Case Law Updates

Federal Court. Court ordered that Minister cease to detain the applicant at the Melbourne Immigration Transit Accommodation centre (MITA) due to the risk of covid-19 entering the MITA and then infecting the applicant. In practical terms, this means Minister will need to place applicant at a different detention centre.

Federal Court. s 501CA(3)(a) required Minister to notify non-citizen that visa had been mandatorily cancelled under s 501(3A). s 501CA(4)(b) required Minister to invite non-citizen to make representations seeking revocation of visa cancellation within period prescribed by regulations. Reg 2.52 set out a period of 28 days after the person is given the notice and the particulars of relevant information under s 501CA(3)(a). When do 28 days start to run? Minister gave notice & made invitation on 22 Jun 2017, but Applicant only made representations on 4 Sep 2017. On 11 April 2019, DHA emailed the Applicant a personal circumstances form, giving him 28 days to respond. Did that email constitute a fresh invitation such as to recommence the running of time and re-enliven the Minister’s power? Can Minister consider late representations

Federal Court. In CNY17, HCA decided that material placed by Secretary before IAA was prejudicial, causing a reasonable apprehension of subconscious bias. Here, Minister placed before AAT convictions of sexual offence against a minor and police materials relating to allegations of sexual offence against another minor, for which Applicant was acquitted. Was it essential to the conclusion in CNY17 that the prejudicial material was irrelevant? If so, were the police materials irrelevant on the basis that: para 13.1(2) of Direction No 79 "expressly or impliedly limited to conduct in which the non-citizen has been found to have engaged by reason of having been convicted of a criminal offence"; or that the AAT could not "go behind and impugn the acquittal"?

Federal Court. Is the materiality test question whether the result, in the absence of error, was inevitable? In assessing materiality, would a court be usurping the statutory task entrusted to the decision-maker if it formed its own view as to what the result should have been in the absence of error?

Federal Court. Due to s 500(6L), AAT had 84 days to decide under s 501CA(4) whether to revoke the mandatory cancellation of Applicant's visa. At the time of AAT's decision, Applicant still had about 6 years of imprisonment to serve. Could AAT make a legally reasonable decision about the risk the Applicant would present to the community upon release 6 years in advance? Did AAT have "power to remit the application with a direction, or recommendation, that a decision concerning the application for revocation of the cancellation of the Applicant’s visa be deferred until closer to the time of his release from imprisonment"?

Federal Court. In considering Direction No 79 for the purposes of s 501CA(4), should decision-makers consider the consequences of any breaches of Australia’s obligations under international law not only to the non-citizen, but also to Australia? We summarise the answers to this and several other questions.

Federal Court. In the context of s 501CA(4), there is a tension between ss 197C and 198 (which require removal even if it would breach international non-refoulement obligations) on the one hand and cl 10.1 of Direction No 79 (which says Australia will not breach those obligations) on the other hand. In XFKR, applicant submitted that AAT had erred by failing to recognise that he would have to be removed from Australia immediately under ss 197C and 198 if the mandatory cancellation of the visa were not revoked. FCA found in XFKR: AAT cited explanatory memorandum, which referred to the Minister’s non-compellable personal power under s 195A; AAT found "that any concern that the applicant might be deported was minimised by the commitment by the Australian government not to refoule"; AAT did not make error. Should XFKR be distinguished?

Federal Court. Although the chapeaux in para 12(1) of Direction No 75 and para 10.1 of Direction No 65 refer to a decision whether to cancel a visa, are those paragraphs are about whether to refuse a visa? Although Direction No 75 is not binding on the Minister personally, is it reasonable to expect that the Minister, as a model litigant, would follow the procedure mandated for his surrogates in that direction? Does the prospect of indefinite detention no longer arise by reason of the insertion of s 197C? If so, does that mean that non-refoulement obligations will no longer be considered?

Federal Court. Rule in Browne v Dunn: "if you intend to impeach a witness you are bound, whilst he is in the [witness] box, to give him an opportunity of making any explanation which is open to him". Does that rule apply to Tribunal decisions? Further, according to the hearsay rule, out-of-court representations made by a person are not admissible to prove the existence of a fact that it can reasonably be supposed that the person intended to assert by the representations, with exceptions. Does the hearsay rule apply to Tribunal decisions? We summarise the answer to these and several other questions.

Federal Court. This decision interprets in detail the operation of s 116(1)(e): "... the Minister may cancel a visa if he or she is satisfied that... the presence of its holder in Australia is or may be, or would or might be, a risk to ... the health, safety or good order of the Australian community or a segment of the Australian community".