Excluded fast track review applicant: meaning of “a claim for protection”

Federal Court (Full Court). Under s 5 of the Migration Act, an "excluded fast track review applicant" includes a fast track applicant who "has made a claim for protection in a country other than Australia that was refused by that country". If a protection visa application is refused and the delegate forms the view that the applicant is an excluded fast track review applicant, that refusal is not subject to merits review. Can it be said that "the words 'a claim for protection' used in the relevant category of exclusion mean a claim for protection that was based upon alleged facts that are materially the same as those relied upon as the basis for the claim subsequently made in Australia"?

s 116(1)(g): risk of harm or persecution

Federal Circuit Court: The risk of harm or persecution if removed from Australia 'was a matter to be weighed by the Tribunal in determining whether to affirm the' delegate's decision to cancel the visa

Drawing conclusions from Interpol Notice: s 501(6)(h)

Federal Court: A person fails the character test if it is reasonable to infer from an Interpol notice [IRN] that the person would present a risk to the community: s 501(6)(h). Applicant applied to FCA, seeking orders restraining Minister from refusing visa and declaring that it was not reasonable to infer risk from IRN. Minister served Notice on Applicant to produce Interpol's Response to Applicant's application for IRN to be deleted. Should Applicant's interlocutory application to set Notice aside succeed, on the basis: that Interpol's response could not be used for the purpose of s 501(6)(h); of public interest immunity?

Test undertaken before, but result achieved within, 3-year period

Federal Circuit Court. Clause 485.212(a)(ii) required the visa application to be accompanied by evidence that the applicant "has achieved, within the period specified by the Minister in the instrument, the score specified ... in the instrument". Clause 4 of IMMI 15/062 specified for cl 485.212(a)(ii) that the test "must have been undertaken within the three years before the day on which the application was made". Did a test undertaken before the 3-year timeframe but whose result was achieved within that timeframe satisfy cl 485.212(a)(ii)?

Direction 90: cl 9.2 interpreted

Federal Court. Can it be said that, "in order to raise a relevant issue under cl 9.2 there needs to be some evidence of the relevant support in the home country"? For the purpose of cl 9.2, is it "necessary that there be some evidence or material to demonstrate there is some qualitative difference between the circumstances in Australia and those in the applicant’s home country"?

Materiality necessary in legal unreasonableness and non-compliance with s 424A(1)?

Federal Court. Can it be said that, if the Tribunal's "failure to inquire was unreasonable, then for there to be a jurisdictional error the failure must be material in the sense that without the failure there would have been a realistic possibility of a different outcome on the review"? Is non-compliance by the Tribunal with s 424A(1) necessarily material to the outcome?

Para 8.5 of Direction 99 inconsistent with s 501CA(4)?

Federal Court. Is Direction 99 inconsistent with s 501CA(4) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) "because it [serves to prohibit consideration of] what would otherwise be a matter that a decision maker should be able to have regard to when exercising its power and discretion [namely, that the Australian community might, in fact, expect that a former visa holder in the position of the applicant should have the cancellation of his or her visa revoked]"?

Direction 99 binding before it commenced?

Federal Court. The Tribunal made its decision after Direction 90 commenced but before Direction 99 commenced. Was the Tribunal obliged to have regard to the “change in policy” in Direction 99?

Tension between MZAPC and Nathanson?

Federal Court (Full Court). In CWY20 and ENT19, the FCAFC held that it was legally unreasonable for the Minister not to consider the reputational consequences for Australia of breaching its non-refoulement obligations when assessing s 501A(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and cl 790.227 of Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), respectively. Are CWY20 and ENT19 legally distinguishable for decisions made under s 501(3)? Is there a tension in the High Court's decisions on materiality in MZAPC and Nathanson?

Should covid-19 prompt MARA to give time extension?

According to the OMARA, following a complaint, it sent a notice under s 309 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) to the practitioner, who asked for an extension of time to respond to the notice until the lifting of the covid-19 pandemic restrictions. Were those restrictions sufficient to justify a time extension?