High Court. Is the effect of Ch III of the Constitution to make punishment of criminal conduct exclusively judicial even if the punishment is separated from the adjudication of that criminal guilt? Did s 36D(1) of the Australian Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth) purport to vest such a power to impose additional or further punishment in the Minister? If so, is s 36D invalid in its operation in respect of the applicant because it reposes in the Minister for Home Affairs the exclusively judicial function of punishing criminal guilt?
Some of the questions to the High Court (HCA) were as follows:
Question 1: Is the effect of Ch III of the Constitution to make punishment of criminal conduct exclusively judicial even if the punishment is separated from the adjudication of that criminal guilt?
Question 2: Did s 36D(1) of the Australian Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth) purport to vest such a power to impose additional or further punishment in the Minister?
Question 3: If the answers to Questions 1 and 2 are 'yes', should punishment by means of termination of citizenship be recognised as an exception to the principle enunciated in Question 1?
Question 4: Is s 36D of the Citizenship Act invalid in its operation in respect of the applicant because it reposes in the Minister for Home Affairs the exclusively judicial function of punishing criminal guilt?
The HCA answered those questions as follows: