Case Law Updates

Federal Court. Is s 34(5)(a) of the Australian Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth) satisfied only where the citizen has been convicted of a single offence, as opposed to multiple offences? Is there a meaningful distinction in the context of s 34(2)(c) between the concepts of it being contrary to the public interest for a person to remain an Australian citizen and it being in the public interest that that person not continue to be an Australian citizen?

Federal Circuit Court: the reference to 2 years under reg 1.15AA 'is not linked to “the assistance” but... to the “medical condition”'

Federal Court: "In light of the appellant’s self-represented status on his appeal, it remains to consider whether the Court should exercise its discretion to order the Minister to produce the country information so as to enable the merits of the appellant’s argument to be determined by reference to it ... Despite the urgings of the Court [the Appellant] has expressed an unwillingness to participate in the hearing of the appeal in a meaningful way". Should the FCA exercise its discretion in favour of the Appellant?

'it was legally unreasonable for the Tribunal to make its decision in this case without waiting for the Minister to make his decision on the nomination approval application, particularly... where the Minister had said about five weeks earlier that the application was progressing...'

Federal Court. Is the grant of an injunction that interfered with the performance of the statutory duty to remove unlawful non-citizens from Australia as soon as practicable exceptional, therefore requiring there to be a strong case for the making of the order?

Federal Court (Full Court): In SZMTA, HCA had held that: error is jurisdictional only if it is material, that is if a different decision could have been made had the error not been made; materiality is a question of fact of which judicial review applicants bear the onus of proof. In Ibrahim, FCAFC had held that it was incumbent on the judicial review applicant to demonstrate what would or could have occurred had the error not been made. In Nguyen, FCAFC, differently constituted, disagreed with that aspect of Ibrahim. In Weti-Safwan, it was unnecessary to resolve that tension, given the facts of that case. Can the Ibrahim / Nguyen tension be resolved? Were those decisions distinguished here? With respect, we disagree with one aspect of this decision.

Federal Court. Did s 501G(3) satisfy the phrase in s 494A(1)(b)(ii) of a provision that "does not state that the document must be given ... by a method prescribed for the purposes of giving documents to a person in immigration detention”? If s 494A(1) applied, did ss 494B(5)(b) and (d), 494C(1) and (5) and s 494D(1) apply? Did the word “giving” in r 5.02 imply a requirement to hand a written notice of the delegate’s non-revocation decision personally to either the applicant or his solicitor? If not and the written notice occurs by email, must it be actually received to satisfy r 5.02?

Federal Court (Full Court): 'While it may be open to the Tribunal to rely on the sort of statistical analysis that it did, there are dangers in relying on such an approach when its fundamental task is to consider the risk that this visa applicant would face if returned'

Federal Court (Full Court). Under s 5 of the Migration Act, an "excluded fast track review applicant" includes a fast track applicant who "has made a claim for protection in a country other than Australia that was refused by that country". If a protection visa application is refused and the delegate forms the view that the applicant is an excluded fast track review applicant, that refusal is not subject to merits review. Can it be said that "the words 'a claim for protection' used in the relevant category of exclusion mean a claim for protection that was based upon alleged facts that are materially the same as those relied upon as the basis for the claim subsequently made in Australia"?

Federal Court (Full Court): In her visa cancellation revocation request, the Respondent made an "uncontentious assertion" that the sentencing remarks relating to her most recent convictions made no reference to whether those convictions involved drug use. The Minister took that assertion as a denial that those convictions were drug related and inferred that, because of the denial, she was likely to re-offend. Should the Minister have put the Respondent on notice that her "uncontentious assertion" would be critical to his decision?