Case Law Updates

High Court: Did availability of alternative avenue of judicial review to FCA preclude application to HCA? Applications to FCCA under s 476(1) must be made within 35 days of migration decision (s 477(1)), unless extension is granted (s 477(2)). Does s 477(1) limit the scope of jurisdiction conferred on FCCA by s 476(1)? Or does it merely limit the exercise of that jurisdiction? Did HCA adopt FCFAC's decision in MZABP? In assessing time extension application, was FCCA's "inference about a self-represented litigant's state of understanding of court procedure ... available to be drawn based solely upon the fact that [Plaintiff] has previously brought proceedings in that court"?

Federal Court (Full Court): In 2012, delegate decided not to exercise the discretion under s 501(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) to refuse the Appellant a bridging visa and notified him of it. In 2013, Appellant was granted a partner visa. In 2016, Appellant was convicted for conduct occurring for 7 years until 2009. In 2018, Minister found that Appellant failed the character test due to the 2016 conviction and personally exercised the discretion to cancel his visa under s 501(2). Did the 2012 decision estop the Minister from making the 2018 decision?

Federal Court (Full Court): If a student visa applicant intends to pursue PR if the opportunity presents itself, decision-makers are allowed to take that intention into consideration in assessing whether the applicant is a Genuine Temporary Entrant (GTE) under cl 500.212. That intention may be expected to normally lead to the conclusion that the applicant is not a GTE. However, such an intention does not necessarily lead to that conclusion. We explain how practitioners can use this decision to argue that a student visa applicant can be a GTE despite also seeking PR. Arguably, the same principle could apply to visitor visa applicants who also seek PR.

Federal Court: In SZSSJ, HCA had found that "officers conducting the ITOAs were specifically instructed to assess the effect of the Data Breach on Australia's non-refoulement obligations [assuming] that an applicant's personal information may have been accessed by authorities in the country in which the applicant feared [being returned to]". Here, DHA informed Second Appellant that it would "assess any implications for [him] personally as part of its normal processes". Unlike in SZSSJ, "there was no evidence in the present case as to what the assessment in accordance with the department’s 'normal processes' came to entail". Can HCA's description of the ITOA process in SZSSJ be used as evidence in other cases?

High Court: Although this case dealt with tax law, it concerned administrative law and could therefore apply to migration matters. The High Court (HCA) observed that "no satisfactory explanation has been offered as to why the plaintiff adopted the course of seeking writs of certiorari and mandamus rather than special leave to appeal against the [judgment of the Full Court of the Federal Court]". Was that in itself a sufficient reason to dismiss the application to the HCA?

One of the complaints against the practitioner came from the Department and was described by the OMARA as follows: "The Former Agent deliberately lodged invalid visa applications to prolong [a client's]  stay [in Australia] and to allow time to meet the visa requirements".

Federal Court: Parties to a court dispute cannot litigate the same issues more than once, although appeals are not considered re-litigation. There are exceptions to the rule against re-litigation: res judicata, issue estoppel and Anshun estoppel, which are "subsumed into the Federal Court’s implied incidental power to prevent abuse of its processes"; abuse of process by re-litigation; untenable claims; and judgement obtained by fraud.

Federal Court: Secretary must give IAA "any other material that ... is considered by the Secretary ... to be relevant to the review": s 473CB(1)(C). On judicial review, should the Secretary's subjective view on whether other material should be given to the IAA be determinative? If so, is that a question of fact? If so, who bears the onus of proving it? Secretary required to give reasons for "decision" on relevance? If not, does that make it difficult to prove that Secretary's "decision" was legally reasonable?

Federal Court: IAA must not consider new info unless: exceptional circumstances exist (s 473DD(a)); and new info could not have been provided to DHA or is credible personal information not previously known (s 473DD(b)). May IAA's satisfaction of s 473DD(b) contribute to its satisfaction of s 473DD(a)? Must it so contribute? If it may, but not necessarily must, so contribute, should it at least usually so contribute? If so, may lack of reference to matters in s 473DD(b) in IAA's reasons lead to an inference that those matters were not considered in determining whether s 473DD(a) was satisfied?

Can we make applications on behalf of a sponsor without confirming we have instructions from a person with authority to bind the sponsor? Can we rely on a colleague's assertion that instructions have been received? Does the absence of professional fees waive the need for written confirmation of agreed services? Should social media interactions be added to client files? Are all employer-sponsored visa applicants prevented from paying nomination fees and charges? Can we provide colleagues or assistants with our ImmiAccount login details?