Case Law Updates

Federal Court. Does the appellate jurisdiction of the Federal Court encompass an appeal from the issue of a writ of habeas corpus? Is the issue of a writ of habeas corpus interlocutory in nature? Did s 198AD(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) apply to a person who: (a) has received a favourable exercise of the power in s 46A(2); or is a “fast track applicant” within the meaning of the Act?

Federal Court. Is a child a party to migration judicial review proceedings only if a person is appointed their litigation representative?

Federal Court. AAT wrote: "a successful applicant had to be both a genuine student and have a genuine intention to remain in Australia temporarily". Was AAT's approach wrong because "cl 572.223(1)(a) only requires a determination that the visa applicant intends genuinely to stay in Australia temporarily and ... there is no additional requirement that the applicant be a genuine student"? As studying in Australia would necessarily prolong Appellant's stay, was it wrong for AAT to reason that appellant wanted to prolong her stay? Was AAT required to make a finding in relation to each factor in Direction No 53?

Federal Court. Can it be said that, "for the Minister to find that there was no material before him being evidence of the applicant’s rehabilitation, notwithstanding the clear evidence of unblemished conduct of the applicant in the community in the seven years following her conviction which suggested rehabilitation of the applicant, is contrary to logic" and/or is legally unreasonable?

Federal Court: In SZSSJ, HCA had found that "officers conducting the ITOAs were specifically instructed to assess the effect of the Data Breach on Australia's non-refoulement obligations [assuming] that an applicant's personal information may have been accessed by authorities in the country in which the applicant feared [being returned to]". Here, DHA informed Second Appellant that it would "assess any implications for [him] personally as part of its normal processes". Unlike in SZSSJ, "there was no evidence in the present case as to what the assessment in accordance with the department’s 'normal processes' came to entail". Can HCA's description of the ITOA process in SZSSJ be used as evidence in other cases?

Federal Court. The decision in Constantino from 2013 was to the effect that the whole of the qualification is to be compared with the whole of the occupation for the purpose of cl 485.222 of Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth)? Can it be said that "descending into an analysis of some of the subjects undertaken in order to find a relationship in part is not required, if the comparison undertaken of the two 'wholes' indicates the test of close relationship would not be satisfied in any event"?

Federal Court. Applicant's visa was cancelled under s 501(3A). Delegate refused to revoke cancellation under s 501CA(4). AAT: found it had jurisdiction to review delegate's decision; erroneously found revocation request had not been made by deadline; thus, found that neither AAT nor delegate had power to revoke; nonetheless found that, had it been made by deadline, it would have affirmed delegate's decision, based on its opinion that there was not "another reason" to revoke cancellation; set aside non-revocation decision; and remitted matter to Minister with a direction that the cancellation decision not be set aside. Was AAT's error not jurisdictional, given its opinion that there was not "another reason"?

Federal Court (Full Court). When the language of a statute is ambiguous, Parliament is presumed to have intended the statute to conform to Australia's obligations under international law and not to interfere with fundamental common law rights and freedoms. Art 12(4) of ICCPR provides: “No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country”. Is the term "person" in ss 501(3A) & 501CA(4) ambiguous, with the result that those provisions should be interpreted as not applying to non-aboriginal non-citizens with longstanding ties to Australia, in light of Art 12(4)? Is there a common law right for such individuals to enter and remain in Australia? If not, should the common law be extended to that effect, influenced by Art 12(4)?

Federal Court. Does the inclusion of a specific procedural fairness requirement into para 8.2(2)(b) of Direction 99 require something more or something different than usual procedural fairness under 501CA(4) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth)? If so, what is that "something more"?

Federal Court (Full Court). Was the appellant Minister, who elected to make a personal decision under s 501CA(4) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), required to personally consider the respondent's representations? Or could he merely rely on a Departmental summary of such representations? If he could not rely on a summary, did he consider those representations? Which party bore the onus, on appeal, on the question of whether the Minister considered those representations?