Case Law Updates

Federal Court: A person fails the character test if it is reasonable to infer from an Interpol notice [IRN] that the person would present a risk to the community: s 501(6)(h). Applicant applied to FCA, seeking orders restraining Minister from refusing visa and declaring that it was not reasonable to infer risk from IRN. Minister served Notice on Applicant to produce Interpol's Response to Applicant's application for IRN to be deleted. Should Applicant's interlocutory application to set Notice aside succeed, on the basis: that Interpol's response could not be used for the purpose of s 501(6)(h); of public interest immunity?

Federal Court (Full Court). Was the Tribunal entitled to double count its assessment of the seriousness of the applicant's offending both when attributing weight to that specific consideration and again when weighing all considerations, both primary and other, in the final assessment?

Federal Court: In SZTAL, the plurality of the HCA held that "the intent requirement in relation to significant harm will only be satisfied if the perpetrator has an “actual, subjective, intention” to cause pain or suffering and that “knowledge or foresight of a result is not to be equated with intent”". However, can it be said that "evidence of foresight of the risk of pain or suffering or humiliation may support an inference of intention and in some cases the degree of foresight may render the inference compelling"?

Federal Court. In relation to Direction 79, can it be said that "the requirement to ‘generally’ give greater weight to the primary considerations means that there must be some matter specific to the circumstances of the case for giving one of the other considerations greater weight than any of the primary considerations before that can occur"? If so, must the whole case under consideration must be out of the ordinary or unusual? Can it be said that "the precise circumstances which led to the issue of materiality not being in issue may be relevant to whether the Court can proceed on the basis that there is no issue as to materiality"?

Federal Court (Full Court). Were the the answers to the interrogatory sought before the primary judge "capable of forming the basis for an inference that persons in the appellant’s situation are not removed from Australia to Iraq, even though s 197C of the Act (as it then stood) removed non-refoulement obligations as a reason to not comply with s 198" and an inference that the Minister "had personal knowledge of the number of persons in respect of whom Australia owed non-refoulement obligations who had been involuntarily returned to Iraq"?

Federal Court. In CNY17, HCA decided that material placed by Secretary before IAA was prejudicial, causing a reasonable apprehension of subconscious bias. Here, Minister placed before AAT convictions of sexual offence against a minor and police materials relating to allegations of sexual offence against another minor, for which Applicant was acquitted. Was it essential to the conclusion in CNY17 that the prejudicial material was irrelevant? If so, were the police materials irrelevant on the basis that: para 13.1(2) of Direction No 79 "expressly or impliedly limited to conduct in which the non-citizen has been found to have engaged by reason of having been convicted of a criminal offence"; or that the AAT could not "go behind and impugn the acquittal"?

Federal Court. In the context of cl 500.212(a) of Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), can it be said that, since the grant of a student visa would allow the appellants to stay in Australia for only a specified period, a mere change of plans from a visitor visa to make an application for a student visa could not provide evidence of an intention to stay permanently or indefinitely in Australia?

Federal Court (Full Court). Cl 485.222: "Each degree, diploma or trade qualification used to satisfy the Australian study requirement is closely related to the applicant’s nominated skilled occupation". This decision concerned cl 485.213(b), which was drafted in identical terms. Can it be inferred from those provisions "that an assessment of the visa applicant’s skills for his or her nominated skilled application could be based on an assessment of the applicant’s qualifications obtained overseas and need not necessarily include any qualification obtained in Australia"? In reaching its conclusion at [47], the Tribunal had only considered ANZSCO's occupational description and the minor group in ANZSCO which included that occupation. Was it a jurisdictional error for the Tribunal to ignore the higher ANZSCO levels, namely the sub-major group and the major group?

Federal Court. As the decision that the applicant sought to compel by mandamus was made favourably to him, with the result that he obtained the practical outcome he pursued, should he be awarded costs? If so, should those costs be offset by costs which the applicant was awarded to pay in a previous court proceeding?

OMARA: "I am satisfied that the Agent knowingly entered into arrangements that facilitated the provision of unlawful migration assistance... I have taken into account that the applications submitted to the Department on behalf of these sponsors were handled through the Agent’s business and that she was the nominated migration agent. It follows that I am satisfied the Agent knew, else ought to have known, immigration assistance was provided unlawfully in relation to their respective matters".