Case Law Updates

High Court. The AAT affirmed a refusal to grant the plaintiff a subclass 485 visa on the basis that his visa application had not been accompanied by evidence that the he had applied for a skills assessment. The plaintiff unsuccessfully applied to the FCCA for judicial review of the AAT's decision and unsuccessfully appealed to the FCA. The plaintiff eventually applied to the HCA for constitutional writ "on the basis of grounds rejected in the courts below". Was the application to the HCA in its original jurisdiction an abuse of process? Can cl 485.223 be satisfied by evidence provided to the decision-maker after the time of submitting the visa application?

Federal Court (Full Court). Till 2014, Migration Act 1958 defined "refugee" by reference to the "Convention", under which a person was not a refugee if it would be reasonable to relocate to a place in their home country where they would not be persecuted (the relocation principle). Since 2014, the Act has defined a "refugee" as a person whose "real chance of persecution relates to all areas of a receiving country", among other things (s 5J(1)(c)). The FCAFC accepted that the relocation principle no longer applies to the definition of "refugee". However, does the reference in s 5J(1)(c) to all areas of a receiving country mean all areas where there is safe human habitation and to which safe access is lawfully possible?

Federal Court. Delegate collected photos and screenshots from Facebook accounts which were not included in, but were referred to, in its decision record. Appellant provided AAT with those reasons, but not the photos and screenshots. AAT was obliged under s 424A(1)(a) to give Appellant particulars of any information it considered would be the reason for affirming decision, except if Appellant gave that information for the purpose of the review application (s 424A(3)(b)). Can it be said that exception did not apply because, "although the photos and screenshots ... were not themselves exhibited in the Delegate’s Reasons, those reasons clearly referred to the substance of the Facebook information, and incorporated that information by reference to the departmental file"?

Federal Court (Full Court). 1st and 2nd Appellants made protection claims, adding their appellant children as dependents and making protection claims on their behalf. IAA's finding about children was simply: "Country information does not indicate that children are prosecuted". That finding was based on the following passage of a DFAT report: "Children are never subject to bail or fines". Was the IAA's finding a finding "about what will not happen to returned asylum seekers who are children, rather than a finding about what will happen" and thus not supported by evidence? In order to prove an error was material and thus jurisdictional, must judicial review applicant adduce evidence in court of what would have occurred had error not been made, as held in Ibrahim? Or should FCAFC follow Nguyen instead?

Federal Court (Full Court). 1st Appellant applied for protection visa and added her children, 2nd and 3rd Appellants. Until and including AAT hearing, children had not made their own protection claims. They all attended the hearing in person. Practitioner also attended, but over the telephone, as his flight was delayed. Children were neither heard nor asked to be heard. 1st Appellant told AAT during hearing her children did not have their own protection claims and practitioner did not intervene to correct her. AAT asked for children to leave hearing room while 1st Appellant gave evidence, which they did. Practitioner did not object to that, but made post-hearing submissions including children's own protection claims. Can it be said that lack of objection and intervention meant that procedural fairness obligation in s 425 was not breached? If so, does that imply practitioners have a right to do so?

Federal Court. Applicant requested that Minister consider exercising power under s 417 of Migration Act. Case officer made a 3 page initial assessment, concluding: "The claims and circumstances presented in this request are not unique or exceptional when assessed against the Minister’s Guidelines. The case is assessed as not meeting the Guidelines for referral to the Minister". Acting Assistant Director's decision read: "I agree with the assessment that circumstances of this case do not meet the Minister’s Guidelines for referral and that, in accordance with the Guidelines, the Department should finalise this request without referral..." Is s 417 conditioned by the requirement of legal reasonableness? If so, was initial assessment or agreement with it legally unreasonable?

Federal Court. Once an act is made to detain a person under s 189 of the Migration Act 1958, is the continuation of that detention also an act under s 189? If so, is the continued detention of a person under s 189 a "migration decision", with the result that the FCA does not have original jurisdiction in an application for a writ in the nature of habeas corpus? If so, does the FCA have a residual original jurisdiction to determine whether a habeas corpus applicant is a person to whom s 189(1) can validly apply? Can 189(1) be applied by reference to a hypothetical officer? Was the Applicant "born in Australia" for the purposes of the Australian Citizenship Act 1948, despite being born in the Cook Islands? Was the Applicant an Aboriginal Australian? Were enrolment on the Commonwealth electoral roll and the issue of an Australian passport determinative of whether Applicant was a citizen?

Federal Court. The AAT carried out a hearing and then invited the Appellant in writing to a second hearing, seeking to "provide [her] with an extended opportunity to address any concerns or issues arising from the evidence before it". The Appellant's RMA would be on maternity leave on the date proposed for the second hearing, so she requested another date. The AAT then cancelled the second hearing and sent a s 359A letter instead, setting out what would be the reason for affirming the delegate's decision and inviting comments. Was the AAT obliged to proceed with the second hearing?

Federal Court. AAT was bound by Direction 56 (now replaced by 84) to consider PAM3 guidelines in assessing Appellant's protection claims. Can it be said that, because AAT "had not mentioned the Guidelines in the section of its reasons on “Relevant Law” or in the substantive section containing its findings on the complementary protection criterion, the Court should infer that it had not taken them into account"? Did the fact that the AAT had only referred to conditions at a specific prison in the Appellant's home country and did not report on conditions in other prisons suggest AAT did not consider PAM3? Does the “intentional” infliction of harm for the purposes of the complementary protection require “actual, subjective intention by the actor to bring about the victims’ pain and suffering by the actor’s conduct”?

Federal Court (Full Court). FCAFC held in Ibrahim that Minister misapprehended s 501BA(2) by believing it prohibited him from affording natural justice. Here, Minister admitted to FCA that if Ibrahim applied to s 501(3), he "proceeded on the basis of the alleged misapprehension". After admission but before FCA's decision,  FCAFC held in Burgess that Ibrahim applied to s 501(3). FCA then decided that Burgess and Ibrahim were correctly decided, but that Minister's admission was not conclusive. Was FCA wrong? Further, for the purposes of the materiality test, Ibrahim held that the judicial review applicant had to prove what he would have done had misapprehension not occurred, with which FCAFC (differently constituted) disagreed in Nguyen.