Does s 198AD(2) apply to a person the subject of favourable decision under s...

Federal Court (Full Court). Does s 198AD(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) apply to a person who has been the subject of a favourable decision under s 46A(2)? Can a court "completely remove the capacity of those legally responsible for the detention of an individual to determine where that individual should be held"?

“I don’t remember”: an improper answer?

Federal Court. Is it "appropriate to use the shell of an old action to commence fresh proceedings including against a new party when that proceeding has been resolved"? Were answers in the form of "I don't remember" to an interrogatory administered to the Minister improper?

FCA’s jurisdiction for false imprisonment extended to other claims?

Federal Court (FCA). If the FCA has jurisdiction to determine a claim for damages for false imprisonment and habeas corpus on the basis that the Respondent failed to remove the Applicant from Australia as mandated by s 198, does 476A exclude the FCA's jurisdiction to entertain the Applicant’s claims for injunctive relief requiring the Respondent to discharge its duty under s 198 or to declare that the Respondent failed to comply with that duty? Can the FCA issue a peremptory writ of mandamus?

Appeal: family violence: must relationship be genuine?

Federal Court (Full Court). Where the Tribunal finds that no marital or de facto relationship as defined in ss 5F and 5CB of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) existed at any time, is the consequence that the question of family violence for the purpose of cl 100.221(4) of Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) does not arise for consideration, contrary to El Jejieh?

FCC ex tempore reasons to be scrutinised with an eye for jurisdictional error?

Federal Court (Full Court). For the purpose of identifying jurisdictional error, are ex tempore reasons for judgement delivered by the Federal Circuit Court to be "scrutinised narrowly and with an eye for error"? Can it be said that "statements may be made in reasons which, in isolation, appear to be expressed at the level of principle but, in fact, have been applied in a more nuanced and fact-specific context"?

Citizenship renounced, no denaturalisation, thus non-alien?

Federal Court. Was the Applicant a non-alien who was not subject to the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), with the result that his detention under s 189(1) of the Act was unlawful, because: he was "accepted by the Australian body politic and community as a citizen ...; the fact that he renounced that citizenship in 1995 does not change his non-alien status"; or "he has the essential characteristics of a non-alien, based on a holistic assessment of his circumstances"?

Granular assessment of re-offending risk?

Federal Court. In assessing the risk of a non-citizen re-offending for the purpose s 501(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), is it unnecessary for a decision-maker to descend to a level of granularity of assessing the risk of specific future criminal conduct, as that would "require the Minister to either develop superhuman prescience or engage in what could only be wild speculation which would ultimately be meaningless"? Is there a "period of limitation in the Act which might prevent the Minister taking action under s 501(2)"?

No rubber stamping, yet no genuine consideration?

Federal Court. If the Minister personally makes a decision under s 501CA(4): is he required "to consider and understand the representations received" for himself, even if he is given an accurate summary of such representations; must he give "reasons as to why the expectations of the Australian community should count against revocation"? Must s 501CA(4) decisions  be made within a reasonable period of time? May the ongoing validity of a decision under s 501(3A) depend upon due and prompt performance of the power under s 501CA(4)?

Intersection between constitutional and administrative laws

Supreme Court of New South Wales. Is the question of whether, in applying a legislative power or discretion that does not infringe on the Constitution and is thus valid, the application of that power infringes on the Constitution a question of constitutional law? If not, does it mean that the implied freedom of political communication may not be a relevant consideration in the exercise of a discretion under any legislation?

Costs when proceedings rendered moot by visa grant

Federal Circuit and Family Court. May a court "award costs where an underlying dispute is rendered moot, even where a decision is not delivered"? If so, where "the relevant supervening event occurs after a trial on the merits, with full argument and submissions from the parties, but before the decision is handed down", will those arguments hold greater weight in the decision whether to make a costs order? Should no order be made, as both sides got what they wanted?

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