Section 501(5) interpreted

Federal Court (Full Court). Section 501(5) provided that the power in s 501(3) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) could only be exercised by the Minister personally. Can it be said that s 501(5) allows a decision-maker to determine in advance of a decision not to provide an affected person with an opportunity to be heard, but does not allow the decision-maker to determine not to consider information which the affected person provided prior to the decision being made?

Citizenship appeal: ‘ordinary residence’

Federal Court (Full Court). Did Lee seek to render the subjective intentions of a child’s parents determinative in relation to the ordinary residence of their child? If not, can it nevertheless be said that the focus in relation to the “ordinary residence” of minors is on the intentions of the parents, and that a reason for this surely was that “a child of tender years has no control over where he or she lives”?

Is legal unreasonableness material by definition?

Federal Court (Full Court). Is an error in the form of legal unreasonableness material to the outcome, by definition?

Did r 5.19 require position to be geographically fixed?

Federal Court (Full Court). The AAT affirmed a refusal of a nomination application under r 5.19 and then affirmed the corresponding subclass 187 visa application refusal. The visa applicant applied for judicial review of the AAT's visa decision. Did he have standing in court to collaterally challenge the AAT's nomination decision through the application for judicial review of the AAT's visa decision? Did cl 187.233(3) refer to a decision in fact made, even if affected by jurisdictional error? Did r 5.19(4) require that the 'position' be restricted to one geographical location?

Does national interest in s 501(3)(d) require evidence of conviction or criminal conduct?

Federal Court (Full Court). Section s 501(3)(d) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) required cancellation of the Appellant's visa to be in the national interest. Can it be said that, although past criminal conduct is usually established by the fact of conviction, "that is not to say that evidence of conviction or evidence of conduct that is criminal to the criminal standard is necessary before it is open to the Minister to be satisfied that cancellation of a visa is in the national interest"?

Leave to set aside notice of discontinuance?

Federal Court. Is an application to set aside a notice of discontinuance filed in the Circuit Court interlocutory in nature, with the result that leave is required to appeal against the discontinuance? If so, will leave "only be granted where the decision below is both attended with sufficient doubt to warrant it being considered by a Full Court, and would result in substantial injustice if leave were refused, supposing the decision to be wrong"?

Further principles of statutory interpretation

High Court. Should statutory provisions be interpreted, so far as possible, to be consistent with international law, particularly where a provision seeks to give effect to matters of international law? Is the primary object of statutory construction to "construe the relevant provision so that it is consistent with the language and purpose of all the provisions of the statute"?

Does second notification reset AAT application deadline?

Federal Court. The applicant was notified that his visa was cancelled under s 501(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). About a month later, upon request, he received a second notification of the same cancellation, as he lost the first one. Did the second notification reset the deadline under s 500(6B) for the making of a valid Tribunal application?

Does FCA have power to transfer matter to Circuit Court?

Federal Court (FCA). If the FCA does not have jurisdiction to determine a judicial review application of a migration decision filed with it but the Federal Circuit and Family Court (FCFC) does, does the FCA nevertheless have power to transfer that application to the FCFC?

Principles of statutory interpretation

High Court. Is the existence of a duty to afford procedural fairness a question of statutory interpretation? Is there a "strong" common law presumption, "generally applicable to any statutory power the exercise of which is capable of having an adverse effect on legally recognised rights or interests, that the exercise of the power is impliedly conditioned on the observance of procedural fairness"?

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