CWY20 wrongly decided or impliedly overruled?

Federal Court (Full Court). Was the Full Court's decision in CWY20 wrong in that "no finding should be made about the implications of Australia’s breach of a treaty obligation in the absence of evidence"? Was CWY20 in any event impliedly overruled by the High Court's decision in Plaintiff M1, in that "the Executive cannot, by compelling Australia’s entry into a treaty, alter the content of Australian domestic law so as to grant rights or impose obligations, such that the law enacted by Parliament is added to, undermined or varied, whether directly or indirectly"?

Does ‘vulnerability’ involve a comparison between victim and offender?

Federal Court (Full Court). Is the vulnerability of a particular victim because of his or her characteristics such as physical stature relative to the characteristics of the offender a relevant vulnerability for the purposes of paras 8.1.1(1)(b)(ii) and 8.4(2)(c) of Direction 90?

Rome Statute & s 5H(2)(a) of Migration Act

Federal Court. Can it be said that "the generally serious consequences of refoulement – but not the particular consequences in an individual case – are taken into account in giving meaning and content to the requirement that there be “serious reasons for considering”" pursuant to s 5H(2)(a) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth)? How to interpret Articles 22(1) and 25(3)(c)-(d) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, entered into force 1 July 2002?

Time of lifting the bar or TOA?

Federal Court. Applicant was an unauthorised maritime arrival (UMA) and thus s 46A barred. In July 2017, Minister made determination that bar be lifted for TPV or SHEV if: a) a similar determination had been made relating to UMA's parent; and b) any application by the parent was made by 1 Oct 2017; and c) that application has not been refused and finally determined. When July 2017 Determination was made, Applicant's mother satisfied criteria (a) to (c). In Sep 2019, Applicant applied for SHEV, but application was considered invalid by DHA, as criterion (c) was no longer satisfied. Was that criterion to be satisfied by reference to July 2017 or the time of the SHEV application? Alternatively, should procedural fairness have applied to an assessment carried out for the purposes of a possible exercise of the Minister's discretion to lift the bar?

Visa application withdrawal

Federal Court. Once a visa application is withdrawn, is a "discretion involved on the part of an officer of the Department in assessing whether there was in fact a withdrawal in order for the withdrawal to take effect"? Is the question of fact of whether a visa application was withdrawn an objective jurisdictional fact?

Direction 90: child’s best interests to be viewed through prism of hypothetical future choices?

Federal Court (Full Court). Were the best interests of the children under Direction 90 to be viewed through the prism of what the appellant would do if the visa was refused? Does the fact that the Tribunal was aware that the interests of the relevant minor children differed and the extent to which they did and that the appellant did not put that difference in issue before the Tribunal mean that the Tribunal engaged in the required weighing exercise?

Is legal unreasonableness on the way to final conclusion material by definition?

Federal Court (Full Court). Instead of saying that errors in the form of legal unreasonableness in the making of a finding “on the way” to the final conclusion are material by definition, can it be said that they are material if they are critical findings, in the sense that there is a built-in requirement of materiality?

Reasonability of removal an objective jurisdictional fact?

Federal Court. Is it reasonably arguable that the question of whether it is ‘reasonably practicable’ to remove a person from Australia is an objective ‘jurisdictional fact’, that is a fact which a court can and should determine for itself?

PIC 4020 waiver: was separation period a mandatory consideration?

Federal Court. Did the Tribunal need to form a view pursuant to PIC 4020(4)(b) about the likely period of separation before determining whether PIC 4020(1) should be waived?

s 116(1)(e)(ii): mandatory considerations

Federal Court. In the context of s 116(1)(e)(ii), can it be said that submissions to the Tribunal, viewed as a whole, are a mandatory relevant consideration, but not every aspect of those submissions can be so described? If so, for the purpose of determining whether an aspect of those submissions is a mandatory relevant consideration, is the fundamental question the importance of that aspect to the exercise of the Tribunal’s function, which will depend on the nature of the material and the circumstances of the case?