Appeal: citizenship renounced, no denaturalisation, thus non-alien?

Federal Court (Full Court). Was the Appellant a non-alien who was not subject to the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), with the result that his detention under s 189(1) of the Act was unlawful, because: he was "accepted by the Australian body politic and community as a citizen ...; the fact that he renounced that citizenship in 1995 does not change his non-alien status"; or "he has the essential characteristics of a non-alien, based on a holistic assessment of his circumstances"?

Can AAT undermine privilege against self-incrimination?

Federal Court (Full Court). Can it be said that "a process of reasoning that interferes with or undermines a fundamental common law right [such as the privilege against self-incrimination] may for that reason be characterised as legally unreasonable"?

Sections 426A and 426B interpreted

Federal Court. Can it be said that, "by reason of s 426B(6) of the [Migration Act 1958 (Cth)], the obligation to provide an applicant with a statement describing the effect of ss 426A(1B) to (1F) is inextricably linked with the obligation to provide an applicant with a copy of the written statement of the decision made under s 426B(2)"?

Katoa extended to determination of leave to raise new judicial review ground?

Federal Court (Full Court). In Katoa, the High Court decided that the Federal Court was not limited, in assessing the merits of a judicial review application, to a reasonably impressionistic level of such merits, when considering whether to grant a time extension within which to bring that application. Should Katoa be extended to the consideration of whether to grant leave for a new ground of judicial review to be agitated for the first time on appeal?

Denial of PF: is articulation of course of action needed to establish materiality?

High Court. Will there "generally be a realistic possibility that a decision-making process could have resulted in a different outcome if a party was denied an opportunity to present evidence or make submissions on an issue that required consideration"? When a Tribunal "errs by denying a party a reasonable opportunity to present their case", does reasonable conjecture "require demonstration of how that party might have taken advantage of that lost opportunity"?

Minister bound by AAT’s factual findings?

Federal Court. Can it be said that, "in relation to the decisional process required by s 65(1), the Minister will only have misconstrued his power under s 501(1) if the facts found by the Minister inconsistent with those found by the Tribunal are critical to the Minister’s decision to refuse the visa"? Was it illogical "for the Minister to find that the applicant was a risk to the Australian community in light of the Tribunal’s previous finding that the applicant was not a danger to the Australian community in accordance with s 36(1C) of the Act"?

Must unarticulated claim be based on established facts to clearly emerge?

Federal Court (Full Court). In relation to the assessment of para 14.2(1)(b) of Direction 79, can it be said that the "“nature” of a person’s ties to family members in Australia – and the weight that should be afforded to that matter – can logically be affected by the existence of relationships with other family members who do not live in Australia"?

Condition 8516: term ‘continue’ interpreted

Federal Court. Condition 8516 imposed on a student visa read: "The holder must continue to be a person who would satisfy the primary or secondary criteria, as the case requires, for the grant of the visa". Can it be said that "the use of the word ‘continues’ in condition 8516 does not require the Appellant to be enrolled in a higher education course continuously and uninterrupted, but rather that it contemplates that it may be satisfied by enrolment at a future date"?

Time extension: court limited to impressionistic assessment of JR application?

High Court. Does the practice in the Federal Court (FCA) of hearing an extension of time application together with argument on the substantive application require the FCA to avoid "conflating the two applications by refusing to extend time on the basis of a final determination of the issues raised by the substantive application, instead of by reference to ... what was necessary in the interests of the administration of justice"? If so, is the FCA limited to an impressionistic assessment of the merits of the substantive application?

Clause 9.1(2) of Direction 90 interpreted

Federal Court. Did para 9.1(2) of Direction 90 "require the legal and practical consequences of prolonged detention with no fixed chronological end point to be weighed against the seriousness of the applicant's criminal offending and other serious conduct"?

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