Is ADVO sufficient to prove spousal relationship?

Federal Court. Applicant gave AAT copy of an Apprehended Domestic Violence Order (ADVO) granted against the sponsor of his partner visa application. AAT affirmed partner visa refusal. Applicant claimed his lawyer advised him to withdraw judicial review application before FCCA in the last minute. FCA found Applicant disagreed with lawyer's advice but "went along with [it]". FCCA gave consent orders, dismissing judicial review application. Applicant applied to FCA for leave to appeal FCCA's decision. Was Applicant estopped by the doctrines of res judicata or Anshun estoppel from pursuing the appeal? Did the circumstances in which the consent orders were made vitiate that consent? Was the grant of the ADVO in itself proof that Applicant was in a spousal relationship with sponsor and therefore met cl 820.211?

LPP attached to legal advice covered by s 438 certificate?

Federal Court. DoesWaterford apply to legal advice sought to be covered by a s 438 certificate? Does s 418 expressly or by necessary implication abrogate legal professional privilege (LPP)? Did s 418(3) require the Secretary to provide to the Tribunal documents attracting legal professional privilege? Should a waiver of LPP be imputed to the Minister here? Was the fact that the Secretary considered the documents containing legal advice relevant to the review determinative of the question whether they were relevant pursuant to s 418(3)?

s 473DC(1)(a): ‘before the Minister’

Federal Court. Does the term 'before the Minister' in s 473DC(1)(a) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) refer to documents or information to which the delegate has had regard? Is it "necessary for a document or information to be physically before the Minister’s delegate or for the delegate to have had regard to it on the very day the decision is made for it to be said that the document or information was before the Minister when the Minister’s delegate made the decision under s 65"?

Tension between ss 197C / 198 and Direction 79?

Federal Court (Full Court). Did cl 14.1(2) and (6) of Direction 79, which conflicted with ss 197C and 198 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), effectively preclude the Tribunal from finding that, if the cancellation of the Appellant’s visa was not revoked and he was not granted another visa, he would be removed from Australia? Is the damage to Australia's reputation if it refoules a person a mandatory consideration for the purposes of s 501CA(4)?

Risk of reoffending a mandatory consideration in s 501A(3)(b)?

Federal Court. Is the risk posed by the non-citizen in question to the Australian community a mandatory relevant consideration for the Minister when exercising the discretion under s 501A(3)(b) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth)?

Is success relevant to ‘formative years’?

Federal Court. Is the question in para 8.3(4)(a)(i) of Direction 99 whether the person was successful in respect of issues such as community participation, employment, or education during his or her formative years relevant in considering whether his or her formative years were spent in Australia? Did para 8.5(2)(a)-(f) exhaustively identify the relevant categories of conduct?

AAT bound by delegate’s decision?

Federal Court. Delegate mandatorily cancelled visa under s 501(3A) on character grounds, but then revoked that cancellation under s 501CA. Applicant offended again and delegate mandatorily cancelled visa under s 501(3A) again, but this time did not revoke the cancellation. AAT affirmed non-revocation decision. Can it be said that, as earlier revocation decision formed part of the background facts against which AAT came to exercise its review jurisdiction, the facts before the AAT were not the same as those before the delegate at the time of revocation, with the result that AAT was not bound to follow that revocation decision?

Must finding of psychological / psychiatric condition be founded on expert evidence?

Federal Court. In the context of administrative law, must a finding that there is a psychological or psychiatric condition be founded upon expert medical or psychological evidence? Was the Minister’s reference to the Applicant’s "psychological sexual issues" a "statement that involved the application of specialist expertise" or that "was not open absent a specialist diagnosis"? Can it be said that "to take account of the fact that he had received a 25% discount in sentencing from the court was to take into account an irrelevant consideration"?

Modifying behaviour: ss 5J(3) and 5L

Federal Court (Full Court). Do the expressions in ss 5L(c)(ii) and 5J(3)(a) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) necessarily encompass the same "characteristic"? Assuming that IAA accepted that the Appellant's interest for music and dance was "a characteristic that [was] fundamental to [his] identity", was it open to IAA to find that Appellant could avoid a real chance of persecution by carrying out his activities underground and with caution? Could the IAA have "decided that the appellant’s expression of his interest in music and dance “underground” would not conflict with a characteristic which was fundamental to his identity ... without having made a finding concerning the existence and nature of that characteristic"?

Thornton extended to Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW)?

Federal Court. Should Thornton and Lesianawai be extended to s 35(4) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW)? Did the fact that the applicant had only been involved in the supply of methamphetamine at the instigation of an undercover officer render his offending as irrelevant to the Tribunal's inquiry as to the protection of the Australian community under para 8.1.1(1) of Direction 99?