Case Law Updates

Federal Court (Full Court). Can it be said that, in the context of a review by the IAA, "a failure to consider a submission offering an explanation which required an evidentiary foundation in circumstances where there was no such foundation could never cross the “threshold of materiality” so as to constitute a jurisdictional error"? Does BVD17 suggest that non-compliance with presidential directions made under s 473FB can have jurisdictional error implications? Are the factors in 473DD(b) mandatory considerations for the purposes of s 473DD(a)? Are those factors exhaustive of what might constitute “exceptional circumstances”? Did Appellant waive claim to apprehension of bias by himself providing the IAA with prejudicial material also provided by the Secretary? And more...

Federal Court: In SZMTA, HCA held that: error was jurisdictional only if it was material, that is if a different decision could have been made had the error not been made; materiality is a question of fact of which judicial review applicants bear the onus of proof. In Ibrahim, FCAFC held that it was incumbent on the judicial review applicant to demonstrate what would or could have occurred had the error not been made. In Nguyen, FCAFC, differently constituted, disagreed with Ibrahim. Can that division be resolved? Further, can errors which individually do not satisfy the materiality test do so if combined?

Federal Court (Full Court): 'Where, as here, material is brought forward in an apparently genuine way that may lead to a reconsideration of an earlier determination as incorrect, it would be wrong to prevent the consideration of factual matters relevant to the making of the preferable decision by reference to' the principle of issue estoppel

High Court. Can it be said that, "while [the respondent] may have been motivated to bring the current proceedings out of loyalty to [another person] or to avoid a possible forensic disadvantage to [that person], that does not mean that the proceedings were brought for an improper purpose"?

Federal Court: when determining under s 501CA(4) of the Migration Act 1958 whether to revoke the mandatory cancellation of a visa, should a decision-maker also take into consideration the non-citizen's submissions regarding what the expectations of the Australian community are or should the decision-maker only take into consideration their own views of what constitutes those expectations?

Federal Court. AAT set refusal aside, finding Applicant met s 36(2)(aa). On remittal, in considering exercise of discretion under s 501(1), Minister "accepted" AAT had found s 36(2)(aa) was satisfied and "noted" Applicant's submission to Minister relating non-refoulement obligations. Can it be said that Minister's acceptance that the AAT had found that s 36(2)(aa) was met should not be viewed as acceptance by him of substratum of AAT's finding? Can it be said that the use by the Minister of term "note" should not be read as the Minister stating that he agreed with the substratum of the Applicant's submissions, with the consequence that the Minister failed to meaningfully assess the Applicant's submissions and thus failed to discharge his discretion? For the purposes of discretion under s 501(1), is Minister entitled to disagree with or adopt AAT's findings?

Federal Court. Might legal unreasonableness (in the sense that the result itself bespeaks error) be found on the basis that there is no plausible justification for the timing of a decision under s 501BA(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) that is otherwise within power?

Federal Court (Full Court). In re-exercising the duty under s 473CB(1)(c) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), must the Secretary identify only documents that were within their possession or control at the time that the decision was referred to the IAA by the Minister, or must the Secretary also have regard to the documents in their possession at the time that they re-exercise that duty?

Federal Court: IAA affirmed decision to refuse Appellant a protection visa on the basis that he could relocate to Kabul: "I am ... not satisfied that there is a real risk of him facing significant harm ... in Kabul". Under s 36(2B)(a), "there is taken not to be a real risk that a non-citizen will suffer significant harm in a country if ... it would be reasonable for the non-citizen to relocate to an area of the country where there would not be a real risk that the non-citizen will suffer significant harm". As per MZACX and MZZJY, in order for relocation to be reasonable, risk of harm in other place is relevant, but risk need not be as high as "real" and harm need not be as serious as "significant". Did IAA treat reasonableness of relocation as necessarily involving the same risk and level of harm as set out in s 36(2)(aa), namely "real" and "significant"?

Federal Court: although legal unreasonableness is not amenable to fixed formulae, this decision contains an interesting description: 'A conclusion, whether stated definitively or arising as a matter of generalisation ... , that is inherently inconsistent with another conclusion (in the sense that at least one of them must be wrong) is one that is attended by irrationality or illogicality of the extreme kind to which the authorities refer'.