Case Law Updates

Federal Court (Full Court). In Katoa, the High Court held that, in determining whether to extend time under s 477A(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), the Federal Court was not limited to a reasonably impressionist level of assessment of the merits of the judicial review application. Does Katoa apply to s 477?

Federal Court. If a party argues on appeal that they were denied procedural fairness in proceedings in the court below, is the question of whether the appeal is futile to be determined "from the standpoint of whether it has been demonstrated in the appeal that had the appellants been accorded procedural fairness it was inevitable that the primary judge would have made an order dismissing the appellants’ application for judicial review"?

High Court. Does responsibility for ensuring an absence of bias, whether actual or apprehended, ultimately lie with a court as an institution and not merely with a member of that court whose impartiality might be called into question? Was there a reasonable apprehension of bias in circumstances where one of the members of the Full Court of the Federal Court hearing a migration-related appeal had appeared for the Crown against the appellant in criminal proceedings?

Federal Court. Are decision-makers required to identify the precise respects in which information is false or misleading? Can the question of whether a person provided "false or misleading information in a material particular" within the meaning of PIC 4020 be answered by a court? In order for the "false or misleading in a material particular" limb of PIC 4020 to be enlivened against a visa applicant, must the applicant have knowledge that the information is false or misleading? If so, are decision-makers required to identify knowledge as a requirement and make an express finding about the matter? Does the materiality threshold involve a question of whether the chances of a different outcome in the absence of error would have been "slim"?

Federal Court (Full Court). The Minister found that child pornography offences for which the Appellant was convicted were "offences against vulnerable member of the community". Was the Minister referring to members of the Australian community, despite the fact the location of the children involved was unknown? Was Dunn v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 489 wrongly decided?

Federal Court (Full Court): In 2012, delegate decided not to exercise the discretion under s 501(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) to refuse the Appellant a bridging visa and notified him of it. In 2013, Appellant was granted a partner visa. In 2016, Appellant was convicted for conduct occurring for 7 years until 2009. In 2018, Minister found that Appellant failed the character test due to the 2016 conviction and personally exercised the discretion to cancel his visa under s 501(2). Did the 2012 decision estop the Minister from making the 2018 decision?

Supreme Court of New South Wales (Court of Appeal). Does a court's failure to properly apply the relevant standard of proof amount to jurisdictional error?

Federal Court. The Applicant, an unauthorised maritime arrival, made a request for Ministerial intervention under s 46A(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). Before determining that request, the Applicant was told that he would be removed from Australia. In an application for interlocutory injunction to restrain his removal, did the balance of convenience favour the respondents because removal would frustrate the duty under s 198?

Once an RMA becomes aware that a client may have provided false information to the Department, are they obliged to notify the Department? MARA's answer to that question is quite interesting.

Federal Court: IAA affirmed decision to refuse Appellant a protection visa on the basis that he could relocate to Kabul: "I am ... not satisfied that there is a real risk of him facing significant harm ... in Kabul". Under s 36(2B)(a), "there is taken not to be a real risk that a non-citizen will suffer significant harm in a country if ... it would be reasonable for the non-citizen to relocate to an area of the country where there would not be a real risk that the non-citizen will suffer significant harm". As per MZACX and MZZJY, in order for relocation to be reasonable, risk of harm in other place is relevant, but risk need not be as high as "real" and harm need not be as serious as "significant". Did IAA treat reasonableness of relocation as necessarily involving the same risk and level of harm as set out in s 36(2)(aa), namely "real" and "significant"?