Is s 210 relevant to protection visa applications?

Federal Court. Appellant's protection visa application was refused. At AAT, he claimed that, if returned to his home country, he would be homeless and destitute due to his financial predicament and would be detained as a result. Generally speaking, s 210 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) provides that a non-citizen is liable to pay the Commonwealth the costs of his/her removal or deportation. In determining whether Appellant would become homeless in his home country, should AAT have considered the effect of s 210, which would impose a further financial burden on him?

RMAs obliged to respond to investigation?

OMARA found it: received 2 complaints against an RMA; sent the RMA notices under ss 308 and 309 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth); and never received a response from the RMA after some months. Can RMAs be sanctioned on the basis of lack of response? What happens to the substance of the complaint?

Proportionality, credibility & legal unreasonableness

Federal Court. Does the concept of proportionality play a role in determining whether an exercise of discretionary power was legally unreasonable? Does the concept of legal unreasonableness apply to individual aspects of the fact-finding of a decision-maker, such as credibility findings? Does the concept of proportionality form part of the assessment of whether a credibility finding has been made in accordance with established principles as to illogicality or irrationality?

Does Yusuf apply to 473EA?

Federal Court: Section 430 requires AAT to provide written statement of reasons for Part 7-reviewable decisions. In Yusuf, it was held as follows about s 430: "The Tribunal is required, in setting out its reasons for decision, to set out "the findings on any material questions of fact". If it does not set out a finding on some question of fact, that will indicate that it made no finding on that matter; and that, in turn, may indicate that the Tribunal did not consider the matter to be material". Does the same principle apply to s 473EA, which requires the IAA to sets out its reasons for a decision?

BAL19 attacked again

Federal Court. In BAL19, FCA decided that s 501 did not apply to protection visa refusals. Does BAL19 also apply to s 501A refusals? Was the decision in BAL19 plainly wrong? Can the Minister "continue to administer the law on their own understanding of what the law is (or what it “should be”), and not as settled in BAL19, or to ... administer the law in a manner which they hope will be settled by the Full Court on appeal"? Subsection 476A(1) gave FCA jurisdiction in relation to migration decisions personally made by the Minister under s 501 and its analogues, but not under s 65. Minister argued that if he failed to make a decision within a reasonable time, that would be a decision under s 65, with the result that FCA did not have jurisdiction to order mandamus in relation to the failure to make a decision within a reasonable time. Did FCA have jurisdiction by reason of the terms "in relation to" in s 476A(1)?

Sub 485: changing streams

Federal Court. Appellant applied for subclass 485 visa under Graduate Work stream, but without positive skills assessment. Although this was not the case here, FCA discussed whether application would be invalid if it nominated 2 streams. Is a stream or subclass a visa class? If a person applies for a visa class, can a different class of visa be granted? Could the visa be granted under the Post Study stream? In answering the latter question, is it relevant that ImmiAccount: allowed the lodgement under the Graduate Work stream despite the fact that Appellant had answered "no" to the question as to whether he had a positive skills assessment; said that lack of a positive skills assessment "may result" in refusal?

Appeal: was non-adjournment an error?

Full Court of Federal Court (FCAFC). Appellant applied to AAT for review of non-revocation of visa cancellation. Hearing was scheduled for 2 weeks before 84-day deadline. Under ss 500(6H)/(6J), AAT could not accept evidence provided in support of Appellant's case unless it had been provided in writing to Minister and AAT at least 2 business days before hearing. Appellant's partner sent AAT an email with declaration in support of his case just a few minutes before hearing. At hearing, AAT said it was precluded by law from considering partner's declaration, but did not refer to the possibility of an adjournment, for which Appellant did not apply. AAT affirmed non-revocation and its decision record gave reasons for refusal to adjourn, including s 500(6H) and 84-day deadline. Appellant argued to FCA that AAT could have made a decision before deadline and have given reasons later. FCA held AAT would have breached s 43(2) of the AAT Act, had it done so. Appellant appealed to FCAFC. With respect, does this decision stand in contrast to a previous FCAFC decision?

Can court order visa grant?

Federal Court. Should Minister have put Applicant on notice he would reconsider delegate's findings? Does Direction 79: treat visa refusals as inappropriate in a case where the “character concerns” of the visa applicant present no risk to the Australian community; allow decision-makers to treat the expectations of the Australian community as the decisive consideration? Are those expectations the Minister's conception of what such expectations are? Is a reasonable time to the making of a decision implied into ss 65 or 501? If so, how is it calculated? Was a delay of more than 3 years unreasonable? If so, did detention become unlawful from the time of implied deadline onwards?

“Exceptional circumstances” a matter of law?

Federal Court. Minister revoked Applicant's citizenship, who applied under s 29(7) of AAT Act for time extension to apply for merits review. AAT wrote: "There is prejudice to the public and the general administration of justice if decisions are not regarded as final and can be re-opened after a period of 12 years unless there are truly exceptional circumstances". As a matter of law, do time extension applicants need to establish “truly exceptional circumstances”? Did AAT treat the need for exceptional circumstances as a matter of law?

Culturally adopted by different Aboriginal community?

Federal Court. Brennan J stated the tripartite test in Mabo (No 2) for determining a person's Aboriginality. That test was adopted in Love in the context of determining whether a person is an alien within the meaning of the Constitution. For the purposes of applying the 2nd and 3rd limbs of that test, can a person "be found to be an Aboriginal Australian through mutual recognition in a different society or people than the one from which he or she has descended biologically", in the absence of evidence of the laws and customs of that different society, "including particularly in relation to the existence or process of any mechanism of 'cultural adoption'"? Does the indigenous society or people have to "exist today for a biological descendent to be able to establish that he or she is not an alien"?

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