Case Law Updates

Federal Court (Full Court): In DFQ17, the FCAFC held that a notification letter sent by DHA did not clearly convey the deadline for an AAT application and, as a result, a "late" merits review application was actually not late. Then, the FCA decision in Ali distinguished DFQ17 by holding that a notification letter sent via email and setting out a deadline of 21 calendar days did clearly convey the deadline. Now, the FCAFC has answered whether "the fact that a notification is sent by email is ... in itself sufficient to distinguish a case from DFQ17".

Federal Court. In Davis, the High Court held that, in the 2016 Ministerial Guidelines issued in relation to section 351 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), the factors that the Department was instructed to assess and balance operated as "an approximation of the public interest". Did the 2016 Ministerial instructions issued in relation to s 195A also operate as "an approximation of the public interest"?

Federal Court: under the Medevac provisions, 2 doctors must assess ("either remotely or in person") a transitory person before they can be brought to Australia for medical treatment. The non-citizen argued that the review of medical records of itself constituted "remote assessment". The Minister argued that "remote assessment" must involve a consultation.

Federal Court: Appellant's previous counsel made a "deliberate decision to not argue before the [FCCA ground 1 now relied upon]". Was it "unjust for Appellant to be bound by error made by counsel"? Ground 2: Appellant applied to AAT and gave a Gmail address for correspondence. AAT sent email to the Gmail address and Appellant replied from it, CCing a Hotmail address. Appellant then sent AAT several emails from Hotmail, but never formally indicated a change of email address. AAT sent invitation to comment on adverse information to Gmail address, but Appellant claimed he did not receive it. Did the Hotmail address fit the description of "last email address ...  provided to the Tribunal", under s 379A(5)(d)? If so, did it also fit the description of "provided to the Tribunal ... in connection with the review", under s 379A(5)(d)? Is it essential that a "change of contact details" form be completed?

Federal Court. In a balancing exercise involving s 501CA(4) and Direction No 79, although almost all factors went in favour of revoking the mandatory cancellation of the Applicant's visa, the balance ultimately tilted against revocation. Does the fact that almost all factors went in favour of revocation deny the materiality of any errors made by AAT? In other words, could it be said that the materiality test involved a balancing (not binary) exercise in that, had the error not been made, even more weight could have been placed in favour of the Applicant, which in turn could have tilted the balance in his favour?

Federal Court. Can it be said that, "once the Minister or a delegate is satisfied that all of the criteria for the grant of a visa are met, she or he is under an immediate duty to grant the visa" and that "once the duty to grant the visa has arisen, any subsequent exercise of the power to refuse the visa under s 501 is invalid"? Is PIC 4001 invalid? Is a decision under s 501 ultimately made under s 65?

Federal Court: This decision summarises the principles governing the exercise of the Tribunal's discretion under s 428 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) to call a witness at the request of an applicant under s 426.

The complementary protection under s 36(2) of the Migration Act 1958 was not engaged, as loss of life as a result of losing access to medical treatment was insufficient to support the conclusion that the appellant would be 'arbitrarily' deprived of his life. However, that provision does not require an actual subjective intent to deprive an applicant of their life

Federal Court. Minister made determination under s 26(3) of Australian Citizenship Act 2007 that Applicant could not make pledge of commitment before a certain date. In the absence of express or implied exclusion of the common law rules of procedural fairness, do those rules generally apply when a decision affects a person's right, property or interest? Did the Act expressly or impliedly exclude those rules?

Federal Court. Does the fact that the grant of an injunction would restrain the enforcement of the law by preventing officers of the Commonwealth from performing a statutory duty, and thereby frustrate the legislative scheme of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), provide a strong reason not to grant an interlocutory injunction in the present case?