Case Law Updates

Federal Court. Can it be said that the "Minister has no interests in the outcome of this litigation beyond ensuring that the law of the Parliament is applied correctly to the personal circumstances of a litigant who has been deprived of his liberty by the State"?

Federal Court (Full Court). For the purpose of identifying jurisdictional error, are ex tempore reasons for judgement delivered by the Federal Circuit Court to be "scrutinised narrowly and with an eye for error"? Can it be said that "statements may be made in reasons which, in isolation, appear to be expressed at the level of principle but, in fact, have been applied in a more nuanced and fact-specific context"?

Federal Court. Was it "uncontroversial that people in immigration detention are subject to a much greater level of surveillance and monitoring than people in the community generally"? Would the complaint that the Tribunal took into account an irrelevant consideration have force "if the fact that the applicant’s ability to avoid drug use had not been “tested” was the Tribunal’s only basis for finding that he posed an elevated risk of reoffending"?

Federal Court (Full Court). Can it be said that "s 501G(1) when read with reg 5.02, does not state that the document must be given by a method prescribed for the purpose of giving documents to a person in immigration detention, and the Minister may, by operation of s 494A(1), give the document to a person by any method that he or she considers appropriate"?

Federal Court. While the AAT was required to treat offending of the type described under cl 13.1.1(1)(a)-(b) of Direction 79 as “very serious”, did it remain for it to allocate weight in respect of such offending relative to all other relevant considerations under s 501CA(4)(b)(ii) of the Migration Act? Are cl 13.1.1(1)(b) and (d) ultra vires s 499 of the Act to the extent that they "required the Tribunal to proceed upon the basis that crimes of a violent nature against women or children are to viewed very seriously, regardless of the sentence imposed"?

Federal Court: This decision is extremely important to subclass 482 (TSS) visa applicants. Although it concerned a subclass 457 visa application, it involved the interpretation of a critical provision that is identical to cl 482.212(3). According to this decision, ANZSCO was not the only guide that could be used to determine the "skills, qualifications and employment background" that were necessary for the applicant to perform the tasks of the nominated occupation. We explain how practitioners can use this decision to their clients' advantage.

Federal Court: There is no common law duty on administrative decision-makers to provide reasons for their decisions. Thus, in the absence of a statutory duty, those decision-makers are not required to provide reasons at all. However, if an administrative decision-maker chooses to provide reasons in circumstances where they are not obliged to do so, can a court on judicial review draw an inference from the fact that the decision record is silent about a particular consideration that such a consideration was not taken into account?

Federal Court. Is the statutory bar imposed by s 501E of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) an inevitable, immediate and direct consequence of the Minister exercising the power conferred by s 501BA, with the result that such a consequence has to be considered when exercising that power?

Federal Court (Full Court). In the High Court's decision in CNY17: unbeknown to Appellant, Secretary gave IAA additional material in purported compliance with s 473CB(1)(c); however, the additional material was objectively both irrelevant to IAA's review and prejudicial to Appellant; IAA then wrote to Appellant: DHA "has provided us with all documents they consider relevant to your case"; IAA eventually affirmed delegate's protection visa refusal, without requesting new information or interviewing Appellant; IAA's reasons stated that it "had regard to the material referred by the Secretary", but did not refer to additional material; HCA held the giving of additional material resulted in a reasonable apprehension of bias on IAA's part. Here, IAA expressly disavowed reliance on prejudicial material. Was that sufficient to avoid apprehension of bias?

Federal Court. Are the procedural fairness duties affected by whether a Tribunal applicant is represented? Is the duty to consider claims not clearly articulated, but which arise tolerably clearly from the material before the Tribunal, affected by whether a Tribunal applicant is represented? Was reliance on ss 36(2)(b) or (c) tolerably clear? Are those 2 provisions a 'time of decision' requirement?