Cl 13.1.2(1) of Direction 79 interpreted
Federal Court. Can it be said that, "where the likelihood of different categories of prospective offending or different degrees of prospective harm might be thought to vary, the task required by cl 13.1.2(1) may only sensibly be completed by a decision-maker differentiating the risk in relation to each category"?
Reasonable practicability of removal: are the reasons for non-cooperation relevant?
Federal Court. "In determining whether there is a real prospect of a detainee's removal from Australia becoming practicable in the reasonably foreseeable future, should there be regard to voluntary actions that may be undertaken by the detained person to assist in their removal irrespective of whether the detainee is refusing to undertake those actions in respect of removal to a particular place because of a genuine subjective fear of harm if removed to that place"?
Delay justified while special leave application is decided?
Federal Court. Should the FCA grant peremptory mandamus, compelling the Minister to grant the Appellant a SHEV? Is consideration of the "national interest" under cl 790.227 "limited to whether or not the appellant poses an unacceptable risk of harm to the Australian community"? May the Minister justify delay where he or she is exhausting his or her rights of appellate review, including by applying to the High Court for special leave to appeal from the FCAFC's decision?
Is s 494AB about jurisdiction? Or does it rather provide the Cth a defence?
High Court. Can it be said that s 494AB of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) does not take away the jurisdiction of any court to hear and determine proceedings of the kinds described in s 494AB(1), but rather provides the Commonwealth with a defence to those claims if they are made in a court other than the High Court? If so, could proceedings instituted in the High Court in relation to the matters identified in s 494AB(1) be remitted to another court for hearing and determination without s 494AB providing an answer or defence to the claim?
Principles of statutory interpretation
High Court. Is the existence of a duty to afford procedural fairness a question of statutory interpretation? Is there a "strong" common law presumption, "generally applicable to any statutory power the exercise of which is capable of having an adverse effect on legally recognised rights or interests, that the exercise of the power is impliedly conditioned on the observance of procedural fairness"?
Pitfall: last email address provided to the Minister
Federal Court: the applicant's last email address provided to the Minister for the purposes of receiving documents was the one provided by the AAT
Does Direction 90 involve double counting?
High Court. Is para 8.2 of Direction 90 invalid, based on the proposition that "family violence can be relevant only to the protection of the Australian community (under para 8.1) or to the expectations of the Australian community (under para 8.4)"? Does the attribution of weight to family violence under paras 8.1, 8.2 and 8.4 involve double counting?
Can FCCA receive “new information”?
Federal Court: Did the FCCA inadvertently deny the Appellant procedural fairness by, among other things, saying to him that "you can't give [the FCCA] anything new"? The answered turned on what "anything new" meant in the circumstances.
“illogical and irrational to reject the evidence”?
Federal Court: Appellant gave different accounts of his protection claims in his screening interview and later as part of protection visa application. Appellant explained that mental health issues were the reason for those different accounts and gave IAA letters from an accredited mental health social worker who had treated him, for the purpose of corroborating his explanation. IAA disbelieved his explanation and went on to say that those letters did not "overcome the significant concerns and adverse findings the Authority made about the ... appellant’s claims and evidence". Was it "illogical and irrational to reject the evidence [from mental health social worker] because it is inconsistent with a conclusion already reached with regard to the very matter that the evidence was relevant to casting light on"?
Can Minister cancel BVE for charges laid before grant?
Federal Court (Full Court): Minister was allowed to cancel a BVE under reg 2.43(1)(p)(ii) based on charges against the holder, despite the fact that those charges were laid before the BVE grant.




















