Case Law Updates

Federal Court. Is the ongoing validity of a cancellation effected under s 501(3) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) conditional upon timely compliance with the requirements of s 501CA? Does the use of the word 'may' in s 501CA(4) mean that the decision-maker retains the discretion not to revoke a visa cancellation even if satisfied that the non-citizen passes the character or that there is 'another reason' to revoke?

Federal Court. Would the consideration under s 501CA(4) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and para 9.2(1) of Direction 99 of the extent of impediments to removal from Australia weigh against revocation only in exceptional circumstances?

Federal Court. The Minister found: "I also consider that he would have the same access to welfare, health, education and public support as other nationals". Was the Minister’s finding limited to a general finding that the Applicant would have the same level of access to welfare and public support as other PRC citizens, which did not encompass a finding as to the existence or extent of such services in the PRC?

Federal Court. In Viane, the HCA said: "No part of the statutory power conferred by s 501CA of the Act obliges the Minister to make actual findings of fact as an adjudication of all material claims made by an applicant". Can the word "all" in that passage be explained by the proposition that "it is only where a matter advanced is supported by factual material and it is necessary to make factual findings in order consider the matter advanced that there is a need to consider that factual material"?

A reinstatement decision by the AAT focusing only on whether the appellant had been properly notified of the hearing was 'too narrow', given that the appellant's arguments on the reinstatement application had not been so confined.

Federal Court. In other to consider "new information", the IAA must, among other things, be "satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances to justify considering the new information" (s 473DD(a)). Can it be said that, if a decision-maker states that "there is already substantial material before me regarding [the applicant's claims] and I have accepted his claims", that would, "by itself, exclude the possibility that there are exceptional circumstances to justify considering 'new information'"? Or can it be said, on the contrary, that the "decision-maker's statement that [it had] accepted the claims of the ... [applicant had] a number of dimensions to it" in the circumstances of this case? With respect, does this Federal Court decision stand in contrast with the High Court's majority judgements in Hossain and SZMTA in 2 respects?

Federal Court. AAT was bound by Direction 56 (now replaced by 84) to consider PAM3 guidelines in assessing Appellant's protection claims. Can it be said that, because AAT "had not mentioned the Guidelines in the section of its reasons on “Relevant Law” or in the substantive section containing its findings on the complementary protection criterion, the Court should infer that it had not taken them into account"? Did the fact that the AAT had only referred to conditions at a specific prison in the Appellant's home country and did not report on conditions in other prisons suggest AAT did not consider PAM3? Does the “intentional” infliction of harm for the purposes of the complementary protection require “actual, subjective intention by the actor to bring about the victims’ pain and suffering by the actor’s conduct”?

Federal Court: In considering whether to revoke a visa cancellation under s 501CA(4), is evidence required to support a decision-maker's conclusion that the non-citizen in question will have access to public health system and social welfare if returned to New Zealand? Has the Tribunal misinterpreted cl 14.2(1)(a)(i) of Direction No 65? Were the "other considerations" in the Direction mandatory considerations?

Federal Court. Did s 501G(3) satisfy the phrase in s 494A(1)(b)(ii) of a provision that "does not state that the document must be given ... by a method prescribed for the purposes of giving documents to a person in immigration detention”? If s 494A(1) applied, did ss 494B(5)(b) and (d), 494C(1) and (5) and s 494D(1) apply? Did the word “giving” in r 5.02 imply a requirement to hand a written notice of the delegate’s non-revocation decision personally to either the applicant or his solicitor? If not and the written notice occurs by email, must it be actually received to satisfy r 5.02?

Federal Court: 86-year-old UK national Appellant had visa mandatorily cancelled and applied for a protection visa, claiming he had several health conditions, including a major depressive disorder. He provided a medical letter stating that, if returned to the UK, he was at high risk of suicide. He claimed he was owed complementary protection under s 36(2)(aa) in that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of being removed, he would suffer significant harm by being arbitrarily deprived of his life pursuant to s 36(2A)(a). Is s 36(2A)(a) restricted to the risk of being deprived of life by a third party? If so and if the UK did not prevent his suicide, would that constitute arbitrary deprivation of life? If so, did the Tribunal made a jurisdictional error in not assessing what would be the UK’s response to the risk of suicide?