Case Law Updates

Federal Court: "On my understanding of the majority approach in SZMTA in those circumstances, read with MZAOL, where there is an admitted non-disclosure of the existence of a s 438 notification, there must be a two-step process undertaken by the supervising court on judicial review to determine “materiality” so as to arrive at a conclusion of jurisdictional error".

Federal Court (Full Court): Under the now "repaired" Medevac provisions, 2 doctors must assess ("either remotely or in person") a transitory person before that person can be brought to Australia for medical treatment. The non-citizen argued that the review of medical records of itself constituted "remote assessment". The Minister unsuccessfully argued before a single judge of the FCA that "remote assessment" must involve a consultation. The Minister appealed the single judge's decision to the Full Court.

Federal Court: AAT made 1st decision, but found out that it was affected by jurisdictional error and made 2nd decision. Both decisions affirmed delegate's decision. Appellant applied for judicial review of 1st decision, arguing that AAT was functus officio after making 1st decision (i.e. lacked power to make 2nd decision). Presumably, Appellant did so in the expectation that it would be easier to establish jurisdictional error in 1st decision. After all, AAT itself had recognised error in it. Is Bhardwaj authority for a "universal proposition that jurisdictional error on the part of a decision-maker will lead to the decision having no consequences whatsoever"? Or will the consequence, if any, depend upon the particular statute? Appellant argued the latter applied and relied on s 430(2A), which provided that AAT has no power to vary or revoke a decision, to argue that the AAT lacked power for 2nd decision.

Federal Court (Full Court): The mandatory cancellation provision, s 501(3A), was inserted into the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) in 2014 and obliges the Minister to cancel a visa if he/she is satisfied that a non-citizen has a substantial criminal record and is serving a full-time sentence of imprisonment. "What happens, then, where the non-citizen is serving a term of imprisonment at the time of the Minister’s decision (after the commencement of the mandatory visa cancellation scheme), but the non-citizen has a “substantial criminal record” only because of a different sentence of imprisonment that was served exclusively before the commencement of that scheme? Is the non-citizen’s visa liable to mandatory cancellation in these circumstances?"

Federal Court: DHA refused visa under s 501(1). AAT remitted matter for reconsideration with a direction that the discretion under s 501(1) be exercised in the applicant’s favour. Minister personally set aside AAT's decision under s 501A(2) in the national interest. Minister's exercise of discretion relied in part on erroneous finding that Applicant entered AU on a false identity. In Lu, the risk of harm posed by an affected person to AU community based on the correct criminal record was a mandatory relevant consideration in the exercise of the discretion under s 501A(2). In Gbojueh, risk of harm was mandatory also in the context of determining the national interest. Should Lu be interpreted as only applying to erroneous findings in relation to a non-citizen's criminal record and thus be distinguished? Did Minister's satisfaction about the national interest involve a jurisdictional fact?

Federal Court: In considering whether to revoke a visa cancellation under s 501CA(4), is evidence required to support a decision-maker's conclusion that the non-citizen in question will have access to public health system and social welfare if returned to New Zealand? Has the Tribunal misinterpreted cl 14.2(1)(a)(i) of Direction No 65? Were the "other considerations" in the Direction mandatory considerations?

According to OMARA: it received 6 complaints against RMA, some of which alleged she failed to pass on tuition fees received from clients to schools; RMA claimed her employee, whom she sponsored on a 457 visa and was an Education Agent (EA), fraudulently received client payments to EA's personal bank account. Questions to OMARA: did RMA coerce EA; did RMA use her position as an employer / sponsor in a manner unbecoming of an RMA; did RMA fail to properly supervise EA? Further, OMARA used IP addresses to determine whether EA had lodged visa applications on RMA's behalf.

Federal Court: Before appeal proceedings at FCA finalised, Callinan AC prepared a Report on the AAT, which included the following passage: "[the MRD Legal Services Section of the AAT has] prepared from time to time “templates” of determinations. I am told that at one stage, this section either volunteered to, or otherwise sought, and did in fact, “check” decisions by Members, on occasions requesting, if not almost insisting, upon changes beyond proofing changes". Appellants sought leave to issue a subpoena to MRD Legal Services Section to produce all documents exchanged with Member which could constitute legal advice. In support of leave application, Appellants' solicitor claimed Member's Linkedin profile revealed Member was legally qualified but "did not have a background in legal practice", thus supporting inference Member received legal advice. If Member received legal advice, did that vitiate AAT's decision?

Federal Court: Cl 8(4) of Direction 65 provided: "Primary considerations should generally be given greater weight than the other considerations". AAT quoted that clause but eventually noted "the requirement that primary considerations should be given greater weight than the other considerations". Did AAT misinterpret cl 8(4)? Did AAT misinterpret cl 14.2(1)(a) by saying it was required to place less weight on how long the Applicant had resided in Australia "because of the limited positive contribution to the Australian community"? If so, was that error material? Is materiality a binary or balancing test? Despite Applicant's clearly articulated claim regarding the impact non-revocation would have on his family, pursuant to cl 14.2(1)(b), AAT made no finding in that regard. Should FCA infer from AAT's recitation of 14.2(1)(b) that it considered that claim? Did AAT misinterpret DHA's warning letter to Applicant?

Federal Court: Certiorari lies for errors of law on the face of the record (ELFR), whether or not those errors are jurisdictional (Kirk). However, under s 474, certiorari does not lie for ELFR for privative clause decisions (PVC). As a result, certiorari lies for PVC only if the error is jurisdictional, despite the fact that reasons of admin decision-makers comprise the record. FCCA orders comprise the record (DMI16), although its reasons do not (Craig). Appeals to FCA of FCCA decisions to dismiss applications for time extension are precluded by s 476A(3). Thus, FCA can only set aside those decisions under s 39B of Judiciary Act 1903 and if FCCA made a jurisdictional error or if there are ELFR in FCCA decisions. Does the materiality test apply to ELFR in FCCA decisions? If FCCA's reasons state the orders to be made, does record incorporate those reasons? Do the "alleged jurisdictional errors of the Tribunal become jurisdictional errors of the" FCCA?