Case Law Updates

Federal Court (Full Court): "Notwithstanding provisions in Pt 7AA of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth)", was the Immigration Assessment Authority "obliged by natural justice ... requirements to put in writing any matters which it considered to be adverse to a referral applicant and to invite the person to comment on those matters in writing"?

Federal Court: The AAT's decision record included: "If his application before the Tribunal is unsuccessful, [the Applicant] would be liable for return to Afghanistan as soon as is reasonably practicable, and in the meantime he would be subject to indefinite detention". As the Applicant was actually not subject to indefinite detention (see s 197C), did the use of the term "indefinite detention" in the decision record mean that the AAT made a decision on an incorrect understanding of the law?

Federal Court. If any part of the decision on the application for a protection visa relied upon ss 5H(2)(c) or 36(2C)(a)(ii) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), must review be sought in the General Division of the Tribunal? If so, was the General Division's jurisdiction confined to reviewing the decision to refuse the application for a protection visa to the extent that reliance was placed by the decision-maker upon those provisions?

Federal Court. Can it be said that the Immigration Assessment Authority's "statement that “there was no evidence before me” should be understood as meaning...

Federal Court (Full Court): AAT did to disclose existence of a non-disclosure certificate issued under s 438(1)(b), but did not take the information covered by it, which related to the Appellant's claim for protection, into consideration. AAT found that: 1) Appellant did not have a well-founded fear of prosecution nor satisfied the complementary protection provisions; 2) and, in any event, Appellant could reasonably relocate to safe areas of his country, meaning that he was not owed protection obligations. If the first finding was erroneous, was that error material/jurisdictional?

Mandatory cancellation under s 501(3A) requires that (a) the non-citizen not pass the character test and (b) be serving a sentence of imprisonment at the time of cancellation. Federal Court: it is irrelevant when the sentence that enlivens s 501(3A)(a) is imposed or completed; the sentence enlivening s 501(3A)(a) does not need to be the same sentence enlivening s 501(3A)(b)

Federal Court. Does NAIS prescribe that the Tribunal will make a jurisdictional error, unless it acknowledges in its reasons the existence of a substantive delay between the hearing and its decision? Can it be said that, "whenever there is an argument as to delay and the effect thereof (regardless of the length of the delay and circumstances of the case), ... the Tribunal’s reasons are necessarily irrelevant to that consideration"? Once significant delay is established, does the evidentiary onus shift to the Minister?

Federal Court (Full Court): 'While it may be open to the Tribunal to rely on the sort of statistical analysis that it did, there are dangers in relying on such an approach when its fundamental task is to consider the risk that this visa applicant would face if returned'

High Court. Was the Respondent's finding of guilt as a child made without recording of a conviction, with the result that his offending as a minor was an irrelevant consideration and that the Minister's consideration of it was erroneous, even if the Respondent referred to his offending as a child in his submissions to the Minister?

Federal Court. If the parties to litigation agree on a principle, is that principle's precedential force diminished? Further, in Vaitaiki, Teoh was interpreted by: Burchett J as requiring decision-makers to take the best interests of children into account as a primary consideration if no notice to the contrary was given; Branson J as requiring decision-makers to treat those interests as a primary consideration. Is the error discussed in Teoh better characterised as one going to procedural fairness or as a failure to take into account a relevant consideration? If the former: is the procedural fairness obligation discussed in Teoh either subsumed within s 425 or not a matter dealt with by Div 4 of Pt 7 of the Act; should the FCA adopt Burchett J's or Branson J's interpretation of Teoh?