Case Law Updates

One of the complaints against the practitioner came from the Department and was described by the OMARA as follows: "The Former Agent deliberately lodged invalid visa applications to prolong [a client's]  stay [in Australia] and to allow time to meet the visa requirements".

Federal Court: the respondent pleaded guilty to recklessly causing injuries to his child, which led to the refusal of his visa application; the AAT accepted the respondent's argument that he had only pleaded guilty because he thought that his child would otherwise be taken away from him; the Minister applied for judicial review...

Federal Court. In Ibrahim, the FCAFC held that, although s 501BA(3) removed the obligation to provide natural justice, it did not prohibit it being provided. Unlike Ibrahim, the Minister here was aware he had the option of providing natural justice, but chose not to. Was that "choice" given to the Minister on the condition that it be exercised legally reasonably? Was the Minister required under s 501BA to consider the submissions made and evidence given by the Applicant to the Tribunal?

Federal Court: A delegate of the Minister refused a protection visa application and provided written reasons, pursuant to s 66 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). Those reasons contained the date of the decision, but not the time. The matter was automatically referred to the Immigration Assessing Authority (IAA) under s 463CA, which required the IAA to review the decision as soon as reasonably practicable after the delegate "made" the decision. Did the fact that the letter was silent as to the time of the delegate's decision mean that there was no decision to refer to the IAA?

Federal Court (Full Court). The power under s 501CA(4) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) can be exercised in the circumstances described in s 501CA(1), which provides as follows: "This section applies if the Minister makes a decision ... under subsection 501(3A)" (emphasis added). If a visa is cancelled under s 501(3A) by a delegate, does that mean that a decision cannot be made under s 501CA(4)?

Federal Court. Did s 500(6H) "preclude the Tribunal from considering information which is not presented by, or on behalf of an applicant, including information that arises from cross-examination or answers given in response to questions put by the Tribunal"? Does s 500(6H) have the effect that oral evidence, which may be given in support of a review applicant’s case cannot "depar[t] in a substantive way from the content of the written statements"?

Federal Court. Can it be said that, "once judgment has been reserved, it is only in exceptional circumstances that the Court will subsequently give leave to a party to re-open the case"? Were the circumstances of this case, where the applicant was a self-represented litigant seeking habeas corpus, exceptional? Can it be said that "abuse of process principles can be applied in respect of repeated applications for the issue of writs of habeas corpus within a short time frame"?

Federal Court. In DFQ17 and BMY18, Full Court of FCA held that, in order for a notification of visa refusal under s 66(2)(d) to be valid, it had to "clearly state" the deadline for applying for merits review. As a result, the "late" AAT applications in those cases were actually not late. In Ali, a single judge of the FCA distinguished DFQ17, holding that the notification in that case clearly stated the deadline for an AAT application. As the circumstances in Ali (i.e. email notification with deadline of 21 calendar days) reflect the vast majority of notifications sent by the Department, Ali had the practical effect of indicating that the error found in DFQ17 only applied to exceptional cases. Now, another single judge of the FCA held, although in obiter (*), that Ali does not sit comfortably with DFQ17 & BMY18 and that the latter decisions should be followed.

Federal Court (FCA). Is the FCA bound by the parties' agreement on the content of the law or facts? If the FCA declares that the Applicant is not an alien within the meaning of s 51(xix) of the Constitution, can the Applicant be removed from Australia under s 198 or detained under s 189 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth)? Should the FCA, in the form of a declaration, "lay down a set of rules or prescriptions to be adopted in any potential (or actual) future litigation, which are intended to control the circumstances in which a non-citizen could successfully contend she or he is an Aboriginal Australian"?

Federal Court. Can it be said that, "just because section 473DD requires that a new claim or evidence must not be ‘considered’ does not mean that the Authority must pretend for all intents and purposes that that claim had never been made and the evidence had never existed"? Does that question assume that s 473DD also prohibits the consideration of new claims, as opposed to only new evidence?