Case Law Updates

Federal Court. Can it be said that the obligation under s 360 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) to invite an applicant to a hearing does not operate on a “once and for all” basis, in that, if a new issue arises after a Tribunal hearing, a further hearing must be convened? Are issues which emerge during a hearing also subject to the obligation imposed by s 360?

Federal Court: Appellant made invalid protection visa application containing only claim X and then made a valid protection visa application containing claims X and Y. The valid application was refused and the Appellant then applied to AAT for merits review. The AAT considered the fact that the invalid application did not contain claim Y as indicative that the Appellant's claims were fabricated and affirmed the delegate's decision. Subsection 47(3) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) provided (and still does) that "the Minister is not to consider an application that is not a valid application" and also applied to the AAT. Can it be said the the AAT's consideration of the claim contained in the valid application by reference to the material in the invalid application was prohibited by s 47(3)?

Federal Court (Full Court). Can the literality of words of judgments be interpreted as if they were the text of a statute? Can secondary materials such as an explanatory memorandum only be looked at if the text of a statute is ambiguous?

Federal Court (Full Court): In SZMTA, HCA held that: error was jurisdictional only if it was material, that is if a different decision could have been made had the error not been made; materiality is a question of fact of which judicial review applicants bear the onus of proof. In Ibrahim, FCAFC held that it was incumbent on the judicial review applicant to demonstrate what would or could have occurred had the error not been made. In Nguyen, FCAFC, differently constituted, disagreed with that aspect of Ibrahim. Can that division be resolved? Were those cases distinguished here?

Federal Court (Full Court). The Minister found that child pornography offences for which the Appellant was convicted were "offences against vulnerable member of the community". Was the Minister referring to members of the Australian community, despite the fact the location of the children involved was unknown? Was Dunn v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 489 wrongly decided?

Federal Court. Was there a need for the IAA's assessment of the credibility of a letter to coincide with that of the delegate? Entry interview form for unauthorised maritime arrivals asked: "1. Why did you leave your country of nationality (country of residence)? ... 7. Were there any armed groups, political groups, or religious groups operating in the area you lived?" Was Question 1 of the entry interview form asking about reasons for not wanting to return? Could Question 7 of the entry interview form be read as eliciting information about the receiving end of conduct? Is IAA required to give reasons for why it finds an applicant lacks credit?

Federal Court. Is what the High Court said in SZSSJ also applicable to s 351 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth)? Can the Minister lay down Ministerial intervention guidelines?

Federal Court. Can it be said that the Tribunal's conclusions that the applicant's crimes against other road users, strangers and members of the public going about their daily lives were crimes against vulnerable members of the community for the purposes of para 8.1.1(1)(b)(ii) of Direction No. 90 were not obvious, with the result that procedural fairness required the Tribunal to put those conclusions to the applicant?

Federal Court. Can it be said that "an exercise of power under s 501(3A) [of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth)] is invalid where, objectively, a sentence of imprisonment of 12 months or more existing at the date of the cancellation decision is subsequently reduced on appeal to less than 12 months"?

Federal Court (Full Court). Do the definition of "non-refoulement obligations" under s 5(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) or s 197C(1) satisfy the description under para 9.1(1) of Direction 90 of being “tests enunciated in the Act”?