Case Law Updates

Federal Court (Full Court): Does the relocation principle for complementary protection claims apply to children? For instance, if a child is making a protection visa application as a primary applicant, could the child claim, through their parents, that if they return to their country, they will choose an unsafe area for the child, with the result that, if that claim is accepted, the relocation principle will not apply?

Federal Court (Full Court): Appellant applied for revocation of the mandatory cancelation of his visa, providing his wife's statutory declaration about his remorse and his own declaration to the same effect. The Minister ignored the Appellant's own declaration. Whether that amounted to jurisdictional error turned on whether the wife's declaration was the "best" evidence about the Appellant's remorse.

Yet another matter remitted by the AAT to the Department based on DFQ17. In DFQ17, the Full Court of the Federal Court held that a "late" Tribunal application was actually not late as the Department's notification letter did not clearly convey the deadline for a valid Tribunal application.

High Court: Should an appellate court make its own finding of fact only where the trial judge's finding of fact was "glaringly improbable" or "contrary to compelling inferences"? Whatever the answer is, it arguably applies to migration matters.

Federal Court (Full Court): The effect of s 48A(1AA) used to be that a person who relied on the Refugees Convention criterion under s 36(2)(a) for a protection visa (PV) application was barred from making a further PV application while in Australia if the original application had been refused. However, that person was not barred from making a further PV application based on the complementary protection under s 36(2)(aa). Subsection s 48A(1AA) was then amended, with the aim of changing that rule, but has the amendment achieved that aim?

High Court: By a 6:1 majority, the HCA decided that the "Chorley exception" to the rule that self-represented litigants cannot recover costs for their own time spent on litigation is no longer part of our common law. The "Chorley exception" allowed self-represented solicitors to recover self-representation costs. But most importantly, the majority questioned whether an incorporated legal practice offering services to third parties could recover costs for work of its sole director and shareholder. Does the same question arise for immigration assistance?

Federal Court (Full Court): A single judge of the FCA had held that the choice to cancel a visa under s 501(3) rather than s 501(2) was not a “decision” that was subject to judicial review. The non-citizen appealed that decision to the Full Court (FCAFC). Further, does Ibrahim apply to decisions under s 501(3), with the effect that it would be a jurisdictional error for the Minister to make those decisions based on the wrong understanding that s 501(3) prevents the Minister from according natural justice? Finally, which decision should be followed on materiality: Ibrahim; or Nguyen?

Federal Court: Did the FCCA inadvertently deny the Appellant procedural fairness by, among other things, saying to him that "you can't give [the FCCA] anything new"? The answered turned on what "anything new" meant in the circumstances.

Federal Court: This decision considered previous decisions on whether an administrative decision-maker is required to consider Australia's non-refoulement obligations in the context of exercising the discretion under s 501CA(4) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) to revoke mandatory cancellation of a visa pursuant to s 501(3A). The central question to the FCA was whether it had wrongly decided Omar.

Federal Court (Full Court): A person fails the character test under s 501(6)(b) if they have been a member of, or have been associated with, a group, organisation or person that has been involved in criminal conduct. Does the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 set up a presumption that a piece of legislation that is silent about its territorial operation, as is the case with s 501(6)(b), only applies within Australia? If so, does the object of the Migration Act 1958 rebut that presumption?