Case Law Updates

High Court. Can it be said that, "while [the respondent] may have been motivated to bring the current proceedings out of loyalty to [another person] or to avoid a possible forensic disadvantage to [that person], that does not mean that the proceedings were brought for an improper purpose"?

High Court. Can it be said that "the differences in the text, context and purpose of s 36(2)(a) and s 36(2)(aa) and, thus, in the construction and application of the separate criteria in s 36(2)(a) and s 36(2)(aa) compel the conclusion that the principle in Appellant S395 in relation to s 36(2)(a) (whether as that provision was framed at the time of the decision or as now in force) does not apply to the statutory task when considering the complementary protection criterion in s 36(2)(aa)? Are the circumstances constituting "significant harm" exhaustively identified in s 36(2A)?

Federal Court. IAA affirmed DHA's decision and FCCA dismissed judicial review application. Appellant appealed to FCA, which heard appeal and reserved judgement on 30 May 2019. On 21 Dec 2020, Minister filed affidavit affirming that Appellant departed Australia on 13 Aug 2019, was still offshore and that his BVE ceased to be in effect. Appellant held no visa to re-enter Australia. Did Appellant abandon the appeal by leaving Australia?

Federal Court. Does the "gravity of the obligation upon the [IAA] to make a determination about whether Australia’s protection obligations w[ere] engaged" inform the determination of whether the IAA's power under s 473DD was exercised legally reasonably? Was it "open to the [IAA] to have regard to the inherent implausibility of the new information when considered in light of other information already before it for the purpose of determining whether it constitutes “credible personal information”within the meaning of s 473DD(b)(ii)"?

Federal Court (Full Court). DHA sent visa cancellation notice on 20 Sep 2018 via email, while Respondent was in prison. Notice was handed to him on 21 Sep 2018, but stated it was delivered by email. Was such defect immaterial, as AAT calculated timeframe by reference to the latter date? Was notice defective by not specifying decision was reviewable under Part 5? Can AAT application be lodged before notice is sent? If notice is defective, does it mean there is no deadline for AAT application? Must AAT consider application without application fee?

Federal Court. Did s 501A(2)(e) require the Minister to consider that there may be consequences for the national interest of breaching Australia's international non-refoulement obligations? Did the power conferred on the Minister by s 501A(2) impose an obligation on the Minister to consider the practical consequences for the Applicant of being returned to the country where he faced persecution?

Federal Court. DHA cancelled visa under s 109. AAT relied on 37 documents given by a 3rd-party as evidence that Appellants were not stateless. Appellants unsuccessfully tried to obtain a copy of those documents through FOI, to the AAT's knowledge, and submitted to AAT they were not authentic and were given to exact revenge. Was AAT required under s 424A to provide Appellants with those documents or copies of them? Did AAT fail to provide a meaningful hearing under s 425?

Federal Court. If a 'transitory person' who needs to be in Australia for a temporary purpose makes a written request to be removed from Australia, do they need to be removed? If so, can that person be removed to a place contrary to their wishes? Is the subjective opinion of an officer which determines the application of s 198AH(1A)(c)? Pending removal under s 198(1) or (1A), is a non-citizen to be detained?

Federal Court. Do the submissions to the IAA alter its obligation to consider the review material, including the claims that were dealt with by the delegate? In determining whether a claim not expressly made to the IAA nevertheless clearly emerged from the materials before it, is it significant that the delegate considered the claim? Was it necessary for the Appellant to expressly repeat to the IAA the claim made to the delegate, in circumstances where there was no evidence that he had abandoned it?

Federal Court. In Ibrahim, the FCAFC held that, although s 501BA(3) removed the obligation to provide natural justice, it did not prohibit it being provided. Unlike Ibrahim, the Minister here was aware he had the option of providing natural justice, but chose not to. Was that "choice" given to the Minister on the condition that it be exercised legally reasonably? Was the Minister required under s 501BA to consider the submissions made and evidence given by the Applicant to the Tribunal?