Case Law Updates

Federal Court (Full Court). FCAFC held in Ibrahim that Minister misapprehended s 501BA(2) by believing it prohibited him from affording natural justice. Here, Minister admitted to FCA that if Ibrahim applied to s 501(3), he "proceeded on the basis of the alleged misapprehension". After admission but before FCA's decision,  FCAFC held in Burgess that Ibrahim applied to s 501(3). FCA then decided that Burgess and Ibrahim were correctly decided, but that Minister's admission was not conclusive. Was FCA wrong? Further, for the purposes of the materiality test, Ibrahim held that the judicial review applicant had to prove what he would have done had misapprehension not occurred, with which FCAFC (differently constituted) disagreed in Nguyen. 

Federal Court. For the purposes of the materiality test, FCAFC (White, Perry and Charlesworth JJ) held in Ibrahim that the judicial review applicant had to prove what would have happened had the decision-maker not made the error in question. FCAFC (Rares, Griffiths and Burley JJ) in Karan came to the same conclusion. FCAFC (Jagot, Robertson and Farrell JJ) in Nguyen disagreed with Ibrahim. FCAFC (Katzmann, Mortimer and Bromwich JJ) recently adopted one of Ibrahim and Nguyen. However, as the FCA decision extracted in this article indicates, the division shown by the Ibrahim / Nguyen tension is still present among justices of the FCA.

Federal Court. Generally speaking, a person does not lose Australian citizenship by becoming a citizen of another country. However, there are exceptions. For instance, in some circumstances, a person who once was an Australian citizen is not an Australian citizen under the Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth) if they became a citizen of PNG by reason of the PNG Constitution. In this particular decision, did the Applicant become a PNG citizen by reason of the PNG Constitution and therefore lose his Australian citizenship?

Federal Court. Applicant was an unauthorised maritime arrival (UMA) and thus s 46A barred. In July 2017, Minister made determination that bar be lifted for TPV or SHEV if: a) a similar determination had been made relating to UMA's parent; and b) any application by the parent was made by 1 Oct 2017; and c) that application has not been refused and finally determined. When July 2017 Determination was made, Applicant's mother satisfied criteria (a) to (c). In Sep 2019, Applicant applied for SHEV, but application was considered invalid by DHA, as criterion (c) was no longer satisfied. Was that criterion to be satisfied by reference to July 2017 or the time of the SHEV application? Alternatively, should procedural fairness have applied to an assessment carried out for the purposes of a possible exercise of the Minister's discretion to lift the bar?

Federal Court. A person fails the character test under s 501(6)(h) if "an Interpol notice in relation to the person, from which it is reasonable to infer that the person would present a risk to the Australian community or a segment of that community, is in force". Interpol issued a notice (IRN) in relation to the Applicant. Was it open to the Minister to draw the inference in s 501(6)(h) from the IRN? In determining whether it was open to the Minister to draw the inference in s 501(6)(h) from the IRN, could regard "be had to the regulatory regime under which Interpol notices are issued"? For the purposes of s 501(6)(h), was the Minister confined to an examination of the IRN?

Federal Court. Appellant claimed in his protection visa application that he was arbitrarily detained in Ethiopia at the airport and driven to prison by a person he believed was a private driver. He claimed: he begged for driver to call his wife and tell where he was being taken to; and that the driver did so. AAT invited Appellant to speculate on why driver would have made the call. AAT itself speculated driver would not have called Appellant's wife. Was it irrational for AAT to rely on a matter the Appellant was asked to speculate about as a basis to make adverse credibility findings against him on the factual elements of which he had first-hand knowledge? Is the "adjectival description of “extreme” ... a necessary element in a finding of illogicality or irrationality"? How high is the materiality threshold?

Federal Court. The then self-represented Applicant made multiple attempts before the statutory deadline to lodge a judicial review (JR) application with the FCCA's Registry. After the last attempt, the Registry refused to accept the filing document, as it did not comply with the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth). Applicant eventually made a time extension application after the deadline. Before FCCA, interpreter was having difficulty understanding the Applicant. FCCA dismissed time extension application, saying nothing before it indicated it had received and refused JR application. Did the lack of a "simple inquiry of the Registry" result in the FCCA making a jurisdictional error? Was it necessary for JR application to substantially comply with the rules?

Federal Court (Full Court). Can it be said that, where "there are two sets of information, going to the safety and suitability of the place of relocation, which are contradictory and inconsistent, the decision-maker must necessarily engage in a “process of evaluation” of the “reliability” of the contradictory and inconsistent sets of information so as to reach a reasoned and reasonable conclusion as to which information, or set of information, he or she will rely upon", for the purposes of ss 36(2)(a) and (aa) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth)?

Federal Court. AAT set aside delegate's decision to refuse protection visa and granted Respondent a visa. Minister applied to FCA for judicial review, claiming AAT had no jurisdiction to grant the visa. Minister also made interlocutory application for matter to be expedited and kept Respondent in detention despite visa grant. Respondent made interlocutory application for his immediate release, on the basis that he was being unlawfully detained. Should FCA expedite the hearing of the Minister's judicial review application? Did FCA have jurisdiction to entertain the Respondent's interlocutory application for release? Did FCA have the power to issue writ of habeas corpus? Was Respondent unlawfully detained after Tribunal granted him a visa?

Federal Court. Direction 79 provides: "crimes of a violent nature against women or children are viewed very seriously". AAT set aside delegate's decision not to revoke under s 501CA(4) the mandatory cancellation of the Applicant's visa under s 501(3A). AAT said that Applicant had "committed offences of violence which relate to vulnerable people" and found that those offences were "serious", not "very serious". Did that finding in itself constitute a jurisdictional error? Does para 13.1.1(1)(b) state that "crimes of a violent nature against women and children are viewed very seriously, regardless of the sentence imposed"? Does para 13.1.2 require AAT to "reach a decision on the nature of the harm that might be involved"? Did AAT engage with para 13.2(4)?