Case Law Updates

Federal Court. Can it be said that, although the Tribunal would not have been entirely acting of its own initiative if it accepted K's invitation conveyed by the Applicant to speak to the Tribunal, the information that would have been given by K would not have been presented "in support of the [Applicant's] case", as it would rather have been presented as a result of the Tribunal eliciting information from K? In other words, was the giving of information by K precluded by s 500(6H) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth)?

Federal Court (Full Court). In the context of s 501CA(4) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), the Tribunal said: "the Tribunal does not consider that drugs are as readily available in detention as they are in the community". Was that a finding for which specific evidence or other material was required? Or could it be made based on the Tribunal’s personal or specialised knowledge?

Federal Court (FCA). Following unsuccessful requests to be removed from Australia under s 198(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), the Applicant applied to the FCA for mandamus directing the Commonwealth to do so. Subsection 476A(1) provided that, despite any other law, the FCA's "original jurisdiction in relation to a migration decision" was limited to the matters under s 476A(1)(a) to (d). Is the refusal to discharge the obligation under s 198 a "migration decision", with the result that the FCA lacked jurisdiction?

MARA: "I am satisfied that the Former Agent deliberately misled [the client] on the lodgement process and on the progress of the visa application/s in order to conceal from [the client] the deficiencies in his working knowledge of migration legislation..."

Federal Court. Does the fact that the grant of an injunction would restrain the enforcement of the law by preventing officers of the Commonwealth from performing a statutory duty, and thereby frustrate the legislative scheme of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), provide a strong reason not to grant an interlocutory injunction in the present case?

Federal Court. Could the fact that there was only one bedroom in the couple's residence be ignored by the Tribunal? If the couple was sharing a bed, did this necessarily militate "strongly against the proposition that they were merely sharing a house"? Is what the decision in He has to say about the correct approach to r 1.15A(3) about whether a person is a spouse directly applicable to the position under r 1.09A(3) for the purpose of determining whether a person is a de facto partner?

Federal Court (Full Court): Is the obiter dicta in MZZJO authority for the proposition that a decision-maker will necessarily make a jurisdictional error if, in assessing a protection visa application, he or she relies "solely or primarily on the absence of claims from an entry interview" whose purpose is not to assess the applicant's claim for protection?

Federal Court. Should subpara (b)(v) of the definition of “immigration detention” in s 5(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) be construed as impliedly conferring power on the Minister to approve in writing ‘another place’ of immigration detention? Did s 273 of the Act and subpara (b)(i) of the definition of “immigration detention” impliedly limited the Minister’s power under subpara (b)(v) only to the approval of places which are not a formal institutional place and not a de facto detention centre? If the Commonwealth’s contracting and expenditure on the Hotels was not lawfully authorised, was the applicant’s detention thus unlawful?

Federal Court. Under s 473CB(1)(b), the Secretary must give the IAA "material provided by the referred applicant to the person making the decision before the decision was made". If a protection visa applicant provided material to a delegate but another delegate refused to grant the visa, can it be said that the material was not given "to the person making the decision"? If the material was given to a delegate by the applicant's representative, can it be said that it was not given by the "referred applicant"? With respect, does this Federal Court decision stand in contrast with the High Court's majority judgement in SZMTA?

Can it be said that, whether an applicant is a genuine applicant for entry and stay as a student is reached by reason only of the particular criteria in cll 500.212(a), (b) and (c)? Do the words in cl 500.212(a) concern only with how long a visa applicant intends to stay in Australia? In assessing whether an applicant "is a genuine applicant for entry and stay as a student", must applicants satisfy each of cll 500.212(a), (b) and (c)? Are some of the factors in Direction No 69 also relevant to cl 500.212(c)? Did the group introduction process at the start of the Tribunal hearing amount to a denial of procedural fairness? Should a litigant be expected to put on an appeal before being entitled to settled reasons from the court below?