Case Law Updates

Federal Court. Appellant had to satisfy the following time of application criterion under cl 890.211 of Sch 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth): "The applicant has had, and continues to have, an ownership interest in 1 or more actively operating main businesses in Australia for at least 2 years immediately before the application is made". She also had to satisfy the following time of decision (TOD) criterion under cl 890.221: "The applicant continues to satisfy the criteria in clauses 890.211...". A delegate of the Minister refused to grant the visa and the Appellant applied to the Tribunal for merits review. Should the Tribunal determine the TOD by reference to the time of the delegate's decision? Or should it determine the TOD by reference to the time of its own decision?

Federal Court. Paragraph 21(2)(h) of the Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth) provides that "[a] person is eligible to become an Australian citizen if the Minister is satisfied that the person ... is of good character at the time of the Minister's decision on the application". Does the fact that the above provision refers to the time the "Minister" makes a decision mean that the Tribunal must assess the applicant's character by reference to the time of the Minister's decision? Or should the Tribunal make that assessment by reference to the time of its own decision? Further, with respect, does this FCA decision stand in contrast to the High Court's majority judgement in SZMTA on the onus of proving that an error was material to the decision?

Federal Court. AAT affirmed delegate's decision not to revoke under s 501CA(4) the mandatory cancellation of the Applicant's visa. On 10 Feb 2020, FCA quashed AAT's decision, but reserved its judgement on whether it should issue a writ of mandamus requiring AAT to determine the application according to law. Subsection 500(6L), which applied to the Applicant at the time of the AAT's decision, provided that the delegate's decision would be affirmed by default if the AAT did not make a decision within 84 from notification of the delegate's decision. Given that, by 10 Feb 2020, the 84-day deadline had already lapsed, would it be futile to issue a writ of mandamus? Or was the AAT's decision, despite having been quashed by the AAT, nevertheless a decision for the purposes of s 500(6L), with the result that that provision no longer applies?

Federal Court. The Appellant, a subclass 485 visa applicant, had to satisfy cl 485.222 to Schedule 2 of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), which read as follows: "Each degree, diploma or trade qualification used to satisfy the Australian study requirement is closely related to the applicant’s nominated skilled occupation". Did the Tribunal make an error in finding that a Diploma of Marketing was not closely related to the nominated occupation of chef?

Federal Court. The Appellant applied for an onshore partner visa more than 28 days after he last held a substantive visa. As a result, he had to satisfy Schedule 3 criteria, unless the Minister was satisfied that there were compelling reasons for not applying those criteria. A delegate refused to grant the visa and the Appellant applied to the Tribunal for review of the delegate's decision. The Appellant submitted the sponsor was 20 weeks pregnant and argued that was a compelling reason. Did cl 820.211(2)(d)(ii) expressly or impliedly make it mandatory for the Tribunal to consider the Appellant’s future role as father to the child when born in determining whether there were compelling reasons? If not, did the Appellant, by his submissions, made his future role as a father a mandatory consideration?

Federal Court (Full Court). The Full Court summarised the legal principles concerning s 501CA(4)(b)(ii), which provides as follows: "The Minister may revoke the original decision [to mandatorily cancel a visa under s 501(3A)] if ... the Minister is satisfied ... that there is another reason why the original decision should be revoked".

Federal Court (Full Court). Subsection 501(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) gives the Minister the discretion to cancel a visa if certain pre-conditions are satisfied. If certain facts satisfy those pre-conditions but the Minister decides not to cancel a visa, can the Minister re-exercise the discretion and cancel the visa under that same provision based on the same facts? If certain facts satisfy those pre-conditions and the Minister decides to exercise the discretion under s 501(2) to cancel a visa, but the Tribunal sets aside that decision, can the Minister cancel the visa once again under that same provision based on the same facts that satisfied those pre-conditions?

Federal Court (Full Court). Direction No 53 set out the factors decision-makers should take into account in determining whether a student visa satisfied the Genuine Temporary Entrant (GTE) requirement. Are decision-makers required to consider all of those factors and make findings about them in circumstances where the applicant does not place reliance on any of those factors? Does the same answer apply to the current direction, namely Direction No 69?

Federal Court (Full Court). Under s 5 of the Migration Act, an "excluded fast track review applicant" includes a fast track applicant who "has made a claim for protection in a country other than Australia that was refused by that country". If a protection visa application is refused and the delegate forms the view that the applicant is an excluded fast track review applicant, that refusal is not subject to merits review. Can it be said that "the words 'a claim for protection' used in the relevant category of exclusion mean a claim for protection that was based upon alleged facts that are materially the same as those relied upon as the basis for the claim subsequently made in Australia"?

Federal Court. In DFQ17 and BMY18, Full Court of FCA held that, in order for a notification of visa refusal under s 66(2)(d) to be valid, it had to "clearly state" the deadline for applying for merits review. As a result, the "late" AAT applications in those cases were actually not late. In Ali, a single judge of the FCA distinguished DFQ17, holding that the notification in that case clearly stated the deadline for an AAT application. As the circumstances in Ali (i.e. email notification with deadline of 21 calendar days) reflect the vast majority of notifications sent by the Department, Ali had the practical effect of indicating that the error found in DFQ17 only applied to exceptional cases. Now, another single judge of the FCA held, although in obiter (*), that Ali does not sit comfortably with DFQ17 & BMY18 and that the latter decisions should be followed.