Case Law Updates

Federal Court: in the context of a review by the Immigration Assessment Authority, were the photos of the scarring previously shown by the Appellant at an interview to a delegate "new information" for the purposes of s 473DC of the Migration Act 1958? Did the fact that the photos were taken many months after the interview make any difference? Further, if the delegate ruled upon the eligibility of both primary and secondary applicants through a single decision record, does it mean that the IAA could not make separate decisions?

Federal Court. Is the so-called implied undertaking (also known as “Harman undertaking”) to the effect that "a party who seeks discovery of documents obtains it on condition that the party will make use of those documents only for the purpose of that action, and for no other purpose"? If so, does the answer suggest that the undertaking only applies to documents obtained under compulsion, as opposed to documents voluntarily provided?

Federal Court (Full Court): although the Tribunal informed the Appellant about the existence of confidential information, it did not inform her about the existence of a non-disclosure certificate; that was an error; the question was whether that error was jurisdictional; that depended, to some extent, on whether the Appellant should have have requested further detail of the confidential information that was not covered by the non-disclosure certificate

Federal Court: Was there an apprehension of bias by reason of same AAT member hearing both nomination refusal review and  corresponding 457 visa refusal review? Did Tribunal's finding that Appellant's evidence was not “persuasive or compelling” of itself amount to a finding that the Appellant was not a credible witness? Did Appellant, who was represented, waive apprehension of bias claim by not asking for the member to recuse herself? During appeal to FCA, it arose that the further nomination application had been refused. Did that mean that  apprehension of bias, if established, was not material? Did Isbester apply to this case? Was refusal to adjourn review legally unreasonable?

Federal Court (FCA). Following unsuccessful requests to be removed from Australia under s 198(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), the Applicant applied to the FCA for mandamus directing the Commonwealth to do so. Subsection 476A(1) provided that, despite any other law, the FCA's "original jurisdiction in relation to a migration decision" was limited to the matters under s 476A(1)(a) to (d). Is the refusal to discharge the obligation under s 198 a "migration decision", with the result that the FCA lacked jurisdiction?

Federal Court. Can it be said that "the detail with which the Tribunal addresses other matters, not obviously more pressing than this claim, gives rise to the inference that it overlooked the claim"? Further, although it was open to the Tribunal not to accept a claim, or to give it little weight, can it be said that "it would not have been rational or reasonable for the Tribunal to form such a dismissive view of this claim that it did not warrant any mention in its reasons"?

Federal Court: May ss 473DD(a) and (b)(ii) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) overlap? Further, IAA refused to consider new info, saying: "The mere fact that some of the applicant’s siblings have been granted protection on the basis the applicant claims is the same as his own claims, has no probative value when assessing the applicant’s claims for protection". Did IAA, in effect, say that "in no circumstances could evidence" relating to the siblings "have probative value when assessing the applicant’s claims for protection", thus amounting to jurisdictional error?

Federal Court (Full Court). Is the content of any statutory obligation to give reasons for a decision "relevant to the question of what, if any, inferences may be drawn from a decision-maker’s statement of reasons vis a vis the apparent absence of any reference to, or findings on, particular claims or evidence"?

Federal Court: A person fails the character test if it is reasonable to infer from an Interpol notice [IRN] that the person would present a risk to the community: s 501(6)(h). Applicant applied to FCA, seeking orders restraining Minister from refusing visa and declaring that it was not reasonable to infer risk from IRN. Minister served Notice on Applicant to produce Interpol's Response to Applicant's application for IRN to be deleted. Should Applicant's interlocutory application to set Notice aside succeed, on the basis: that Interpol's response could not be used for the purpose of s 501(6)(h); of public interest immunity?

Federal Court. By stating that Direction 110 required some actions to be taken, did the Assistant Minister proceed on the basis that he was personally required to apply the Direction, thereby making a jurisdictional error?