Judgement affecting the liberty of an individual?

Federal Court: s 24(1A) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 provides that an appeal shall not be brought to the Federal Court (FCA) from the Federal Circuit Court (FCCA), unless the FCA gives leave to appeal. However, according to s 24(1C), leave is not required for an appeal from an interlocutory judgement affecting the liberty of an individual. Was a no-jurisdiction judgement by the FCCA an interlocutory judgement that affected the liberty of an individual?

GTE: are cll 500.212(a), (b) & (c) cumulative?

Federal Court (Full Court). If the decision-maker assesses cl 500.212(a) of Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) as not satisfied, is it required to consider whether cll 500.212(b) or (c) are satisfied?

AAT’s too narrow approach on reinstatement decision

A reinstatement decision by the AAT focusing only on whether the appellant had been properly notified of the hearing was 'too narrow', given that the appellant's arguments on the reinstatement application had not been so confined.

s 426A: AAT required to consider application merits?

Federal Court. If primary and secondary visa applicants have their combined visa applications refused and they make a Tribunal application for the review of the refusals, does that constitute the making of multiple applications, one for each applicant? Is there anything in 426A "or the statutory context in which it appears which requires the Tribunal to have regard to the merits of the substantive application"? If not, does that mean that "in all circumstances no consideration of the merits is warranted"?

Does “personal information” imply knowledge of person’s name?

Federal Court: The Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) cannot consider new information unless it is credible "personal information", which means information about an identified, or reasonably identifiable, individual. Could the IAA have determined the identity of an individual the subject of a previous IAA decision by accessing the IAA's records, with the result that such a person was "reasonably identifiable"? Alternatively, does "personal information" imply knowledge of a person's name?

Unwilling to participate: should FCA order production of documents?

Federal Court: "In light of the appellant’s self-represented status on his appeal, it remains to consider whether the Court should exercise its discretion to order the Minister to produce the country information so as to enable the merits of the appellant’s argument to be determined by reference to it ... Despite the urgings of the Court [the Appellant] has expressed an unwillingness to participate in the hearing of the appeal in a meaningful way". Should the FCA exercise its discretion in favour of the Appellant?

Appeal: member of the Australian community?

Federal Court (Full Court). The Minister found that child pornography offences for which the Appellant was convicted were "offences against vulnerable member of the community". Was the Minister referring to members of the Australian community, despite the fact the location of the children involved was unknown? Was Dunn v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 489 wrongly decided?

Consequences of removal under s 199

Federal Court: the NZ citizen Appellant signed papers requesting to be removed from Australia under s 199(1) of the Migration Act 1958, in which case the airfare was paid for by the DHA. However, the DHA found that the removal rendered her a 'behaviour concern non-citizen': s 5(1). As a result, she was unable to obtain a further subclass 444 visa. If the Appellant did not understand the significance of her removal request, was she really a 'behaviour concern non-citizen'?

Interlocutory injunction in the context of s 48B

Federal Court. Is there a serious question to be tried, namely whether the Secretary is under a duty to bring the applicant’s request for ministerial intervention under s 48B of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) to the Minister’s attention? Can it be said that, although any potential harm to the applicant if he is removed is not a reason for considering that the duty in s 198(6) to remove him does not exist, harm if removed is relevant to the balance of convenience?

Must partner visa sponsor have capacity to fulfil undertaking under r 1.20?

Federal Court (Full Court). Cl 820.211(2)(c) required Appellant to be sponsored at TOA. Cl 820.221(4) required sponsorship to have been approved at TOD. Under reg 1.20(1), sponsor is a "person …who undertakes the obligations stated in sub-regulation (2)". Reg 1.20(2)(c) provided that the "sponsor undertakes to assist the applicant, to the extent necessary, financially and in relation to accommodation...". AAT adopted PAM3, which read that r 1.20 "requires officers to be satisfied that the sponsor can meet the financial needs of the applicant". AAT found Appellant's partner was not capable of fulfilling the undertaking under r 1.20 and thus was not a sponsor. Is the capacity to fulfil that undertaking relevant for the purposes of cl 820.221(4)?