PIC 4005 / 4007 policy might be unlawful
Federal Court (Full Court): Are MOCs allowed to calculate what constitutes "significant costs" under PIC 4007(1)(c)(ii)? Does the degree with which MOCs are required to describe the particularity of the "form or level" of a condition "depend upon the extent to which there is diversity in the experience for those with the particular type of condition"? Who bears the onus of proving that degree on judicial review? Are MOCs' opinions binding for the purposes of waiver? If not, are they at least relevant for those purposes? Can a decision be vitiated with jurisdictional error for having relied on a MOC opinion based on outdated information? If so, must there be a "real indication in the material that the condition ... was changing" in order for the information to be outdated? Does this decision resolve the Ibrahim / Nguyen tension?
AAT’s jurisdiction where case officer has no authority
Federal Court (Full Court): If a case officer has received no delegation of authority to cancel a visa under s 109 of the Migration Act 1958 but does so anyway, does the Tribunal have jurisdiction to review that cancellation? If so, is the Tribunal's power limited to setting aside the original decision?
Does s 477(1) limit the “exercise” or “scope” of the jurisdiction under s 476(1)?
High Court: Did availability of alternative avenue of judicial review to FCA preclude application to HCA? Applications to FCCA under s 476(1) must be made within 35 days of migration decision (s 477(1)), unless extension is granted (s 477(2)). Does s 477(1) limit the scope of jurisdiction conferred on FCCA by s 476(1)? Or does it merely limit the exercise of that jurisdiction? Did HCA adopt FCFAC's decision in MZABP? In assessing time extension application, was FCCA's "inference about a self-represented litigant's state of understanding of court procedure ... available to be drawn based solely upon the fact that [Plaintiff] has previously brought proceedings in that court"?
Is credibility assessment linear?
Federal Court (Full Court). If a decision-maker disbelieves a person on one matter, can it be said that that disbelief might be carried over to affect the decision-maker's disbelief in other matters? If so and if it is established that belief of a person's credibility on one matter was erroneously based, can it be said, in the context of assessing the materiality of an error, that that might convince the decision-maker of the need to revisit its conclusions on other matters?
Can recidivism risk fall within broad range?
Federal Court (Full Court). Was it permissible for the Tribunal to conclude that the Appellant's risk of recidivism fell within a broad range, namely "from (1) at best, low-moderate; and (2), more likely, a risk of re-offending that is now little or no different than what it was at the time of his most recent removal from the Australian community"?
UNCAT’s Interim Measures Request
Federal Court. Does the Federal Court have jurisdiction to hear the application for judicial review insofar as it seeks: declarations that the Minister's decision that the United Nations Committee Against Torture's Interim Measures Request was 'unwarranted' is affected by jurisdictional error; a declaration that Australia owes non-refoulement obligations in relation to the Applicant?
Can country information include “personal information?
Federal Court. Can it be said that "information about conditions in a specific country (usually called “country information”) may include information about an identified or reasonably identifiable individual" and therefore that country information may include "personal information" for the purposes of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth)?
Spouses a single person at common law?
High Court. Is there a "principle in Australian common law respecting the single legal personality of spouses"? In other words, do husband and wife form a single person at common law? Does or did the Australian common law include "a rule by virtue of which the common law of conspiracy does not apply to spouses"?
“Late” AAT applications: 1 more piece to DFQ17’s jigsaw
Federal Court. DFQ17 held that a visa refusal notification letter must clearly convey the deadline for an application for merits review in order to comply with s 66(2)(d)(ii). Here, the following sentence was found under the heading "Registries of the [AAT]": "As this letter was given to you by hand, you are taken to have received it when it was handed to you". Did the place of that sentence render the notification unclear? The letter also read: "As you are in immigration detention, the prescribed timeframe commences on the day on which you were notified of this decision, and ends at the end of seven working days (beginning with the first working day that occurs on or after that day)". Did the latter sentence precisely track reg 4.31(1)?
Is the Act addressing Pearson unconstitutional?
Federal Court (Full Court). Does item 4 of the Migration Amendment (Aggregate Sentences) Act 2023 (Cth) (Amending Act) involve a usurpation of judicial power? Does item 4 have the effect of withdrawing or fettering the entrenched jurisdiction of the High Court under s 75(iii) and (v) of the Constitution? Do items 4(3), (4) and (5)(b)(i) of Sch 1 to the Amending Act effect an acquisition of the applicant’s right to sue for false imprisonment otherwise than on just terms, contrary to s 51(xxxi) of the Constitution?




















