Case Law Updates

Federal Court. Can it be said that "it is the proposition that “Aboriginal Australians (understood according to the tripartite test in Mabo (No 2)) are not within the reach of the ‘aliens’ power conferred by s 51(xix) of the Constitution” which is the ratio decidendi of Love/Thoms"? Does the majority reasoning in Love/Thoms as a whole require a single judge to "superimpose onto the Mabo (No 2) test, which was expressed by Brennan J as the method for determining membership of an Indigenous group, a requirement to prove native title in particular land and waters"?

Federal Court (Full Court). In deciding whether it was in the national interest to grant a visa, was the Minister obliged to take into account the legal consequences of his decision, "particularly when those consequences have implications not only for an applicant but also for the nation"? Is there a "necessary inconsistency between being satisfied that the appellant is not a danger to Australia’s security for the purpose of s 36(1C) and not being satisfied that it is in the national interest to grant him a SHEV for the purpose of Sch 2 cl 790.277"?

Federal Court (FCA). Following unsuccessful requests to be removed from Australia under s 198(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), the Applicant applied to the FCA for mandamus directing the Commonwealth to do so. Subsection 476A(1) provided that, despite any other law, the FCA's "original jurisdiction in relation to a migration decision" was limited to the matters under s 476A(1)(a) to (d). Is the refusal to discharge the obligation under s 198 a "migration decision", with the result that the FCA lacked jurisdiction?

Federal Court. The expression “compelling reasons” in cl 802.211(2)(d)(ii) of Schedule 2 to the Regulations was not defined. Did that expression have the same meaning discussed in Plaintiff M64/2015 in the context of cl 202.222(2)? Is the genuineness of the marriage a matter that must be taken into account in determining whether there are compelling reasons for not applying the Sch 3 criteria? If not, does that mean that the Tribunal was bound to ignore the nature of the relationship?

Federal Court (Full Court). In the High Court's decision in CNY17: unbeknown to Appellant, Secretary gave IAA additional material in purported compliance with s 473CB(1)(c); however, the additional material was objectively both irrelevant to IAA's review and prejudicial to Appellant; IAA then wrote to Appellant: DHA "has provided us with all documents they consider relevant to your case"; IAA eventually affirmed delegate's protection visa refusal, without requesting new information or interviewing Appellant; IAA's reasons stated that it "had regard to the material referred by the Secretary", but did not refer to additional material; HCA held the giving of additional material resulted in a reasonable apprehension of bias on IAA's part. Here, IAA expressly disavowed reliance on prejudicial material. Was that sufficient to avoid apprehension of bias?

Federal Court (Full Court). Is s 501(6)(d)(i) limited to the period of visa in question? Do the principles in Drake (No 2) about policies apply to Ministerial directions? Did the effect of para 8.1.1(1)(a) of Direction 90 (that the Australian Government and the Australian community consider sexual crimes to be very serious) relieve the Tribunal of the obligation conferred upon it by paragraph 8.1(2)(a) to consider the nature and seriousness of the non-citizen's conduct to date?

Federal Court. Can it be said that, "ordinarily disclosure of the expert's report for the purpose of reliance on it in the litigation will result in an implied waiver of the privilege in respect of the brief or instructions or documents … at least if the appropriate inference to be drawn is that they were used in a way that could be said to influence the content of the report, because, in these circumstances, it would be unfair for the client to rely on the report without disclosure of the brief, instructions or documents"?

Federal Court: Federal Court had held in a previous decision that, on judicial review, "where an issue goes to a legal error relevant to the exercise of [an administrative] decision-maker’s jurisdiction then it may, depending on the type of error, be appropriate to admit evidence not before the decision-maker". Here, the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) affirmed a delegate's decision to refuse a protection visa, as it found that Sri Lanka was safe. If Sri Lanka then becomes safe, could it be said that the IAA's decision "became" legally unreasonable?

Federal Court. Does the fact that a particular conclusion on a particular issue is based on specialised knowledge "have the result that the rules of procedural fairness do not require that the issue be brought to the attention of an applicant if the issue is a critical or important one which is not obvious on the known material"?

High Court: Although this case dealt with tax law, it concerned administrative law and could therefore apply to migration matters. The High Court (HCA) observed that "no satisfactory explanation has been offered as to why the plaintiff adopted the course of seeking writs of certiorari and mandamus rather than special leave to appeal against the [judgment of the Full Court of the Federal Court]". Was that in itself a sufficient reason to dismiss the application to the HCA?