Case Law Updates

Federal Court. Due to s 500(6L), AAT had 84 days to decide under s 501CA(4) whether to revoke the mandatory cancellation of Applicant's visa. At the time of AAT's decision, Applicant still had about 6 years of imprisonment to serve. Could AAT make a legally reasonable decision about the risk the Applicant would present to the community upon release 6 years in advance? Did AAT have "power to remit the application with a direction, or recommendation, that a decision concerning the application for revocation of the cancellation of the Applicant’s visa be deferred until closer to the time of his release from imprisonment"?

Federal Court (Full Court). What is the meaning of "only because" in s 140(2)(a) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth)? If the Federal Court sets aside an AAT decision to affirm a decision made under s 140 to cancel a visa, is that visa "taken never to have been cancelled", by reason of s 114(1)? Is a visa sponsor obliged under s 104 to notify the Department about a change in circumstance? Was AAT prevented from making decision under s 140(2) by reason of s 140(3)? Was the meaning of "parent" in s 15 of the Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1995 (NSW) confined to "biological parent"?

Federal Court: Delegate purported to cancel NZ citizen Appellant's subclass 444 visa under s 116(1)(e) of the Migration Act and DHA purported to remove her under s 198. The cancellation was then quashed by the FCCA on the basis of jurisdictional error (JE). Appellant eventually tried to re-enter Australia, but was refused a 444 visa because: s 32(2)(a)(ii) provided that a 444 visa applicant must not be a "behaviour concern non-citizen"; under s 5, a person who "has been removed or deported from Australia or removed or deported from another country" is a "behaviour concern non-citizen". Can it be said that the phrase “removed or deported from Australia” means legally or lawfully removed or deported from Australia. Alternatively, can it be said that Appellant was never removed under the Act?

Federal Court (Full Court). Section s 501CA(4)(a) provides that the Minister may revoke the mandatory cancellation of a visa if "the person makes representations in accordance with the invitation". Reg 2.52(2)(b) provides that representations must be "made ... within 28 days after the person is given the notice" of cancellation. Here, the notice said that representations must be "received within 28 days". Do the terms "in accordance with the invitation" allow the notice to determine what the legislation means? Do the terms "makes" and "made" mean "receives" and "received"?

Federal Court (Full Court): Q1 to the FCAFC: did Minister personally spend about an hour or only 11 minutes considering whether to cancel a visa? Q2: should the Court could draw a Jones v Dunkel inference that the Minister spent only 11 minutes? Q3: if the Court finds that Minister spent only 11 minutes, was that sufficient for the Minister to give proper, genuine and realistic consideration to the materials provided by the Department?

Federal Court. Where the Minister by his or her conduct invites further submissions for the purpose of exercising the personal power in s 501BA(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), is the Minister thereafter compelled to consider that material, even though s 501BA(3) provides that the rules of natural justice do not apply to s 501BA(2)?

Federal Court. If the parties to litigation agree on a principle, is that principle's precedential force diminished? Further, in Vaitaiki, Teoh was interpreted by: Burchett J as requiring decision-makers to take the best interests of children into account as a primary consideration if no notice to the contrary was given; Branson J as requiring decision-makers to treat those interests as a primary consideration. Is the error discussed in Teoh better characterised as one going to procedural fairness or as a failure to take into account a relevant consideration? If the former: is the procedural fairness obligation discussed in Teoh either subsumed within s 425 or not a matter dealt with by Div 4 of Pt 7 of the Act; should the FCA adopt Burchett J's or Branson J's interpretation of Teoh?

Federal Court (Full Court). In Jul 2017, Minister determined that s 46A bar be lifted for TPV or SHEV if: a) a similar determination had been made relating to UMA's parent; and b) any application by the parent was made by 1 Oct 2017; and c) that application has not been refused and finally determined. Was the latter criterion to be satisfied by reference to Jul 2017 or the time of the SHEV application? We also summarise the court's views on the requirements of procedural fairness concerning s 46A.

Federal Court (Full Court). For the purposes of assessing complementary protection criteria, s 36(2B)(a) required AAT to consider whether "it would be reasonable for the non-citizen to relocate to an area of the country where there would not be a real risk that the non-citizen will suffer significant harm". Is s 36(2B)(a) informed by, and does it give effect to, a principle akin to the principle of internal relocation? Did AAT misinterpret s 36(2B)(a) by using as a starting point its assessment that Appellant had two "home areas", rather than directing attention to the place where Appellant was likely to return to?

Federal Court. Was cl 14.2(1)(b) of Direction 79 concerned with the effect of non-revocation, as opposed to revocation, of the cancellation of the non-citizen’s visa? Do cll 14.2 or cl 14.4(1) permit consideration only of the negative impacts on family members of removal of the non-citizen from Australia?