Case Law Updates

Federal Court. Can it be said that, "if an applicant fails to appear at a scheduled hearing, the Tribunal has three options: (i) to proceed to make a decision on the review (s 426A(1A)(a)); (ii) to dismiss the application “without any further consideration of the application or information before the Tribunal” (s 426A(1A)(b)); or (iii) to adjourn the review and reschedule the hearing (ss 426A(2) and 427(1)(b))"? If so, must its decision nevertheless have an evident and intelligible justification?

Federal Court (Full Court). In the decision in Stewart  plainly wrong? If an invitation issued under s 501CA contained an error in the specification of the deadline for the making of representations, can it nevertheless be said that whether the invitation is invalid will depend on the extent and consequences of the error? If an invitation issued under s 501CA is invalid, does it follow that the anterior mandatory cancellation decision itself under s 501(3A) is also invalid?

Federal Court. Was the question under the definition of “serious Australian offence” whether the particular offence is “punishable by” a certain term of imprisonment, instead of whether the offender was capable of being so punished? Was the definition of “particularly serious crime” in s 5M of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) limited to a “serious Australian offence” or a “serious foreign offence”?

Federal Court: the NZ citizen Appellant signed papers requesting to be removed from Australia under s 199(1) of the Migration Act 1958, in which case the airfare was paid for by the DHA. However, the DHA found that the removal rendered her a 'behaviour concern non-citizen': s 5(1). As a result, she was unable to obtain a further subclass 444 visa. If the Appellant did not understand the significance of her removal request, was she really a 'behaviour concern non-citizen'?

Federal Court. Is an alien who has no legal right to remain in Australia "permitted to engineer their own release into the community by frustrating the efforts of officers to carry out their duty under s 198 of the Act"? If so, should a non-citizen who seeks to prevent his/her return to the country where they fear harm, but does not seek to prevent his/her removal from Australia to some other place, be seen as engineering their own release into the community?

Federal Court. Can it be said that, "in order to raise a relevant issue under cl 9.2 there needs to be some evidence of the relevant support in the home country"? For the purpose of cl 9.2, is it "necessary that there be some evidence or material to demonstrate there is some qualitative difference between the circumstances in Australia and those in the applicant’s home country"?

Federal Court: Minister found Appellant satisfied s 36 and assessed whether he should refuse protection visa under s 501 by considering consequences of decision, finding that: if granted, potential harm to AU community was "so great that any likelihood that [such harm] would occur represents" unacceptable risk; if refused, Appellant would remain in indefinite detention while Minister considered exercising discretion to grant another visa. As a result, Minister reasoned he did not need to consider consequences of removal, such as persecution. Was that reasoning flawed? Further, can it be said that: "s 36(1C) is a specific criterion applicable only to an applicant for a protection visa and it precludes the Minister using s 501(1) or its analogues as a basis to refuse to grant a protection visa"; PIC 4001 is inconsistent with ss 36(1C) or 501?

Federal Court (Full Court). The High Court said as follows in Viane about s 501CA(4) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth): "That scheme necessarily requires the Minister to consider and understand the representations received". Does Viane equally apply to the consideration of any material relied on by a person who was subject to the exercise of the power under s 501(1)?

Federal Court: In MZABP, FCAFC had held that it is an error for FCCA to assess the full merits of a judicial review application made under s 476 for the purposes of s 477(2). Here, did FCCA make that error by saying that the application under s 476 "would be dismissed if it were a matter that I was dealing with on the merits"? If so, does the materiality test apply to court decisions? With respect: although the FCA has "not had any authority cited to [it] which demonstrates that the materiality principle" applies to court decisions, an earlier FCAFC decision had answered that question; we believe the FCA misinterpreted the materiality test; we disagree with the FCA's decision on whether the error in the present matter was material.

Federal Court (Full Court). Can it be said that "the material the subject of the second certificate did not have the quality of confidence required by s 376 due to an “iniquity” arising from emails sent by [the Appellant's] wife to the Minister"? Was s 376(1)(b) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) such that "the relevant quality of confidence attaches to the information at the point the information is given"?