Cumulative materiality?
Federal Court. Is the materiality threshold high? Can individual errors which in and of themselves are immaterial nevertheless be cumulatively material?
Was conduct leading to manslaughter conviction violent?
Federal Court. Appellant had pleaded guilty to manslaughter. In personally deciding under s 501CA(4) whether there was "another reason" to revoke the mandatory cancellation of Appellant's visa, Minister found that "further" offending of a violent nature by the Appellant could result in serious physical harm to members of the Australian community. Was Minister's decision legally unreasonable in that, although Appellant's conduct led to a violent outcome (death), the nature of the conduct was not violent, as there was no intent to harm? Is a subclass 444 visa a "limited stay" visa?
Carer visa: changing sponsors & more
Federal Court. The sponsorship form for a carer visa application required sponsor's partner to sign that form, giving her approval to the sponsorship. Both the sponsor and partner signed form 40. Is a sponsorship valid if sponsor does not understand nature of the sponsorship obligations? Does the partner's signature on form 40 itself constitute sponsorship by the partner? Can carer visa applicant change sponsors after visa application is lodged? DHA received a webform from informant about Appellant and provided AAT with webform and non-disclosure certificate issued under s 376. Was certificate invalid in that it was impossible to identify who the informant was and that the only information the informant sought to conceal was his/her identity?
BAL19 overturned
Federal Court (Full Court). Is the power conferred by s 501 to refuse to grant a visa "exercised in the performance of the duty imposed by s 65(1)(b) to refuse to grant the visa for the reason that the grant of the visa is prevented by s 501"? In BAL19, FCA decided that s 501 did not apply to protection visa applications. Was BAL19 wrongly decided? Must the power under s 501A(2) be exercised within a reasonable period of time? If so, was a period of 18 months unreasonable?
Materiality test threshold & more
Federal Court (Full Court). If a court treats the materiality threshold other than being very low, does it run the risk of engaging in impermissible merits review?
Can FCA have “confidence in this particular Minister”?
Federal Court (FCA). On 16 Jun 2020, we summarised a court decision where the Minister had said it would not comply with FCA orders as such orders were made "in error", as the Minister was of the view that FCA had wrongly decided BAL19 and was appealing that decision. In that 16 Jun decision, FCA said "there is no self-evident reason why even a Minister of the Crown should not comply with orders made by this Court and, if found guilty of contempt, liable to the same penalties as any other litigant". On 23 Jun 2020, KDSP overturned BAL19. Could FCA express any "confidence in this particular Minister making any decision “forthwith” ... or within a reasonably short period of time"?
Does OMARA access ImmiAccount records?
OMARA: "The Agent claimed that he had experienced technical difficulties when lodging" a visa application for a complainant through ImmiAccount. To what extent does OMARA have access to ImmiAccount records? For instance, does it have access to records indicating when a draft application was created or saved? Further, can a client who has not paid any fees or signed an agreement make a complaint?
Should covid-19 prompt MARA to give time extension?
According to the OMARA, following a complaint, it sent a notice under s 309 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) to the practitioner, who asked for an extension of time to respond to the notice until the lifting of the covid-19 pandemic restrictions. Were those restrictions sufficient to justify a time extension?
Can Ministers be imprisoned for contempt of court?
Federal Court. On 10 June 2020, Flick J held that BAL19 was not plainly wrong and declared that the Minister's delay in deciding the Applicant's protection visa application was unreasonable. His Honour held on that date that it was unnecessary to issue mandamus ordering the Minister to make a decision within a deadline his Honour expected that the Minister would abide by the declaration and make a decision without delay. However, the Minister wrote to the Applicant as follows after Flick J's decision: "As the Minister has now appealed the judgment of Justice Flick, no decision will be made on your client’s visa application pending the outcome of the appeal. The Minister’s position is that s 501A is an available power in relation to your client’s visa application and that Justice Flick was in error in finding that the delay in making such a decision was unreasonable and that s 501A was not an available power in the circumstances of this matter. Any decision made prior to the resolution of the appeal as to whether BAL19 was wrongly decided would render the appeal moot". Can Ministers of the Crown be imprisoned for contempt of court?
Challenge to refusal to grant travel ban exemption
Federal Court. Delegates refused 2 requests made under s 7 of the Biosecurity (Human Biosecurity Emergency) (Human Coronavirus with Pandemic Potential) (Overseas Travel Ban Emergency Requirements) Determination 2020 (Cth). Section 7 provided that an exemption to the travel ban may be granted to an AU citizen or PR in exceptional circumstances, which are demonstrated by providing a compelling reason for needing to leave Australia. Does s 7(2) exhaust the concept of exceptional circumstances? Does the delegate's use of the language of “critical” reason rather than “compelling” reason indicate error? Do the situations which indicate a need for compassion to be exercised fall within the concept of “exceptional circumstances"? Does s 7 call for a balancing exercise of the reason for travel against the risk it might pose to the AU community? Were the circumstances described in Department of Home Affairs' website a policy? Must content of procedural fairness obligations conform to the circumstances of an emergency situation? Was denial of procedural fairness cured by fact that first refusal put Applicants on notice of factors considered by delegate?