Demeanour

High Court. Delegate: interviewed Appellant in person and audio recorded it; was convinced, based on demeanour, that Appellant's evidence during interview was plausible and...

Does s 501CA(4) require consideration of non-refoulement obligations?

High Court. Could the materiality test be expressed by saying that a person affected by an error "would need to show that there was at least a possibility" of a different outcome, had the error not been made? Is there anything "in the text of s 501CA, or its subject matter, scope or purpose, that requires the Minister to take account of any non-refoulement obligations when deciding whether to revoke cancellation of any visa that is not a protection visa where the materials do not include, or the circumstances do not suggest, a non-refoulement claim"?

RMA sanctioned for lack of VEVO consent

'... Agent had accessed the personal and immigration information of a person who was not her client on three separate occasions without their knowledge or permission, using [VEVO]'

Relocation principle is more nuanced than once thought

Federal Court (Full Court). Till 2014, Migration Act 1958 defined "refugee" by reference to the "Convention", under which a person was not a refugee if it would be reasonable to relocate to a place in their home country where they would not be persecuted (the relocation principle). Since 2014, the Act has defined a "refugee" as a person whose "real chance of persecution relates to all areas of a receiving country", among other things (s 5J(1)(c)). The FCAFC accepted that the relocation principle no longer applies to the definition of "refugee". However, does the reference in s 5J(1)(c) to all areas of a receiving country mean all areas where there is safe human habitation and to which safe access is lawfully possible?

covid-19 relevant to waiver of Sch 3

AAT gave some weight to the fact that the applicant's country of origin is impacted by covid-19 in assessing under cl 820.211(2)(d)(ii) whether there were compelling reasons for not applying Sch 3. Although past AAT decisions are not binding on future AAT decisions, we discuss how a decision of the Federal Court can be useful in that it states that like cases should be treated alike, meaning that this AAT decision can be used to argue that the AAT should also give some weight to covid-19 in future cases.

Presumption in favour of international comity?

High Court. Is the common law presumption against extraterritorial operation more accurately labelled as a "presumption in favour of international comity"? Did the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) confer jurisdiction on the Federal Court? Can it be said that "Federal courts, other than the High Court, owe their jurisdiction to laws enacted under s 77(i) of the Constitution"?

Lay witness acting as representative

Federal Court. Does the AAT Act "require the representative to be independent of the applicant or to provide objective advice or guidance to the applicant"? Can it be said that "to conduct a review that is fair, just and economical does not require the necessary preclusion of a person who is also a witness from acting as a representative provided that by a representative so acting, the applicant is not deprived of a fair opportunity to present his or her case"?

MARA: sponsorship requirements

This decision illustrates how the OMARA can use metadata to check whether applications are genuine and the potential level of involvement of practitioners in the provision of "misleading or inaccurate statements"

Beneficial reading of self-represented litigant’s grounds of appeal?

Federal Court. The grounds of appeal formulated by the self-represented appellant "do not appropriately articulate any appellable error by the primary judge. On their face, they simply ask this Court to detect jurisdictional error in the Tribunal’s decision". Would it be wholly inappropriate to read those grounds of appeal "as asserting that the learned primary judge erred by failing to detect the jurisdictional errors identified in grounds one and two"?

Does family violence include belittling, intimidating or frightening conduct?

Federal Court. Does family violence include belittling, intimidating, frightening, or similar conduct directed to the person claiming to be the victim of domestic violence? Can it be said that, instead of being obliged to accept the evidence that was before her, the independent expert was required to make her own, independent assessment as to whether or not the appellant was a victim of relevant family violence?