the AAT as “‘low’ to ‘low to moderate’ risk” that the applicant will re-offend'?

Federal Court. AAT was bound by Direction 56 (now replaced by 84) to consider PAM3 guidelines in assessing Appellant's protection claims. Can it be said that, because AAT "had not mentioned the Guidelines in the section of its reasons on “Relevant Law” or in the substantive section containing its findings on the complementary protection criterion, the Court should infer that it had not taken them into account"? Did the fact that the AAT had only referred to conditions at a specific prison in the Appellant's home country and did not report on conditions in other prisons suggest AAT did not consider PAM3? Does the “intentional” infliction of harm for the purposes of the complementary protection require “actual, subjective intention by the actor to bring about the victims’ pain and suffering by the actor’s conduct”?

Federal Court. If a persecution claim is based upon membership of a particular social group, may AAT be required to consider a group definition open on the facts but not expressly advanced by an applicant? If AAT chooses to exercise its jurisdiction more widely than an applicant or the Minister has asked, must it do so according to law? IAA found Appellant did not satisfy s 36(2)(a) on the basis that, as she had only told a few people she had been rapped, there was not a real chance that she would suffer societal discrimination. Did IAA make a jurisdictional error by not asking Appellant why she would not tell others about her rape? Could stigma or discrimination arising from sexual assault give rise to a protection claim?

Federal Court. In deciding whether to affirm cancellation made under s 109, AAT said Department would conduct an ITOA before removing Appellant from Australia. Combined effect of ss 198 and 197C was that, if AAT affirmed Department's decision, Appellant should be removed as soon as reasonably practicable despite Australia's non-refoulement obligations. Did the removal duty have to be performed regardless of whether any ITOA process would occur?

Federal Court. In NATB, the FCAFC held that the reference to reasonable practicability in s 198AD "does not require an officer to take into account what is likely, or even virtually certain, to befall the unlawful non-citizen after removal is complete". In MB v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCA 442, the FCA then held that the applicant in that case was "entitled to have his claims for protection in respect of Nauru determined and, if found to be well founded, not to be refouled to Nauru". Can MB be reconciled with NATB?

Federal Court (Full Court). Can it be said, based on a single judge FCA decision, that the "principles of legal unreasonableness, in the sense considered in Li, have no application in the review of a decision... as to the existence of certain facts that satisfy statutory criteria", but only to the review of a discretionary power? Summary of principles concerning review of: state of satisfaction under s 65 for illogicality and irrationality; adverse credibility findings. Can it be said that "the psychological reactions of a couple to their first sexual encounter are matters of common human experience"? Or do those reactions need to be supported by evidence such as psychological evidence? Can it be said that, "if two people give a different account of an event and the evidence of one is rejected, that does not provide a logical basis on which to reject the evidence of the other"?

Federal Court. Can it be said that, “in order to make a decision in accordance with law on the remittal of a matter it is necessary, in the sense required by the doctrine of necessity as an exception to the bias rule, that the differently constituted IAA be provided by the Secretary (under s 473CB(1)(c) of the Migration Act) with a copy of the judgment or judgments identifying the legal error which vitiated the first decision of the IAA”?