Case Law Updates

Federal Court. The Appellant applied for an onshore partner visa more than 28 days after he last held a substantive visa. As a result, he had to satisfy Schedule 3 criteria, unless the Minister was satisfied that there were compelling reasons for not applying those criteria. A delegate refused to grant the visa and the Appellant applied to the Tribunal for review of the delegate's decision. The Appellant submitted the sponsor was 20 weeks pregnant and argued that was a compelling reason. Did cl 820.211(2)(d)(ii) expressly or impliedly make it mandatory for the Tribunal to consider the Appellant’s future role as father to the child when born in determining whether there were compelling reasons? If not, did the Appellant, by his submissions, made his future role as a father a mandatory consideration?

Federal Court (Full Court). The Full Court summarised the legal principles concerning s 501CA(4)(b)(ii), which provides as follows: "The Minister may revoke the original decision [to mandatorily cancel a visa under s 501(3A)] if ... the Minister is satisfied ... that there is another reason why the original decision should be revoked".

Federal Court (Full Court). Subsection 501(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) gives the Minister the discretion to cancel a visa if certain pre-conditions are satisfied. If certain facts satisfy those pre-conditions but the Minister decides not to cancel a visa, can the Minister re-exercise the discretion and cancel the visa under that same provision based on the same facts? If certain facts satisfy those pre-conditions and the Minister decides to exercise the discretion under s 501(2) to cancel a visa, but the Tribunal sets aside that decision, can the Minister cancel the visa once again under that same provision based on the same facts that satisfied those pre-conditions?

Federal Court (Full Court). Direction No 53 set out the factors decision-makers should take into account in determining whether a student visa satisfied the Genuine Temporary Entrant (GTE) requirement. Are decision-makers required to consider all of those factors and make findings about them in circumstances where the applicant does not place reliance on any of those factors? Does the same answer apply to the current direction, namely Direction No 69?

Federal Court (Full Court). Under s 5 of the Migration Act, an "excluded fast track review applicant" includes a fast track applicant who "has made a claim for protection in a country other than Australia that was refused by that country". If a protection visa application is refused and the delegate forms the view that the applicant is an excluded fast track review applicant, that refusal is not subject to merits review. Can it be said that "the words 'a claim for protection' used in the relevant category of exclusion mean a claim for protection that was based upon alleged facts that are materially the same as those relied upon as the basis for the claim subsequently made in Australia"?

Federal Court. In DFQ17 and BMY18, Full Court of FCA held that, in order for a notification of visa refusal under s 66(2)(d) to be valid, it had to "clearly state" the deadline for applying for merits review. As a result, the "late" AAT applications in those cases were actually not late. In Ali, a single judge of the FCA distinguished DFQ17, holding that the notification in that case clearly stated the deadline for an AAT application. As the circumstances in Ali (i.e. email notification with deadline of 21 calendar days) reflect the vast majority of notifications sent by the Department, Ali had the practical effect of indicating that the error found in DFQ17 only applied to exceptional cases. Now, another single judge of the FCA held, although in obiter (*), that Ali does not sit comfortably with DFQ17 & BMY18 and that the latter decisions should be followed.

Federal Court. A visa application is only made once the VAC is received. This decision confirms that VACs paid by funds transfer (e.g. BPAY) are "taken not to have been received until the payment is electronically matched to the applicant's Internet application form". As the Court interpreted the relevant legislation (including reg 2.12JA) the same way RMAs have for 16 years, there is no reason to be alarmed by this decision.

Federal Court. Applicant gave AAT copy of an Apprehended Domestic Violence Order (ADVO) granted against the sponsor of his partner visa application. AAT affirmed partner visa refusal. Applicant claimed his lawyer advised him to withdraw judicial review application before FCCA in the last minute. FCA found Applicant disagreed with lawyer's advice but "went along with [it]". FCCA gave consent orders, dismissing judicial review application. Applicant applied to FCA for leave to appeal FCCA's decision. Was Applicant estopped by the doctrines of res judicata or Anshun estoppel from pursuing the appeal? Did the circumstances in which the consent orders were made vitiate that consent? Was the grant of the ADVO in itself proof that Applicant was in a spousal relationship with sponsor and therefore met cl 820.211?

Federal Court (Full Court). This decision summarises the legal tests used by the Federal Court to determine whether: to grant an extension of time within which an appeal is to be filed; to allow a party to raise a new ground of alleged error on the part of an administrative decision-maker that was not agitated before a primary judge.

Federal Court (Full Court). "[C]an a person satisfy the criterion in s 36(2)(aa) if the harm she or he identifies arises because of separation from her or his family members, who – for one reason or another – will not in fact return with that person to her or his country of nationality"? Can the "significant harm" arise from the act of removal from Australia itself? If not, might rendition be an exception? If the Federal Circuit Court (FCCA) "considers any 'doubt' attaches to a decision of [the Federal Court]", is the FCCA bound to follow that decision"? Can the mental harm that would flow from the separation from relatives or self-harm constitute "significant harm"?