Federal Court. Can it be said that "it will almost invariably be the case that there will be differences between the accounts given by a visa applicant" and that the Immigration Assessment Authority's jurisdiction to "review" a decision "is not properly discharged by merely identifying differences between some of the accounts given and labelling those differences “inconsistencies”"?
Some of the questions to the Federal Court (FCA) were as follows:
Question 1: Can it be said that "it will almost invariably be the case that there will be differences between the accounts given by a visa applicant" and that the Immigration Assessment Authority's jurisdiction to "review" a decision "is not properly discharged by merely identifying differences between some of the accounts given and labelling those differences “inconsistencies”"?
Question 2: If a respondent to judicial review proceedings does not apparently put the materiality of an error in issue, is the court determining the judicial review application and the judicial review applicant justified in not expressly addressing it?
Question 3: Can it be said that "an emphatic disbelief on one issue can, consciously or subconsciously, affect the consideration of, or weight given to, other evidence of the person who is disbelieved"?
Question 4: Is it "sufficient to conclude for the purposes of materiality that a different decision is unlikely"?
The FCA answered those questions as follows: