Case Law Updates

Federal Court (Full Court). In determining whether a "claim" estoppel arises, can different grounds of jurisdictional error be seen as separate causes of action or claims arising out of the one decision? In determining whether Anshun estoppel arises, is the principal inquiry "whether the ground of review should have been brought forward in the first proceeding, in the sense that it was unreasonable for the appellant not to have done so"?

Federal Court. Can it be said that, "if an applicant fails to appear at a scheduled hearing, the Tribunal has three options: (i) to proceed to make a decision on the review (s 426A(1A)(a)); (ii) to dismiss the application “without any further consideration of the application or information before the Tribunal” (s 426A(1A)(b)); or (iii) to adjourn the review and reschedule the hearing (ss 426A(2) and 427(1)(b))"? If so, must its decision nevertheless have an evident and intelligible justification?

Federal Court (Full Court). In the examination of facts on which a putative state of mind of an administrative decision-maker is founded, is a court limited to judicial review principles? Will that state of mind be vitiated if it is founded upon “findings or inferences of fact which were not supported by some probative material or could not be supported on logical grounds"? In BSE17, FCA held that a "no evidence" ground relating to administrative fact-finding in the course of the exercise of power (i.e. after the state of mind has been reached) cannot be made out even if a "skerrick" of evidence is available to support that fact-finding. In the formation of the state of mind, is a skerrick of evidence that is consistent with the fact-finding necessarily probative material? 

Federal Court (Full Court). Was it permissible for the Tribunal to conclude that the Appellant's risk of recidivism fell within a broad range, namely "from (1) at best, low-moderate; and (2), more likely, a risk of re-offending that is now little or no different than what it was at the time of his most recent removal from the Australian community"?

Federal Court: A person fails the character test if it is reasonable to infer from an Interpol notice [IRN] that the person would present a risk to the community: s 501(6)(h). Applicant applied to FCA, seeking orders restraining Minister from refusing visa and declaring that it was not reasonable to infer risk from IRN. Minister served Notice on Applicant to produce Interpol's Response to Applicant's application for IRN to be deleted. Should Applicant's interlocutory application to set Notice aside succeed, on the basis: that Interpol's response could not be used for the purpose of s 501(6)(h); of public interest immunity?

Under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), a person served a written notice by the Department, requesting information that might help it ascertain the identity or whereabouts of another person, is obliged to provide that information. Non-compliance can result in imprisonment. Is an RMA obliged to provide clients' information? Does the answer depend on whether the RMA is a lawyer? If practitioners do not have the information sought, are they required to take steps to obtain it?

Federal Court. The grounds of appeal formulated by the self-represented appellant "do not appropriately articulate any appellable error by the primary judge. On their face, they simply ask this Court to detect jurisdictional error in the Tribunal’s decision". Would it be wholly inappropriate to read those grounds of appeal "as asserting that the learned primary judge erred by failing to detect the jurisdictional errors identified in grounds one and two"?

Federal Court (Full Court). Can it be said that, "if it is common ground between parties that a particular fact is so, then it is a denial of procedural fairness for an administrator, for example, the Tribunal, to depart from that position without giving each party an opportunity to make submissions on that subject; in other words, ambushing by a decision-maker can amount to jurisdictional error"?

Federal Court. If a conviction and sentence was sufficient to engage the Tribunal's jurisdiction for the purposes of s 501CA(4)(a)(i) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and other convictions and sentences were not needed to engage that jurisdiction, could the Tribunal go behind those other convictions and sentences insofar as they had a bearing on s 501CA(4)(a)(ii)?

According to the majority, jurisdictional error consists of a material breach of a condition of the exercise of a decision-making power. ‘Ordinarily... breach of a condition cannot be material unless compliance with the condition could have resulted in the making of a different decision'.