Case Law Updates

Federal Court. Can it be said that the Immigration Assessment Authority's "statement that “there was no evidence before me” should be understood as meaning...

Federal Court. In the context of s 501BA(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), was it legally unreasonable for the Minister not to honour...

Federal Court. Does the rule in Browne and Dunn, being one of fairness, apply equally to a trial judge as to counsel?

High Court. Is the ratio in the High Court's decision in SDCV that, "even where s 46(2) of the AAT Act prevents the Federal Court from providing an applicant with any means to respond to material subject to a certificate ... , it is not contrary to Ch III because it forms an inseverable part of an additional avenue for review that is beneficial (when compared to the other available avenues of review), and therefore causes no practical injustice"?

Federal Court (Full Court). On an appeal by way of rehearing, must the Court determine the correctness of the orders under appeal by applying the law as it stands at the time it gives judgment on appeal to facts that are found on the basis of all the evidence properly before it?

Federal Court. The Applicant was found to be owed protection, but had his protection visa application refused for character reasons. He was a person within the cohort affected by NZYQ, meaning that he could not be held in immigration detention while removal from Australia remained impracticable in the reasonably foreseeable future. As such, he was granted a BVR. Was the Tribunal required to compare the risk to the Australian community as between holding the BVR and a protection visa?

Federal Court. Can it be said that the "Minister has no interests in the outcome of this litigation beyond ensuring that the law of the Parliament is applied correctly to the personal circumstances of a litigant who has been deprived of his liberty by the State"?

Federal Circuit and Family Court. The Tribunal refused to release information under s 362A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), finding that disclosure was not permitted under the Australian Privacy Principle 6. Did the Tribunal make an error, in that the primary purpose of collecting such information was the same for which the delegate and Tribunal would have disclosed it, namely to assess whether the applicant was the sponsor's spouse?

Federal Court. Was it impossible for the Applicant to demonstrate the testing of his rehabilitation in the community, as he had not been in the community, with the result that the finding about lack of testing in the community was illogical?

Federal Circuit and Family Court. Did the Tribunal’s unattributed copying from the delegate’s reasons, combined with other factors, lead to the conclusion that it failed to bring its own independent mind to the merits of the review? If so, is that a type of error that is material by definition?