Family violence: must relationship be genuine? Materiality onus shifted?
Federal Court. Delegate refused second stage partner visa (subclass 100) on the basis of end of relationship. On review at AAT, Appellant made family violence claim. At what point did the requirement to prove the existence of a genuine relationship end? Secretary: issued two s 375A certificates which covered documents that were capable of proving that relationship was genuine; revoked 1 of those certificates; and issued a s 376 certificate. In circumstances where Minister defended a denial of procedural fairness by successfully claiming at FCCA public interest immunity in respect of a document covered by an undisclosed certificate, is the onus to prove that, had the Tribunal not failed to disclose the s 376 certificate, it could have arrived at a different decision, shifted from Minister to Appellant?
Can detailed decision reveal it overlooked evidence?
Federal Court. Can the fact that a decision record is comprehensive, thoughtful and fully footnoted strongly indicate that an item of evidence not referred to in it was overlooked?
Can stigma arising from rape found protection claim?
Federal Court. If a persecution claim is based upon membership of a particular social group, may AAT be required to consider a group definition open on the facts but not expressly advanced by an applicant? If AAT chooses to exercise its jurisdiction more widely than an applicant or the Minister has asked, must it do so according to law? IAA found Appellant did not satisfy s 36(2)(a) on the basis that, as she had only told a few people she had been rapped, there was not a real chance that she would suffer societal discrimination. Did IAA make a jurisdictional error by not asking Appellant why she would not tell others about her rape? Could stigma or discrimination arising from sexual assault give rise to a protection claim?
Can AAT consider criteria not considered by delegate?
In CPJ16, FCA had determined whether AAT could consider criteria within s 501(6) not considered by original decision-maker. Here, delegate had refused to grant protection visa based on cl 866.222. By the time of AAT's decision on review, that provision had been disallowed and thus no longer applied. Question to AAT was whether to remit the matter to Department with a direction that cl 866.222 did not apply or assess for itself the other criteria for the grant of the visa. It chose the latter. Was AAT authorised to do that? With respect, this decision makes no reference to CPJ16, which was on point, although concerning a different provision.
Can disbelief on an issue subconsciously affect other issues?
Federal Court (Full Court). Can disbelief of an applicant or witness on one point subconsciously carry over to affect the decision-maker's disbelief of the same person on other points?
Is para 6.3(7) of Direction 79 a mandatory consideration?
Federal Court. In Mataia, FCA had decided that the principle in cl 6.3(5) of Direction No 79 is a not a mandatory relevant consideration. Does Mataia apply to cl 6.3(7)?
Reservations about BCR16?
Federal Court. In BCR16, FCAFC explained there was a difference between “claiming to fear harm if required to return to a place and non-refoulement obligations”. Is that distinction illusory in some circumstances? Does the fact that an unlawful non-citizen is eligible to apply for a substantive visa that can be granted when the applicant is in the migration zone but has not done so prevent the application of s 198(2B) to him or her? Should those who advise the Minister, and his Department, "be encouraged to ensure that clear factual information about these matters is put before the Tribunal, so that its merits review function can be most effectively exercised"?
Does Love apply to non-Aboriginals?
Federal Court. Does the decision of the High Court in Love apply to non-Aboriginals? Can it be said that, to say that the possibility of a non-citizen re-offending cannot be dismissed "completely" without relating that observation to material that provides a foundation for the possibility of re-offending equates to merely saying that the future is uncertain?
Student: GTE and group hearings
Can it be said that, whether an applicant is a genuine applicant for entry and stay as a student is reached by reason only of the particular criteria in cll 500.212(a), (b) and (c)? Do the words in cl 500.212(a) concern only with how long a visa applicant intends to stay in Australia? In assessing whether an applicant "is a genuine applicant for entry and stay as a student", must applicants satisfy each of cll 500.212(a), (b) and (c)? Are some of the factors in Direction No 69 also relevant to cl 500.212(c)? Did the group introduction process at the start of the Tribunal hearing amount to a denial of procedural fairness? Should a litigant be expected to put on an appeal before being entitled to settled reasons from the court below?
How low is the materiality test threshold?
Federal Court (Full Court). FCA had said: "The Tribunal’s reasons provide no indication that matters were finely balanced. On the contrary, protection of the Australian community weighed heavily against revocation". Did FCA engage in merits review by saying that mandatory considerations under s 501CA(4) which AAT had ignored "were not sufficient to outweigh those matters" and that AAT's error was thus immaterial? Does the materiality test threshold vary from statute to statute? Does the content of the materiality test expounded in SZMTA apply only to denial of procedural fairness? Does the materiality threshold vary according to the type of decision within the Migration Act? Is the threshold for determining materiality that there must be a possibility of a successful outcome that is more than 'infinitesimal'? Was it necessary, in order to establish the materiality of AAT's error, for Appellant to demonstrate by evidence what he would have done had error not been made?