Case Law Updates

Federal Court (Full Court). Were the best interests of the children under Direction 90 to be viewed through the prism of what the appellant would do if the visa was refused? Does the fact that the Tribunal was aware that the interests of the relevant minor children differed and the extent to which they did and that the appellant did not put that difference in issue before the Tribunal mean that the Tribunal engaged in the required weighing exercise?

Federal Court (Full Court). In order to comply with s 494D of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), does Form 956 need to state that the authority conferred is for the Minister to give documents to the authorised recipient, instead of the person concerned? Did Form 956 authorise an agent to receive communications from the Department about the revocation of visa cancellation, even though it only indicated that assistance was provided with an "application process"?

Federal Court (Full Court). Was the appellant Minister, who elected to make a personal decision under s 501CA(4) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), required to personally consider the respondent's representations? Or could he merely rely on a Departmental summary of such representations? If he could not rely on a summary, did he consider those representations? Which party bore the onus, on appeal, on the question of whether the Minister considered those representations?

Federal Court (Full Court). Did detention in a Youth Justice Centre involve an element of punishment, with the result that such a kind of detention was a form of punitive detention? Was the meaning of “sentenced to a term of imprisonment” in s 501(7) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) intended to depend on the different sentencing regimes in diverse jurisdictions? Did a “term of imprisonment” within the meaning of s 501(7)(c) also include non-punitive imprisonment?

Federal Court (Full Court). Do the definition of "non-refoulement obligations" under s 5(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) or s 197C(1) satisfy the description under para 9.1(1) of Direction 90 of being “tests enunciated in the Act”?

Federal Court. Was a delay of almost 4 years in deciding a protection visa application very lengthy? Is it reasonable for the Minister to consider s 501A for some period? Even though the Applicant's case was about the delay after the Tribunal remitted the matter to the Department, should this delay be considered in light of a previous delay? Is an absence of resources a justification for delay? Could the Minister further delay making a decision on the basis of a pending criminal trial?

Federal Court. Did Direction 90 preclude Tribunal from considering a claim relating to extent of impediments if removed, as the claim fell outside the considerations set out in para 9.2(1)? Was the Tribunal expected to discuss whether its finding that removal from Australia was likely to result in hardship of itself was or formed part of “another reason” to revoke the visa cancellation pursuant to s 501CA(4)(b) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth)? If so and the Tribunal did not discuss the effect of that finding, was the standard of reasonable conjecture for establishing materiality undemanding?

Federal Court. Is the phrase “extent of impediments if removed” under para 14(1)(e) is given meaning by para 14.5(1) of Direction 79? Is the “extent of impediments” if removed referred to in the chapeau to para 14.5 a mandatory consideration, by reason of para 14(1)(e)? In making a finding about the “extent of impediments”, was it mandatory to consider each of the matters in sub-paragraphs (a) to (c) of paragraph 14.5(1)? If the Tribunal made an error, should the materiality of the error be assessed as a balancing, as opposed to a binary, exercise?

Federal Court (Full Court). Did para 8.3(4)(a) of Direction 90 suggest that decision-makers cannot consider periods of absence or of limited meaningful contact arising from periods during which a non-citizen is incarcerated? Was para 8.3(4)(a) ultra vires the Migration Act 1958 (Cth)?

Federal Court. Does an administrator need to have proof beyond reasonable doubt that certain conduct occurred for it to find that it occurred? Can it be said that, under s 501(3) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), it suffices if the Minister merely suspects that a non-citizen does not pass the character test, whereas under s 501C(4)(b) a suspicion is not enough and the Minister must be satisfied that the person does not pass the character test?