Direction 79: objective determination of relevance of factors?
Federal Court. In Direction 79, primary and other considerations were specified as matters that must be taken into account 'where relevant'. For the purposes of determining whether there has been compliance with Direction 79, is relevance a matter to be objectively determined? Should judicial review applicants identify particular aspects of the reasoning of an administrative decision said to be illogical or irrational and then claim that, as they were material, there was legal unreasonableness?
Is a s 36(1C)(b) decision a mandatory consideration under s 501(1)?
Federal Court (Full Court). "In light of the findings of the Tribunal (which are treated as findings of the Minister pursuant to s 43(6) of the [AAT Act]), and/or the direction of the Tribunal made pursuant to s 43(1) of the AAT Act", was the Minister "obliged to conclude that [the respondent] was not a danger and/or risk to the Australian community"? Should it be "implied into s 501(1) that a Tribunal’s earlier decision as to the application of s 36(1C)(b) is a mandatory relevant consideration on a subsequent consideration of the application of s 501(1)"?
Apprehended bias: lay observer conceived of as a lawyer?
High Court. Should the hypothetical, fair-minded lay observer be attributed with knowledge "that barristers are professional members of an independent Bar who do not identify with the client; that judges are usually appointed from the senior ranks of the Bar; and that it may be expected they will have personal or professional associations with many counsel appearing before them"?
IAA bound to consider request for submissions to exceed 5 pages?
Federal Court. Can a failure by the IAA to accede to or respond to a request made by an applicant to provide submissions in excess of five pages constitute a denial of procedural fairness?
Stewart plainly wrong?
Federal Court (Full Court). In the decision in Stewart plainly wrong? If an invitation issued under s 501CA contained an error in the specification of the deadline for the making of representations, can it nevertheless be said that whether the invitation is invalid will depend on the extent and consequences of the error? If an invitation issued under s 501CA is invalid, does it follow that the anterior mandatory cancellation decision itself under s 501(3A) is also invalid?
Procedural fairness & information volunteered
Federal Court. Is information supplied by the subject of an administrative decision absolutely excluded from the obligation to afford that person procedural fairness?
Regs 2.55(7)(a) & 2.52(2)(b) interpreted
Federal Court (Full Court). Does the deeming effect under r 2.55(7)(a) apply to r 2.52(2)(b)? Does the mere fact that a State prison can be a place of immigration detention mean that a person held there is "in immigration detention"? Can it be said that "the act of “an unidentified person” giving him the notice of cancellation cannot amount to “service” within the meaning of" r 5.02?
Makasa applicable to re-exercise of discretion?
Federal Court. In Makasa, the High Court decided that the discretionary power under s 501(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) could not be enlivened twice based on the same circumstances. Does Makasa provide support for the proposition that a decision-maker cannot consider, for the purpose of the exercise of the discretion under s 501(1), convictions that have been considered in the exercise of the discretion in a prior decision?
Circumstances where prospect of indefinite detention is a mandatory consideration
Federal Court. Was the prospect of indefinite detention a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the Tribunal’s decision which should have been considered, as the the obligation to consider it was not limited to "circumstances where the Tribunal was satisfied that Australia would be in breach of its international non-refoulement obligations should the applicant be returned" to their home country? In other words, does the Full Court decision in DQM18 prevail over AZAFQ to the extent of any inconsistency?
Separation from child expected to be expressed in reasons?
Federal Court (Full Court). Can it be said that, "if executive power is to be exercised with a conscious understanding that it will result in the long term separation of a child from a loving and supporting parent with likely long term harm to the children then, given the nature of the obligation to give reasons in the present case, it is to be expected that the seriousness of that consequence and its consideration would both be manifested expressly in the reasons of the Minister"?