Case Law Updates

Federal Court (Full Court): In Chung, FCA held that visa refusal notification under s 66 was no decision for the purpose of s 476. That led FCA to hold in BYN18 that a s 501CA(3)(a) notice was no decision for that purpose. Was BYN18 wrongly decided? If so, could Chung be revisited? In SZQDZ, FCAFC held that decision of an IMR was not a “migration decision” for the purpose of ss 476 / 477. HCA then held in SZSSJ that an ITOA was a “migration decision” for that purpose. Did SZSSJ impliedly overrule SZQDZ, as FCA held in EKU17? Is obligation under s 501CA(3) discharged if non-citizen does not have capacity to understand notification & invitation purportedly issued under it? Are there implications to or from DFQ17?

Federal Court. In BCR16, FCAFC explained there was a difference between “claiming to fear harm if required to return to a place and non-refoulement obligations”. Is that distinction illusory in some circumstances? Does the fact that an unlawful non-citizen is eligible to apply for a substantive visa that can be granted when the applicant is in the migration zone but has not done so prevent the application of s 198(2B) to him or her? Should those who advise the Minister, and his Department, "be encouraged to ensure that clear factual information about these matters is put before the Tribunal, so that its merits review function can be most effectively exercised"?

Federal Court (Full Court). Is 'danger' as used in s 36(1C)(b) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth): such that "the harm that will eventuate if the danger becomes a reality is non-trivial" and "of a physical or psychological kind"; one "that combines an assessment of how probable harm is with an assessment of the severity or seriousness if the probability eventuates"? Is the 'Australian community' as used in s 36(1C)(b) conceived of as the community as a whole and/or any person or persons who are part of it?

High Court. Can it be said that s 494AB of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) does not take away the jurisdiction of any court to hear and determine proceedings of the kinds described in s 494AB(1), but rather provides the Commonwealth with a defence to those claims if they are made in a court other than the High Court? If so, could proceedings instituted in the High Court in relation to the matters identified in s 494AB(1) be remitted to another court for hearing and determination without s 494AB providing an answer or defence to the claim?

Federal Court: s 36(3) of Migration Act 1958 provides that Australia is taken not to have protection obligations if non-citizen "has not taken" all possible steps to enter & reside in any other country apart from Australia and the country where they fear persecution. AAT found that Indian Appellant had well-founded fear of persecution in India, but not Nepal. Appellant argued to AAT that, at the TOD of, he could only enter Nepal through India. Was AAT required to consider whether Appellant could or would prospectively: voluntarily return to Nepal; be removed from Australia to India? Or was AAT required to focus instead only on whether, by the TOD, Appellant had taken all possible steps to enter & reside in Nepal?

Federal Court (Full Court). When the language of a statute is ambiguous, Parliament is presumed to have intended the statute to conform to Australia's obligations under international law and not to interfere with fundamental common law rights and freedoms. Art 12(4) of ICCPR provides: “No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country”. Is the term "person" in ss 501(3A) & 501CA(4) ambiguous, with the result that those provisions should be interpreted as not applying to non-aboriginal non-citizens with longstanding ties to Australia, in light of Art 12(4)? Is there a common law right for such individuals to enter and remain in Australia? If not, should the common law be extended to that effect, influenced by Art 12(4)?

Federal Court: 'It may be accepted that departure from non-statutory Ministerial guidelines may give rise to action liable to be set aside on judicial review, for error of law, where at least a decision-maker, not bound to apply a policy, purports to apply it as a proper basis for disposing of the case in hand or misconstrues or misunderstands it, so that what is applied is not the policy but something else'

Federal Court: It is often said that jurisdictional errors made by an original decision-maker are always irrelevant to a merits review application, given that the Tribunal will make a decision de novo. However, that is not always the case, as this decision illustrates.

One of the complaints against the practitioner came from the Department and was described by the OMARA as follows: "The Former Agent deliberately lodged invalid visa applications to prolong [a client's]  stay [in Australia] and to allow time to meet the visa requirements".

Federal Court (Full Court). The appellant Minister sought to set-off a costs order made in the respondent non-citizen's favour out of a costs order made in the Minister's favour in previous court proceedings. Did the primary judge's exercise of discretion, refusing to allow the offset costs because this would discourage lawyers from acting on a conditional basis, miscarry?