Case Law Updates

Federal Court. Does s 41(2) of the AAT Act authorise the making of an order after the AAT has made its decision? Is the subject of s 43(5C) the operation or implementation of the AAT's decision, instead of the decision under review by the AAT? Can it be said that "the power under s 44A(2)..., to make an order staying or otherwise affecting the operation or implementation of a decision the subject of an appeal to [FCA], should be construed so that it is [not] limited to a power that has prospective effect only", at least in circumstances where an "applicant has made a claim for final relief that the Tribunal’s decision be set aside ab initio"?

Federal Court (Full Court). "Where it may be inferred that a Tribunal consciously determined not to have regard to extraneous and prejudicial information in making its decision, [does it necessarily follow] that the fair-minded lay observer would exclude the possibility that the Tribunal might have been subconsciously affected by that information"? In determining a claim of apprehended bias where the Secretary provided the Tribunal with irrelevant, but highly prejudicial, material in the context of Part 7 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), what is the knowledge attributable to the hypothetical fair-minded lay observer?

High Court. The Plaintiffs argued that the covid-19-related Quarantine (Closing the Border) Directions (WA) issued under the Emergency Management Act 2005 (WA) impermissibly infringed s 92 of the Constitution. The Court held that the exercise of the power given by ss 56 and 67 of the Act to make paras 4 and 5 of the Direction did not raise a constitutional question. Does this mean that the limitations imposed by s 92 of the Constitution are irrelevant for the purpose of judicial review of delegated legislation or administrative decisions made under the Act? One of the judgements arguably answered that question in a novel way.

Federal Court (Full Court). FCCA reserved for 5 years its judgement on an application under s 477 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) for an extension of time within which to make a judicial review application. Did the FCCA make a jurisdictional error by failing to take into account its own delay in determining the application for an extension of time? Can delay be sufficient to infect a judgement with jurisdictional error?

Federal Court. If a judicial review applicant cannot afford to order the transcript of a Tribunal hearing, can they nevertheless file an affidavit to describe the evidence given at that hearing? Can the absence from otherwise detailed reasons of any reference to a submission or argument made to an administrative decision-maker indicate that it is unlikely that such decision-maker considered such submission or argument? In determining the materiality of an error, can a court assume that the administrative decision-maker approached the decision with a closed mind?

Federal Court. Section 486E of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) provides that a person must not "encourage" the commencement or continuation of migration litigation if the case "has no reasonable prospect of success". Section 486F provides that a court may make a costs order against a person who breached s 486E. Can it be said that a "lawyer’s conduct in formulating the grounds, filing the notice of appeal and certifying the grounds as having reasonable prospects of success, whilst asserting an entitlement to charge fees for legal services for doing those things are together sufficient to support an inference that a legal practitioner has “encouraged” the client to commence and continue the litigation in the requisite sense"?

Federal Court (Full Court). In Jul 2017, Minister determined that s 46A bar be lifted for TPV or SHEV if: a) a similar determination had been made relating to UMA's parent; and b) any application by the parent was made by 1 Oct 2017; and c) that application has not been refused and finally determined. Was the latter criterion to be satisfied by reference to Jul 2017 or the time of the SHEV application? We also summarise the court's views on the requirements of procedural fairness concerning s 46A.

Federal Court (Full Court). Was it open to the Minister to seek to persuade the Tribunal that the Appellant had engaged in the conduct that constituted the offence of which he was acquitted? In other words, could the Tribunal "go behind" the acquittal? In a case which is concerned with a claim of apprehended bias based upon irrelevant but prejudicial material being before the decision-maker, are the reasons given for the decision relevant to determination of whether a claim apprehended bias is made out?

Federal Court. What does the requirement to consider the two limbs in cl 13.1.2(1) in Direction 79 "cumulatively" mean? If the Tribunal considers the two limbs in cl 13.1.2(1) in sequence before proceeding to consider them together and in combination, does it follow that it did not consider them "cumulatively"?

Federal Court. In the context of s 116(1)(e)(ii), can it be said that submissions to the Tribunal, viewed as a whole, are a mandatory relevant consideration, but not every aspect of those submissions can be so described? If so, for the purpose of determining whether an aspect of those submissions is a mandatory relevant consideration, is the fundamental question the importance of that aspect to the exercise of the Tribunal’s function, which will depend on the nature of the material and the circumstances of the case?