Failure to disclose reliance on movement records a JE?
Federal Court. The Tribunal obtained the sponsor’s movements record after the hearing and took that evidence into account in affirming the decision without giving the appellant an opportunity to be heard about the evidence of the sponsor’s travel and the couple’s time apart in relation to whether compelling reasons existed. The movement records had a direct bearing on the veracity of the appellant’s "compelling reasons" claim. Did that constitute a failure to comply with ss 359A or 360 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth)?
Sections 36(1C)(b) and 36A interpreted
Federal Court. Section 36(1C)(b) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) referred to a protection visa applicant being "a danger to the Australian community"? Must the nature of the danger "be one to the safety and wellbeing of the Australian community at large, in general or as a whole, rather than to “one or more members”"? If the delegate's protection visa refusal was made before s 36A was added, did this provision apply to the AAT?
Best interests of children a primary consideration?
Federal Court. If the parties to litigation agree on a principle, is that principle's precedential force diminished? Further, in Vaitaiki, Teoh was interpreted by: Burchett J as requiring decision-makers to take the best interests of children into account as a primary consideration if no notice to the contrary was given; Branson J as requiring decision-makers to treat those interests as a primary consideration. Is the error discussed in Teoh better characterised as one going to procedural fairness or as a failure to take into account a relevant consideration? If the former: is the procedural fairness obligation discussed in Teoh either subsumed within s 425 or not a matter dealt with by Div 4 of Pt 7 of the Act; should the FCA adopt Burchett J's or Branson J's interpretation of Teoh?
Lost Australian citizenship by becoming PNG citizen?
Federal Court. Generally speaking, a person does not lose Australian citizenship by becoming a citizen of another country. However, there are exceptions. For instance, in some circumstances, a person who once was an Australian citizen is not an Australian citizen under the Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth) if they became a citizen of PNG by reason of the PNG Constitution. In this particular decision, did the Applicant become a PNG citizen by reason of the PNG Constitution and therefore lose his Australian citizenship?
Can Minister rely on Departmental summary of non-citizen’s representations?
Federal Court (Full Court). Was the appellant Minister, who elected to make a personal decision under s 501CA(4) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), required to personally consider the respondent's representations? Or could he merely rely on a Departmental summary of such representations? If he could not rely on a summary, did he consider those representations? Which party bore the onus, on appeal, on the question of whether the Minister considered those representations?
Appeal: duty of care owed to limit duration of detention?
Federal Court (Full Court). Are all duties of care discharged by the exercise of reasonable care, without imposing more stringent or onerous burdens? If so, does it necessarily follow that "a duty to achieve a particular result (eg confining the appellant’s detention to a specified duration) is not one that the law of tort would impose"?
Is the Act addressing Pearson unconstitutional?
Federal Court (Full Court). Does item 4 of the Migration Amendment (Aggregate Sentences) Act 2023 (Cth) (Amending Act) involve a usurpation of judicial power? Does item 4 have the effect of withdrawing or fettering the entrenched jurisdiction of the High Court under s 75(iii) and (v) of the Constitution? Do items 4(3), (4) and (5)(b)(i) of Sch 1 to the Amending Act effect an acquisition of the applicant’s right to sue for false imprisonment otherwise than on just terms, contrary to s 51(xxxi) of the Constitution?
Minister bound under s 501(1) by AAT’s findings under s 65?
Federal Court. AAT set refusal aside, finding Applicant met s 36(2)(aa). On remittal, in considering exercise of discretion under s 501(1), Minister "accepted" AAT had found s 36(2)(aa) was satisfied and "noted" Applicant's submission to Minister relating non-refoulement obligations. Can it be said that Minister's acceptance that the AAT had found that s 36(2)(aa) was met should not be viewed as acceptance by him of substratum of AAT's finding? Can it be said that the use by the Minister of term "note" should not be read as the Minister stating that he agreed with the substratum of the Applicant's submissions, with the consequence that the Minister failed to meaningfully assess the Applicant's submissions and thus failed to discharge his discretion? For the purposes of discretion under s 501(1), is Minister entitled to disagree with or adopt AAT's findings?
Habeas corpus and false imprisonment explained
Federal Court. May the extent of what a habeas corpus applicant is required to demonstrate to secure his/her release have regard to the extent to which knowledge of relevant matters is in the hands of the detainer? Can an action for false imprisonment be brought by a person who has no basis at all for a view that the detention was not lawfully justified? In a claim for false imprisonment, must the applicant negative a defence which the respondent may have? In other words, is the lack of a defence an element of the tort?
Omar (first instance) wrongly decided?
Federal Court (Full Court). Can it be said that, in the content of determining whether there is another reason to revoke under s 501CA(4) the mandatory cancellation of a visa under s 501(3A), "the greater the degree of clarity in which a claim has been made and advanced for consideration, the greater may be the need for the Tribunal to consider the claim in clear terms"? Further, was Omar (first instance) wrongly decided?


















