“Encouraging” migration litigation

Federal Court. Section 486E of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) provides that a person must not "encourage" the commencement or continuation of migration litigation if the case "has no reasonable prospect of success". Section 486F provides that a court may make a costs order against a person who breached s 486E. Can it be said that a "lawyer’s conduct in formulating the grounds, filing the notice of appeal and certifying the grounds as having reasonable prospects of success, whilst asserting an entitlement to charge fees for legal services for doing those things are together sufficient to support an inference that a legal practitioner has “encouraged” the client to commence and continue the litigation in the requisite sense"?

Which version of s 338(2)(d) applies?

Federal Court: This judgement is about a visa which was refused in 2017, when the "old" version of s 338(2)(d) was in effect. However, the judgement referred to the "new" version of that provision, which only came into effect in December 2018. This case illustrates how challenging it is for anyone to keep up with the pace of change in our industry. Fortunately, it seems that the reference to the "new" provision did not make a difference in the outcome of the case, given the circumstances.

Urgent injunction application

Federal Court: Minister cancelled Appellant's visa and detained him. Appellant applied to FCA for extension of time to file application seeking judicial review of cancellation decision. FCA dismissed that application on 18 Dec 2019 and delivered ex tempore reasons. DHA was going to remove Appellant on 7 Jan 2020. On 6 Jan 2020, self-represented Appellant: filed late appeal of the FCA's decision (presumably to FCAFC); did not apply for an extension of time to appeal; and also applied for an urgent injunction to restrain his removal. By the date of the decision on the injunction application, 6 Jan 2020, FCA still had not published its reasons nor formally entered its order. Was injunction granted? Injunction application was decided by a different single judge of the Federal Court, not the FCAFC.

Subsection 48A(1AA) interpreted

Federal Court (Full Court): The effect of s 48A(1AA) used to be that a person who relied on the Refugees Convention criterion under s 36(2)(a) for a protection visa (PV) application was barred from making a further PV application while in Australia if the original application had been refused. However, that person was not barred from making a further PV application based on the complementary protection under s 36(2)(aa). Subsection s 48A(1AA) was then amended, with the aim of changing that rule, but has the amendment achieved that aim?

Meaning of ‘end of the day’

Federal Court. Section 47(6) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) read: "A sentence of imprisonment (or an aggregate sentence of imprisonment) starts at the beginning of the day on which it commences or is taken to have commenced and ends at the end of the day on which it expires." Do the terms 'end of the day' mean end of daylight hours for the purpose of the reference to 12 months' imprisonment in ss 501(7)(c)-(d) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth)?

Hossain distinguished?

Federal Court (Full Court): 'the decision in Hossain did not state a general principle of statutory construction to the effect that there is an implied obligation that all powers conferred on administrative decision-makers are to be exercised on a correct understanding and application of the applicable law such that a material breach of that obligation would be jurisdictional'.

Federal Court divided on the materiality test

Federal Court (Full Court): An error is only jurisdictional if material and only material if, had it not been made, the decision could have been different (HCA: Hossain). Materiality is a question of fact in respect of which judicial review applicants bear the onus of proof (HCA: SZMTA). It was incumbent on the appellant to demonstrate what would have occurred had the error not been made (FCAFC: Ibrahim). Differently constituted, the FCAFC disagreed with that aspect of Ibrahim, distinguished SZMTA and Hossain and reconciled the latter 2 cases with WZARH.

Breach of s 198 remedied by mandamus, not habeas corpus?

High Court. Was the Executive's desire to comply with Australia's non-refoulement obligations an improper justification not to remove the unlawful non-citizen Respondent from Australia, by virtue of s 197C of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth)? If the Minister fails to remove a person from Australia under s 198 as soon as reasonably practicable, is the appropriate remedy an order mandating compliance by the Executive with the duty imposed by s 198, as opposed to the release of the non-citizen?

Member of the Australian community?

Federal Court. Minister found that child pornography offences for which Applicant was convicted were "offences against vulnerable member of the community". Was the Minister referring to members of the Australian community, despite the fact the location of the children involved was unknown? When deciding under s 501CA(4) whether to revoke the mandatory cancellation of a visa, was Minister required to consider that Applicant also held at the same time another visa that would be cancelled by operation of s 501F(3)?

Leave to argue ground not argued below after grant of special leave to appeal?

High Court. Can it be said that "an unrevoked grant of special leave to appeal entitles an appellant to advance any ground of appeal on which special leave has been granted unless precluded by operation of law such as by waiver or estoppel"?

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