Case Law Updates

Federal Court (Full Court). Para 8.1.1(1)(a)(iii) of Direction 90 said that decision-makers must have regard to the fact that family violence is viewed very seriously by the Australian Government. Did para 8.1.1(1)(a)(iii) bind decision-makers to view family as very serious?

Federal Court (Full Court). May a person "engage in some religious practices of a particular faith without being a doctrinal adherent of that faith", such as Christianity? If so, can it be said that "a persecutor might nevertheless perceive the person to be a Christian, or perceive the person’s practices to be blasphemous, and may, accordingly, persecute the person for the reason of religion"?

High Court. Can a couple live "separately and apart" even when they reside in the same home? Is it possible for a couple who maintain "separate residences" to not be living separately and apart, so long as they live as a "single household"?

Federal Court (Full Court): According to the "poisoned well" principle, "it is not unknown for a party’s credibility to have been so weakened in cross-examination that the tribunal of fact may well treat what is proffered as corroborative evidence as of no weight because the well has been poisoned beyond redemption". Does that principle apply to evidence provided by an applicant towards supporting their credibility? In other words, can a decision-maker treat that evidence as "poisoned" too, or is it required to assess that evidence before it forms an opinion on credibility?

Federal Court: In considering non-refoulement obligations in the context of a decision under s 501CA(4) and Direction 65, did Minister "[misunderstand] that the applicant’s claims would 'necessarily' be considered in the event that the applicant was to make an application for a protection visa"? Minister said it was "unnecessary to determine whether non-refoulement obligations are owed in respect of [the applicant] for the purposes of the present decision as he is able to make a valid application for a Protection visa". Is it implicit that Minister understood that such obligations would be considered in the same way in the context of an application for a protection visa? Did Minister fail to give genuine consideration to matters raised by the Applicant outside of the concept of non-refoulement obligations?

Federal Court. In determining pursuant to cl 13.1.1(1)(e) of Direction 79 "whether there is any trend of increasing seriousness", should the trend be determined by reference to the dates of the offending, as opposed to the dates of the conviction for such offending? If a particular offending is followed by a less serious offending, does that necessarily mean that the trend of offending is of decreasing seriousness? Is the determination under cl 13.1.1(1)(e) a jurisdictional fact?

Federal Court (Full Court): ordinarily, a subclass 820 visa application will be decided first and the 801 second. However, decision makers can reverse that order in some circumstances; perhaps that means that a TSS visa can be refused before nomination is processed in some circumstances, thus denying review rights to visa applicants

Federal Court. Para 13.1.2(1)(a) of Direction 79 reads: "In considering the risk to the Australian community, decision-makers must have regard to, cumulatively: ... The nature of the harm to individuals or the Australian community should the non-citizen engage in further criminal or other serious conduct". Does para 13.1.2(1)(a) require consideration of the probability of the harm manifesting?

Federal Court. Applicant was convicted of manslaughter. In considering under s 501CA(4) whether to revoke the mandatory cancellation of Applicant's visa, Minister referred to a media article that, according to Minister, related the Applicant's "failure to provide information to the Queensland Parole Board in relation to the body of the deceased notwithstanding that he was the admitted instigator of the events leading to his death". Was Minister prevented from considering that article, in light of the FCAFC decision in HZCP?

Federal Court. Should there be "unnecessary obstacles placed in the way of those who identify as First Nations People [such an adverse costs order] in proving what they contend is their rightful status under the Constitution"? Can it be said that the fact that a non-citizen's "legal representation was provided on a conditional basis with recoverable fees limited to any amount of costs paid by the respondent pursuant to an order of the Court tends neither for nor against the exercise of discretion [to award costs] in this case"?