Case Law Updates

Federal Court. Should the FCA grant peremptory mandamus, compelling the Minister to grant the Appellant a SHEV? Is consideration of the "national interest" under cl 790.227 "limited to whether or not the appellant poses an unacceptable risk of harm to the Australian community"? May the Minister justify delay where he or she is exhausting his or her rights of appellate review, including by applying to the High Court for special leave to appeal from the FCAFC's decision?

Federal Court: FCA allowed an appeal by non-citizen Appellant, remitting the matter to AAT for reconsideration of Appellant's protection visa refusal. As Appellant could be unsuccessful at AAT again, he made interlocutory application under s 37AF of FCA Act, for suppression of aspects of the appeal orders, as he feared retaliation in Pakistan. "The issue is whether, to obtain an order, it is necessary to show that, absent an order being made, it would be probable that the person in question will suffer harm, or whether all the section requires is for the Court to be satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the order sought is necessary to protect the person’s safety". If Pakistani authorities already knew of Appellant's desertion anyway, should the suppression orders be limited to what those authorities still did not know, namely the content of his criticisms towards them?

Federal Circuit and Family Court. The Minister sought to set-off a costs order made in the applicant's favour out of a costs order made in the Minister's favour in previous court proceedings. Can it be said that "there is a public interest in people challenging governmental decisions being adequately legally represented, and allowing a set-off in circumstances such as the present may discourage appropriate lawyers from acting"?

Federal Court (Full Court). Was the obligation under s 39(1) of the AAT Act to ensure procedural fairness higher than that provided by the common law? Must the content of a “reasonable opportunity” in s 39(1) of the AAT Act be construed in light of the terms of s 500(6L) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth)?

Federal Court. Was cl 14.2(1)(b) of Direction 79 concerned with the effect of non-revocation, as opposed to revocation, of the cancellation of the non-citizen’s visa? Do cll 14.2 or cl 14.4(1) permit consideration only of the negative impacts on family members of removal of the non-citizen from Australia?

Federal Court (Full Court). Is s 501(6)(d)(i) limited to the period of visa in question? Do the principles in Drake (No 2) about policies apply to Ministerial directions? Did the effect of para 8.1.1(1)(a) of Direction 90 (that the Australian Government and the Australian community consider sexual crimes to be very serious) relieve the Tribunal of the obligation conferred upon it by paragraph 8.1(2)(a) to consider the nature and seriousness of the non-citizen's conduct to date?

Federal Court. Does s 423A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) codify the circumstances in which the Tribunal may draw an unfavourable inference?

Federal Court: Federal Court had held in a previous decision that, on judicial review, "where an issue goes to a legal error relevant to the exercise of [an administrative] decision-maker’s jurisdiction then it may, depending on the type of error, be appropriate to admit evidence not before the decision-maker". Here, the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) affirmed a delegate's decision to refuse a protection visa, as it found that Sri Lanka was safe. If Sri Lanka then becomes safe, could it be said that the IAA's decision "became" legally unreasonable?

Federal Court: the Appellant made a Tribunal application but mistakenly answered in the application form that he held a refugee visa, with the result that the AAT's online system did not ask for payment of the application fee. That fee was only paid after the timeframe for making a valid application. The AAT recognised the mistake was understandable given how its online system was designed, but nevertheless found it had no jurisdiction. Was the review application 'accompanied by the prescribed fee'?

Federal Court (Full Court). Should a tribunal of fact "be hesitant about reaching its own conclusions about a person’s state of mind where there is expert evidence on the subject"? Is the Tribunal bound by opinions expressed by experts? Was the Tribunal required to refer in its reasons to every matter to which the expert psychologist had regard?