Case Law Updates

Sanctions involving findings that practitioners have facilitated the provision of unlawful immigration assistance have become more and more common. OMARA: "I am satisfied that the Agent’s administrative staff have provided immigration assistance within the meaning of section 276 of the Act and that such was done under the Agent’s direction".

Federal Court (Full Court). Was Sandor v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 434 wrongly decided?

Federal Court. Does legislation "operate extraterritorially merely because it might have some relationship to events which occur overseas"? Does s 6 of the Biosecurity (Human Biosecurity Emergency) (Human Coronavirus with Pandemic Potential) (Emergency Requirements—High Risk Country Travel Pause) Determination 2021 (Cth) operate extraterritorially? Is there a "common law right on the part of Australian citizens to re-enter Australia"? If so, was that right abrogated by legislation?

Federal Court (Full Court): Where a conviction or sentence is the foundation for the exercise of power by a decision-maker, can a challenge be made to the essential facts on which the conviction or sentence was based? If not, is the position different in the context of s 501CA(4)? Should AAT have considered "evidence that went beyond the essential facts underpinning his conviction and sentence"? Can a decision-maker, for the purposes of s 501CA(4), refuse to accept a non-citizen's challenge to a fact on which a sentence is based, on the one hand, and use that challenge against the non-citizen in the context of assessing remorse, on the other hand? Can the difference between sentence & conviction play any role in answering whether the facts on which they were based might be challenged? Subsequent FCA decision seems to have impliedly distinguished this decision.

High Court. If the Minister exercises the power under s 501CA(4) and makes a finding of fact in his reasons, must he "do so based on some evidence or other supporting material, rather than no evidence or no material, unless the finding is made in accordance with the Minister's personal or specialised knowledge or by reference to that which is commonly known"? If so, is there "any express requirement that the Minister disclose whether a material finding was made from personal knowledge"? If not, can it be assumed that the finding was based on that knowledge?

The provision of false information was irrelevant for the purposes of determining whether a passport was a bogus document under s 5(1) and thus whether a protection visa should be refused under s 91WA of the Migration Act 1958

Federal Court (Full Court): If a student visa applicant intends to pursue PR if the opportunity presents itself, decision-makers are allowed to take that intention into consideration in assessing whether the applicant is a Genuine Temporary Entrant (GTE) under cl 500.212. That intention may be expected to normally lead to the conclusion that the applicant is not a GTE. However, such an intention does not necessarily lead to that conclusion. We explain how practitioners can use this decision to argue that a student visa applicant can be a GTE despite also seeking PR. Arguably, the same principle could apply to visitor visa applicants who also seek PR.

Federal Court. If the parties to litigation agree on a principle, is that principle's precedential force diminished? Further, in Vaitaiki, Teoh was interpreted by: Burchett J as requiring decision-makers to take the best interests of children into account as a primary consideration if no notice to the contrary was given; Branson J as requiring decision-makers to treat those interests as a primary consideration. Is the error discussed in Teoh better characterised as one going to procedural fairness or as a failure to take into account a relevant consideration? If the former: is the procedural fairness obligation discussed in Teoh either subsumed within s 425 or not a matter dealt with by Div 4 of Pt 7 of the Act; should the FCA adopt Burchett J's or Branson J's interpretation of Teoh?

Federal Court (Full Court). "Where it may be inferred that a Tribunal consciously determined not to have regard to extraneous and prejudicial information in making its decision, [does it necessarily follow] that the fair-minded lay observer would exclude the possibility that the Tribunal might have been subconsciously affected by that information"? In determining a claim of apprehended bias where the Secretary provided the Tribunal with irrelevant, but highly prejudicial, material in the context of Part 7 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), what is the knowledge attributable to the hypothetical fair-minded lay observer?

Federal Court (Full Court). Para 8.1.1(1)(a)(ii) of Direction 99 required decision-makers to consider that crimes against women "are viewed very seriously by the Australian Government". Did para 8.1.1(1)(a)(ii) require the Tribunal to consider such crimes "very seriously"? May it be "necessary for the decision-maker to take account of facts alleged to underpin a claim that non-refoulement obligations are owed where those facts are relied upon as another basis for revocation of the cancellation decision"?