Habeas corpus exempt from rule against abuse of process?
Federal Court (Full Court). Is a court prevented from restraining abuses of its process in an application for habeas corpus?
MARA: can 186/187 visa applicants bear nomination costs?
OMARA: [All expenses incurred for the [subclass 187] nomination application are the responsibility of the sponsor and cannot be transferred to the visa applicant"... "I am satisfied that the Agent’s text message conversation with [the complainant] was related to the facilitation of payments intended to be provided to the employer by the visa applicant for a nominated position. It is an offence under sections 245AR and 245AS of the Act to ask for, receive, offer to provide, or provide a benefit in return for the occurrence of a sponsorship related event".
Arrest warning mechanics a matter of ‘ordinary human experience’?
Federal Court. In Australia, it a matter of "ordinary human experience" that a copy of an arrest warrant may be left with a third party connected to the suspected offender? Are the laws of a foreign country relating to the issuance of arrest warrants a matter of "ordinary human experience"?
Combined effect of ss 359C, 360, 363 & 363A
Federal Court. Combined effect of ss 360(2)(c) and (3) is that an applicant is not entitled to appear before AAT if s 359 applies to the applicant. Subsection 359C(1) applies if a person is invited under s 359 to give information and does not do so within the deadline. Section 363A provides that AAT has no power to permit a person to do a thing if a provision states that the person is not entitled to do that thing, unless a provision "expressly provides otherwise". Does s 363 "expressly [provide] otherwise" by giving AAT the power to "take evidence on oath or affirmation" or to "summon a person to appear"?
Did practitioner act in contravention of ss 245AR & 245AS?
OMARA. Did the practitioner facilitate payments to a sponsor in exchange for a visa applicant’s employment and sponsorship? If so, did she act in contravention of ss 245AR and 245AS?
s 501CA(3): who can notify of cancellation?
Federal Court: the effect of s 497(2) of the Migration Act 1958 was that the person who sent a visa cancellation notification under s 501CA(3) needed not be delegated power under s 496(1) to cancel or notify of cancellation
Mistranslations and practitioner’s fraud on the court?
Federal Court: FCCA dismissed application under s 477(2) for extension of time within which to make judicial review application under s 476. As dismissals under s 477(2) are not appealable, Applicant applied to FCA for judicial review of FCCA's decision, arguing that FCCA denied him procedural fairness and thus made a jurisdictional error. In what circumstances can mistranslations or non-translations vitiate a decision? Further, Applicant claimed that his representative "had undertaken to bring proceedings [to the FCCA within the statutory timeframe] challenging the IAA’s decision and yet had failed to do so". If that claim were accepted, did the representative's action constitute fraud on the FCCA?
Appeal: lay witness acting as representative
Federal Court (Full Court). Did the discretion in s 32(4) of the AAT Act relate to persons required to appear before the Tribunal, but not to parties? May the word “appear” in s 32(1) of the AAT Act "be understood as invoking concepts of agency, such that the party may be taken to adopt and to be bound by the choices of the representative in the presentation of his or her case"?
Are road users obviously vulnerable members of community?
Federal Court. Was the adverse conclusion that the Applicant had committed serious crimes against other road users who were to be viewed as vulnerable members of the community for the purposes of para 8.1.1(1)(b)(ii) of Direction 90 one not obviously open on the known material, with the result that the Tribunal not putting the Applicant on notice of it amounted to a denial of procedural fairness?
Differences between habeas corpus and false imprisonment
Federal Court (Full Court). Is the threshold of the evidentiary burden of proof borne by applicants for habeas corpus higher than that borne by applicants for false imprisonment, in that the former requires the applicant to demonstrate that there is a “case fit to be considered”, whereas the latter only requires demonstration of the fact of imprisonment? Must applicants in both causes of action satisfy the evidentiary burden by reference to the same point in (or period of) time?




















