Case Law Updates

Federal Court. Does the concept of proportionality play a role in determining whether an exercise of discretionary power was legally unreasonable? Does the concept of legal unreasonableness apply to individual aspects of the fact-finding of a decision-maker, such as credibility findings? Does the concept of proportionality form part of the assessment of whether a credibility finding has been made in accordance with established principles as to illogicality or irrationality?

According to the OMARA, the suspended RMA turned 'a blind eye to the activities of [a non-RMA], choosing to be ignorant of his conduct'. It seems that assistance by the non-RMA with skills assessment applications was considered by the OMARA to be 'immigration assistance', which only RMAs can provide.

Federal Circuit Court. Clause 485.212(a)(ii) required the visa application to be accompanied by evidence that the applicant "has achieved, within the period specified by the Minister in the instrument, the score specified ... in the instrument". Clause 4 of IMMI 15/062 specified for cl 485.212(a)(ii) that the test "must have been undertaken within the three years before the day on which the application was made". Did a test undertaken before the 3-year timeframe but whose result was achieved within that timeframe satisfy cl 485.212(a)(ii)?

High Court. If the Minister exercises the power under s 501CA(4) and makes a finding of fact in his reasons, must he "do so based on some evidence or other supporting material, rather than no evidence or no material, unless the finding is made in accordance with the Minister's personal or specialised knowledge or by reference to that which is commonly known"? If so, is there "any express requirement that the Minister disclose whether a material finding was made from personal knowledge"? If not, can it be assumed that the finding was based on that knowledge?

Federal Court (Full Court). Is a court prevented from restraining abuses of its process in an application for habeas corpus?

Federal Court (Full Court). Does s 476A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) prevent "direct review" by the Federal Court of an exercise of power under s 189, including by way of an application for habeas corpus? We summarise the answer to that and 35 other questions.

Federal Court (Full Court). Is the Tribunal required to apply the Direction in force at the time when the application for merits review is made, instead of the Direction in force at the time when the Tribunal makes its decision? Can the Tribunal remit a matter for reconsideration, instead of re-exercising the discretion under s 501(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) for itself?

Federal Court. Was it permissible for the delegate to consider, for the purpose of r 2.20(17)(c) of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), that the Appellant had not signed a request for removal, was not in immigration detention and had a pending application for judicial review?

Federal Court (Full Court): Direction 65, which for the purpose of this decision was identical to Direction 79, required the Tribunal to take into account a number of considerations in deciding whether to refuse a visa under s 501 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). One such consideration was labelled the "expectations of the Australian community". Are those expectations pre-determined by the direction itself as deemed expectations? What is the content of those expectations?

Federal Court: Could it be said that, once a visa application form is first drafted on a particular date, it cannot "thereafter be altered and that its form [is] forever fixed as at that date"? If, while a non-citizen is in the migration zone, the Minister considered an invalid protection visa application to be valid and refused to grant the visa, is the non-citizen barred under s 48A from making further protection visa applications while in the migration zone? Does the s 48A bar apply to non-citizens who are making a new protection visa application as secondary applicants?