Case Law Updates

Federal Court: In Sharma, FCA had held that: if "a previous conviction is the foundation for the exercise of power by the decision-maker, no challenge can be made to the fact of the conviction (or sentence)" in the context of s 501(6)(d)(i); otherwise, "the essential facts underlying the conviction are not immune from challenge", although there is a "heavy onus on a person seeking to challenge" them. Was Sharma wrongly decided? Does Sharma apply to s 116(1)(e)? Further, are the considerations set out in Direction 65 or Direction 79 exhaustive?

According to the majority, jurisdictional error consists of a material breach of a condition of the exercise of a decision-making power. ‘Ordinarily... breach of a condition cannot be material unless compliance with the condition could have resulted in the making of a different decision'.

Federal Court (Full Court): In SZFDE, HCA had held that a representative's conduct only invalidates a review under Pt 7 of the Migration Act if conduct is fraudulent and subverts the review. Here: 2 visa refusals were automatically referred to the IAA for review under Pt 7AA; the same representative purported to make submissions to the IAA on behalf of both visa applicants (the respondents); however, without the respondents' knowledge, those were template submissions copied from other cases, which said little about the respondents' cases, made arguments that related to other applicants and made generic arguments. The FCAFC was divided on whether SZFDE applied to Pt 7AA reviews.

High Court. Should statutory provisions be interpreted, so far as possible, to be consistent with international law, particularly where a provision seeks to give effect to matters of international law? Is the primary object of statutory construction to "construe the relevant provision so that it is consistent with the language and purpose of all the provisions of the statute"?

Federal Court. DFQ17 held that a visa refusal notification letter must clearly convey the deadline for an application for merits review in order to comply with s 66(2)(d)(ii). Here, the following sentence was found under the heading "Registries of the [AAT]": "As this letter was given to you by hand, you are taken to have received it when it was handed to you". Did the place of that sentence render the notification unclear? The letter also read: "As you are in immigration detention, the prescribed timeframe commences on the day on which you were notified of this decision, and ends at the end of seven working days (beginning with the first working day that occurs on or after that day)". Did the latter sentence precisely track reg 4.31(1)?

Although the AAT will defer dealing with late applications in the MRD pending an appeal to the Full Court of the Federal Court, that does not necessarily mean that late applicants should defer lodging their review applications any further

Q1 to the OMARA: assuming that it was not the Agent who forged the sponsor's signature and that he was not aware of the forgery, did he nevertheless facilitate the forgery by lack of diligence? Q2: assuming that the Agent's copying of the letterhead from the sponsor's website into nomination documents without the sponsor's knowledge did not involve dishonesty, was that nevertheless a misleading act? Q3: did the metadata on the Agent's file notes indicate to OMARA that those notes were not contemporaneous?

Federal Court. In a balancing exercise involving s 501CA(4) and Direction No 79, although almost all factors went in favour of revoking the mandatory cancellation of the Applicant's visa, the balance ultimately tilted against revocation. Does the fact that almost all factors went in favour of revocation deny the materiality of any errors made by AAT? In other words, could it be said that the materiality test involved a balancing (not binary) exercise in that, had the error not been made, even more weight could have been placed in favour of the Applicant, which in turn could have tilted the balance in his favour?

Federal Court. In Ibrahim, the FCAFC held that, although s 501BA(3) removed the obligation to provide natural justice, it did not prohibit it being provided. Unlike Ibrahim, the Minister here was aware he had the option of providing natural justice, but chose not to. Was that "choice" given to the Minister on the condition that it be exercised legally reasonably? Was the Minister required under s 501BA to consider the submissions made and evidence given by the Applicant to the Tribunal?

Federal Court. Para 13.1.1(1)(e) of Direction 79 said that decision makers, when considering whether to revoke under s 501CA(4) the mandatory cancellation of a visa, should consider the "frequency of the non-citizen’s offending". If several offences arose out of one, overall occasion of offending, can those offences be seen as frequent? Para 13.1.1(1)(d) was about "the sentence imposed by the courts for a crime or crimes". AAT said: "To an extent, the investigatory exercise required by this sub-paragraph (e) largely mirrors that required in an application of the immediately preceding sub-paragraph (d). This is because any trend of increasing seriousness of offending is usually analogous to the regime of sentencing imposed for it". Did AAT engage in double counting?