Katoa extended to determination of leave to raise new judicial review ground?
Federal Court (Full Court). In Katoa, the High Court decided that the Federal Court was not limited, in assessing the merits of a judicial review application, to a reasonably impressionistic level of such merits, when considering whether to grant a time extension within which to bring that application. Should Katoa be extended to the consideration of whether to grant leave for a new ground of judicial review to be agitated for the first time on appeal?
Denial of PF: is articulation of course of action needed to establish materiality?
High Court. Will there "generally be a realistic possibility that a decision-making process could have resulted in a different outcome if a party was denied an opportunity to present evidence or make submissions on an issue that required consideration"? When a Tribunal "errs by denying a party a reasonable opportunity to present their case", does reasonable conjecture "require demonstration of how that party might have taken advantage of that lost opportunity"?
Minister bound by AAT’s factual findings?
Federal Court. Can it be said that, "in relation to the decisional process required by s 65(1), the Minister will only have misconstrued his power under s 501(1) if the facts found by the Minister inconsistent with those found by the Tribunal are critical to the Minister’s decision to refuse the visa"? Was it illogical "for the Minister to find that the applicant was a risk to the Australian community in light of the Tribunal’s previous finding that the applicant was not a danger to the Australian community in accordance with s 36(1C) of the Act"?
Must unarticulated claim be based on established facts to clearly emerge?
Federal Court (Full Court). In relation to the assessment of para 14.2(1)(b) of Direction 79, can it be said that the "“nature” of a person’s ties to family members in Australia – and the weight that should be afforded to that matter – can logically be affected by the existence of relationships with other family members who do not live in Australia"?
Condition 8516: term ‘continue’ interpreted
Federal Court. Condition 8516 imposed on a student visa read: "The holder must continue to be a person who would satisfy the primary or secondary criteria, as the case requires, for the grant of the visa". Can it be said that "the use of the word ‘continues’ in condition 8516 does not require the Appellant to be enrolled in a higher education course continuously and uninterrupted, but rather that it contemplates that it may be satisfied by enrolment at a future date"?
Time extension: court limited to impressionistic assessment of JR application?
High Court. Does the practice in the Federal Court (FCA) of hearing an extension of time application together with argument on the substantive application require the FCA to avoid "conflating the two applications by refusing to extend time on the basis of a final determination of the issues raised by the substantive application, instead of by reference to ... what was necessary in the interests of the administration of justice"? If so, is the FCA limited to an impressionistic assessment of the merits of the substantive application?
Clause 9.1(2) of Direction 90 interpreted
Federal Court. Did para 9.1(2) of Direction 90 "require the legal and practical consequences of prolonged detention with no fixed chronological end point to be weighed against the seriousness of the applicant's criminal offending and other serious conduct"?
Makasa extended to s 501(3A)?
Federal Court. If a conviction forms the basis for a visa cancellation under s 501(3A) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and the cancellation is then revoked under s 501CA(4), is a decision-maker prevented from using that same conviction as the basis to cancel the visa under s 501(3A)? Did s 501(3A) require an act of the Minister by which a visa was cancelled? Or was the provision rather self-executing?
Scope of merits review influenced by scope of delegate’s decision?
Federal Court (Full Court). Is the ambit of a review by the Tribunal "necessarily influenced by the ambit of the steps and proceedings that have taken place prior to its review"?
Appeal: Direction 79: treating balancing exercise as a discretion an immaterial error?
Federal Court (Full Court). Although referring to the test in s 501CA(4)(b)(ii) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) as involving a discretion, did the Tribunal ask itself the correct question when it searched for "another reason" under the Direction, as the Direction itself referred to that question as involving a discretion? If not, can it nevertheless be said that "the formation of a state of mind as to whether “another reason for revocation” exists was the cerebral equivalent of exercising a discretion not to revoke a cancellation decision"?


















