Case Law Updates

Federal Court. In DFQ17 and BMY18, FCAFC held that the notification letters under s 66 in those cases were invalid, as they did not "clearly convey" the deadlines for the respective merits review applications. Must a notification be "piecemeal, entirely obscure and essentially incomprehensible" in order to be invalid? Here, a delegate cancelled the Appellant's visa and notified him as follows under the heading "Review rights": "An application for merits review of this decision must be given to the AAT within [7] working days after you are taken to have received this letter... As this letter was sent to you by email, you are taken to have received it at the end of the day it was transmitted". Did the above notice clearly convey the statutory deadline?

Federal Court (Full Court). In Katoa, the High Court held that, in determining whether to extend time under s 477A(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), the Federal Court was not limited to a reasonably impressionist level of assessment of the merits of the judicial review application. Does Katoa apply to s 477?

High Court. Is a non-disclosure certificate issued under s 473GB of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) "new information" within the meaning of s 473DC? If so and the IAA treats a certificate as valid and exercises the power conferred by s 473GB(3)(a) to have regard to the information protected by the certificate, can the IAA be taken to have considered that the certificate itself "may be relevant" within the meaning of s 473DC(1)(b)?

High Court. If the Minister exercises the power under s 501CA(4) and makes a finding of fact in his reasons, must he "do so based on some evidence or other supporting material, rather than no evidence or no material, unless the finding is made in accordance with the Minister's personal or specialised knowledge or by reference to that which is commonly known"? If so, is there "any express requirement that the Minister disclose whether a material finding was made from personal knowledge"? If not, can it be assumed that the finding was based on that knowledge?

Federal Court. Can it be said that, "just because section 473DD requires that a new claim or evidence must not be ‘considered’ does not mean that the Authority must pretend for all intents and purposes that that claim had never been made and the evidence had never existed"? Does that question assume that s 473DD also prohibits the consideration of new claims, as opposed to only new evidence?

Federal Court (Full Court): Can admin decision-makers make findings of fact in the absence of evidence? Which of the following approaches is correct? A finding made with no evidence will only amount to jurisdictional error where: a) "the relevant finding is a precondition to the exercise of jurisdiction"; b) "the finding is a critical step in the ultimate conclusion of the decision-maker". Can admin decision-makers, in certain circumstances, "draw on their accumulated knowledge or experience in respect of particular countries"?

Federal Court. Can it be said that a protection "claim based on the need to support one’s family is more likely to “clearly emerge” from the material given the fundamental relevance of the matter in human terms"? Does the "review material" before the Immigration Assessment Authority include the delegate's decision?

Federal Court. In light of the High Court decision in MZAPC, is it necessary for a court to consider materiality as a separate issue after finding that an administrative decision was legally unreasonable?

High Court: By a 6:1 majority, the HCA decided that the "Chorley exception" to the rule that self-represented litigants cannot recover costs for their own time spent on litigation is no longer part of our common law. The "Chorley exception" allowed self-represented solicitors to recover self-representation costs. But most importantly, the majority questioned whether an incorporated legal practice offering services to third parties could recover costs for work of its sole director and shareholder. Does the same question arise for immigration assistance?

Federal Court. AAT convened 3 hearings: 1st was adjourned shortly after starting; 2nd was adjourned after 2.5 hours due to concerns about quality of the English / Tamil interpreting; 3rd was the substantive one. In its decision, AAT said it gave the 2nd hearing "little weight", given the interpreting concerns. Did Division 4 of Part 7 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) require AAT to disregard the entirety of the evidence at 2nd hearing?